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Abstract 
This study delves into the post-Arab Spring period when political Islam was at the forefront of 
the drive for democratisation in the MENA region. The theories of political Islam and liberal 
democracy are used as the theoretical framework for the study. A qualitative approach was 
undertaken with a focused textual analysis of a variety of academic papers and opinion pieces 
on the theory of political Islam in order to discuss the compatibility of political Islam and 
democracy. The study makes use of Tunisia and the Ennahdha Movement as a case study to 
assess the practical application of political Islam. The research is limited to the 2011-2015 
period in Tunisia in order to specifically make use of the electoral periods to determine the 
political Islam credentials of the Ennahdha Movement. What the study has determined is that 
there is sufficient evidence of the symbiotic relationship between political Islam and liberal 
democracy, making political Islam a viable approach for political movements in Muslim 
majority countries. 
This study contributes to the literature on political Islam as well as analysis of the post-Arab 
Spring developments in Tunisia. It provides a more in-depth focus on what makes Ennahdha a 
political Islam movement and uncovers its liberal democratic character. 
Keywords:   Political Islam, liberal democracy, Ennahdha Movement, Tunisia, Arab Spring, 
elections, Rached Ghannouchi
  
 
 
 
1 
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
1.1  General Introduction 
Political Islam, broadly defined by (Fuller, 2002, p. 48) as, "the belief that the Koran and the 
Hadith have something important to say about the way society and governance are organised", 
emerged as the viable political path following years of authoritarianism in the countries of the 
Arab Spring in 2011. As a political theory, political Islam developed over several centuries 
through the political experiences of Islamist leaders starting with the Prophet Muhammed and 
his successors. According to Campbell (2008, p. 436) the Prophet Muhammed did not view 
politics as a part of the divine, but rather as a human creation built through deliberation and 
utility. As Islam developed its worldview of politics, majority Muslim states from North Africa 
to Asia experienced their own challenges with finding approaches to political governance that 
were in sync with or complimentary to their beliefs. Countries such as Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Senegal, the United Arab Emirates (U.A.E) and Morocco have adopted varying roles of 
religion in their socio-political make-up and have proven stable and economically successful. 
In North Africa especially, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya and Egypt, followed the route of autocratic 
secular leadership which dominated the independence years of the 1950s until the advent of 
the Arab Spring. Despite being home to majority Muslim populations these countries were not 
able to reconcile religion and politics, resulting in conflict between government and Islamist 
movements.  
With the increasingly Islamist tendencies (Taspinar, 2015) of Turkey's ruling Justice and 
Development Party (AKP) as inspiration and Qatar as funder (Bryant, 2014), Islamist parties 
rose to prominence in North Africa between 2011 and 2013 following the Arab spring. These 
movements took advantage of their superior organisation and grass-roots reach developed 
within the context of their religious based outreach (Disler, 2013) and strong sense of 
community and social work to initially rise to power in constituent assembly elections in 
Tunisia (2011), Egypt (2012) and Libya (2014)1. The fractured non-Islamist, and mostly 
                                               
 
1 While many differences do exist between the experiences of Islamist political movements in 
the three countries, the number of similarities is overwhelming. At the core lies the common 
relationship with the MB and its international movement which has united proponents of 
political Islam from the three countries.  
  
 
 
 
2 
secular, oppositions were in most instances unable to organise themselves in the initial period 
after the 2010 and 2011 uprisings in North Africa. In Egypt alone, 36 new political parties 
emerged, of which a third were Islamist and a further third were secular. These secular parties 
were mostly centre-left parties such as the Social Democratic Party and the Equality & 
Development Party. In total 41 parties took part in the elections (Teti, 2011). In Tunisia 81 
parties and numerous independent candidates took part in the elections in October 2011. Parties 
such as Afek Tounes, The Free Patriotic Union (UPL), Al-Moubedra and the Tunisian Pirate 
party emerged as new secular parties. Due to years of effective single party statehood both in 
Tunisia and Egypt political prowess and true party politics were eroded (Schäfer, 2014). 
Political participation and activism were not popular during the years leading up to 2011 as 
critical voices were either imprisoned, tortured or even murdered. Opposition movements 
chose the safety of exile to raise awareness and strengthen their base in the hope that with 
international backing they would be able to participate in free and fair elections. With the ruling 
parties being disbanded or made illegal both countries experienced the emergence of opposition 
parties consisting of members of the former ruling parties resulting in the parties being viewed 
as too close ideologically to the freshly deposed rulers and therefore less attractive to the 
electorate. 
The Islamist movement in Tunisia predated the independence from France, however as French 
culture and political bureaucracy became entrenched into the political DNA of Tunisia, its 
politicians drifted further away from Islam and even sought to undermine and suppress the 
Islamists. Islam remained the main religion in Tunisia, but its political role was made redundant 
by the post-independence political leadership. Instead Islamists focussed on socio-economic 
efforts, especially with the increasingly marginalised population groups who did not benefit 
from a growing culture of corruption and nepotism (Esposito et al., 2016, p. 181). During the 
late 1990s and early 2000s the Ennahdha Movement emerged as a consolidated home of 
Islamists in Tunisia. Despite government pressures, the Ennahdha Movement started to show 
signs of growth and became more and more politically motivated as it tried to stand up to the 
deterioration of rights experienced by its supporter base. With a politically astute and active 
leadership developing support in exile, Ennahdha was becoming an unofficial opposition in 
Tunisian politics although doing so from exile. As public discontent grew in Tunisia in late 
2010 and resulted in the President fleeing the country, Ennahdha’s leadership was allowed to 
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return to the country and formally take up political activities, eventually winning most of the 
support in the 2011 elections and forming the country’s first Islamist government. 
However, the defeat of Islamist parties aligned to the Egypt based Muslim Brotherhood and 
Salafist movements in the Libyan elections of 2014, and a military coup in July 2013 that 
deposed the Muslim Brotherhood's Freedom and Justice party in Egypt, threatened to end the 
popularity of governance by political Islam, only two years after its rise to prominence 
following the Arab Spring. According to the populations and secular politicians in these 
countries, Islamist parties rising to power (Jamaoui, 2014) were a causal factor for the increase 
in terrorism and extremism experienced in the region which had an impact on the decline in 
popularity of Islamist parties. However, the aforementioned causal linkage is difficult to prove 
given that there were several other causal factors which led to an increase in terrorism and 
extremism in the second decade of the 21st century. Amongst these rising youth unemployment, 
increased Islamophobia, radicalisation through social media and the emergence of radical 
Islamist groups who previously enjoyed the support of Western nations in regional conflicts 
were likely more influential.  
The initial lack of organisation, resources and political base exhibited by secular parties in 2011 
and 2012 was replaced by an improvement in the organisation of secular political movements 
such as Nidaa Tounes in Tunisia and the parties making up the House of Representatives (HoR) 
in Libya. These parties often have links to the deposed regimes and with strong desires to 
separate politics and the State from religion. In Tunisia and Egypt secular political movements, 
with the support of youths organised through social media, were behind the uprisings which 
sparked the Arab Spring, Islamist parties and forces only entered the political arena after the 
uprisings as many of the leadership of Islamist parties were imprisoned or exiled.  As secular 
parties became more organised, and better funded they were able to appeal to a larger political 
base which preferred to leave religion out of politics. Islamists could no longer simply rely on 
a moral approach to politics and principled positions related to their faith, they had to appeal 
to the wider audience in order to retain their support levels and as such were forced to 
reconsider some of their more conservative positions. In the case of Tunisia, the Islamist 
Ennahdha Movement, which was thrust into power following elections in 2011, was left with 
no option but to voluntarily cede power to a technocratic government in the face of weeks of 
popular protests. The latter outcome came about as the result of a negotiated roadmap proposed 
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by a powerful "Quartet" comprising the Tunisian Lawyers Guild, the Union Générale 
Tunisienne du Travail (UGTT) Trade Union, the Union Tunisienne de l’Industrie, du 
Commerce et de l’Artisanat (UTICA) union of business leaders and the Tunisian League for 
the Defence of Human Rights (Schäfer, 2014). Ultimately, Ennahdha was relegated to second 
position in parliamentary and presidential elections in 20142.  
1.2 Background to the research 
Tunisia gained its independence from France in 1956. Its first President, Habib Bourguiba, was 
viewed by the Tunisian people as an enlightened man who sought to take Tunisia out of the 
bonds of colonialism and into the world as a respected member of the community of nations. 
Bourguiba “abolished polygamy, legalised abortion, allowed women to contract their own 
marriages, sue for divorce, and marry non-Muslims, a liberation of women that today remains 
unmatched in the Arab world” ("Habib Bourguiba", 2000). These decisions and rights led to 
the formation of a modern secular state which was the trademark of Tunisia under Bourguiba. 
While remaining a Muslim state, Tunisia showed very little of the characteristics of Islamism 
in daily life. The changes were quite remarkable and included attempts to liberalise fasting 
during Ramadan ("Habib Bourguiba", 2000).  
President Bourguiba was the first Tunisian leader to challenge traditional Islamist views in the 
late 1950s and in 1960 when he proposed breaking the fast in order to fulfil the development 
project (McCarthy, 2014). This challenge eventually led to a crackdown by the government 
and security forces on Islamists and Islamist movements by 1981 (McCarthy, 2014). This trend 
was continued by his successor, Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali (1987-2010), who carried out a 
medical Palace Coup3 in 1987 to oust Bourguiba. Ben Ali never attempted to align himself 
with the Islamist movements in Tunisia. Instead he continued the oppression of Islamist 
                                               
 
2 Legislative elections 26 October 2014. Nida Tounes: 1,279,941 votes, 37.56%, 86 seats; 
Ennahda Movement: 947,014 votes,  27.79%, 69 seats (loss of 20 seats); Free Patriotic 
Union: 140,873 votes, 4.13%, 16 seats; Popular Front: 124,046  votes, 3.64%, 15 seats. 
(Source: http://www.isie.tn/documents/Décision-Instance-supérieure-indépendante-pour-les-
élections-relatives-proclamation-des-résultats-définitifs.pdf) 
3 On 7 November 1987, a panel of medical doctors provided Ben Ali with a medical report 
declaring Bourguiba incompetent. Ben Ali enacted Article 57 of the Constitution and removed 
Bourguiba from office. Bourguiba had been declared President for life by the Tunisian 
Assembly in 1975.  
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movements through arrests, trials and exile (Koplow, 2011). The success of consecutive 
regimes in undermining the Islamist movement, both in terms of religious practice and political 
activity, became evident in the almost total absence of the Islamists in the protests that rocked 
Tunisia in 2010 and 2011. Islamist movements were unable to organise themselves effectively 
and therefore could not meaningfully participate in the “Jasmine Revolution” (AFP, 2011) of 
Tunisia.  
Under the rule of Ben Ali, a system of patronage and corruption evolved and became 
entrenched in all levels of the Tunisian state (Churchill, Nucifora, & Rijkers, 2014). Bribery, 
extortion and corruption became common place and led to many Tunisian families and 
politicians to become very wealthy, thanks to their proximity and pliability towards President 
Ben Ali and his family (Freund, Nucifora, & Rijkers, 2014). Tunisia was viewed as a 
democracy in the sense that elections were held regularly, and some political opposition was 
tolerated (Sadiki, 2002). In addition, the Ben Ali regime’s ability to maintain stability and 
suppress radical elements was viewed favourably by the West. Tunisia was even one of the 
first country’s to be on track to meet several of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) 
(ECA, 2012). Political events in 2010 however uncovered an elaborate propaganda façade 
which covered many underlying issues of underdevelopment and unemployment which the 
outside world was oblivious to (Cavatorta & Haugbølle, 2012).  
Events in Tunisia are widely credited as the spark which ignited what has been coined by the 
western media as the Arab Spring (Alhassen, 2012) in much of the Middle East and North 
Africa (MENA) region. The Jasmine Revolution referred specifically to the uprisings in 
Tunisia and was the name given to the uprising by Tunisians4. The self-immolation of 
Mohamed Bouazizi, a fruit vendor in the central Tunisian town of Sidi Bouzid in December 
2010 was the tipping point which spread the growing unrest of under-developed central Tunisia 
to the rest of the country. Self-immolation was becoming a more frequent form of suicide in 
                                               
 
4 The Tunisian blogger Zied El Hani is a renowned journalist in Tunisia and was also the 
President of the Tunisian Journalists Union and a Presidential Candidate in 2014. His reference 
to the Jasmine Revolution was picked up by Western Media as well as the activists on Facebook 
who were organising the protests in Tunisia. As an activist prior to the fall of Ben Ali he was 
a dissenting voice in the Tunisian media against the crackdown on media freedoms in the 
country. 
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the region and amongst a mostly Islamist population whose religion did not condone suicide 
or self-desecration (Kimball, 2011). However, desperation gave way to extreme measures and 
despite these acts of self-immolation not being politically motivated, they became a focal point 
around which opposition groups saw an opportunity for political gain (Kimball, 2011). The 
police state fortified under the Ben Ali regime was the ‘stick’ used to ensure that the volatile 
sectors of the Tunisian populace who were not privy to advantages of proximity and corruption, 
was not able to rise against Ben Ali (Lutterbeck, 2015). With Mohamed Bouazizi’s public act 
of desperation, the oppressed population defied their oppressors and took to the streets at great 
personal danger to take a stand. The protests which followed in Tunisia led to not only the 
downfall of the Ben Ali regime, but also inspired similar protest movements across the MENA 
region with varying degrees of success.  The desire by the Tunisian people for a true democracy 
was captured in the slogans of the revolution. 
Secularism and nationalism had become so enshrined in the Tunisian psyche that the slogans 
of the revolution had nothing to do with religion, but rather focussed on the principles of 
freedom, dignity and human rights. Similar slogans appeared in Egypt, both examples pointing 
to the successful oppression of Islamists by the secular regimes in the two countries. These 
slogans called for “karama, tharwa and haqooq (dignity, revolution and rights)” (Alhassen, 
2012) and became popular in the graffiti which became an accepted art form in the MENA 
region during this time.  
Despite this entrenched secularism, years of dictatorial rule left a strong sense of suspicion 
against anyone with links to the former regimes. Into this environment stepped the Islamist 
movements of Ennahdha and the Muslim Brotherhood in Tunisia and Egypt respectively, both 
parties were opportunistic in their decision to enter into the political race. In Tunisia, the youths 
that took to the streets disappeared, mostly behind their computers and social media, leaving a 
vacuum which needed to be filled if the gains of the revolution were to be consolidated. 
Ennahdha’s exiled leader, Rached Ghannouchi, returned to Tunisia and immediately started 
laying the groundwork for Ennahdha’s rise to power. This emergence of a new political force 
was not well received by the established political elite who had survived the post Ben Ali 
political purge and saw a push-back from secular parties with strong ties to the former regime 
(Jamaoui, 2014). On the ground in Tunisia many of the middle class were yearning for a return 
to the way things were before the revolution, however without a dictator at the helm. 
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The deficiency of trust in the Islamist Ennahdha Movement and its ability to effectively govern 
a democratic Tunisia without the imposition of strict Islamic laws emerged as a central debate 
within Tunisia and garnered the interest of the international community. This gave rise to the 
primary objective and research question of the study, whether Political Islam and democracy 
are compatible? 
1.3  Problem Statement 
After decades of dictatorship Tunisia, Egypt and Libya needed to find a new political way as 
demanded by protestors. The initial problem in Tunisia was what political approach would be 
acceptable to the people. Through analysis of the protests and the demands of the protestors it 
has been shown that the demands of the protestors aligned with democratic principles and it 
was assumed therefore that a democracy was to be pursued. Western democracies such as the 
United States of America (USA), France and the United Kingdom (UK) raced to provide 
support by seeking to entrench democratic principles in Tunisia as a country and in its new 
crop of politicians. However, in doing so Western nations failed to anticipate the popularity of 
Islamism and by extension Political Islam amongst the Tunisian electorate. Political Islam was 
immediately viewed sceptically due to its relationship with conservative application of Islam 
in the Middle East as well as its links to extremism in Afghanistan, Nigeria and Iraq. As such 
its potential as a new form of democracy was ignored and not thoroughly researched. What this 
study proposes to do is to analyse both Political Islam and democracy, assess their compatibility 
and by using the case study of Tunisia answer the question whether Political Islam is a viable 
option for democratic governance in majority Muslim countries seeking to reconcile the desires 
for democracy with the moral and ethical tenets of the Islam religion.  
1.4  Objectives           
The objectives of the research will be;  
1. To discuss the compatibility of the theories of Political Islam and democracy 
2. To historicise the evolution of Ennahdha from a social movement into a political party 
practising Political Islam. 
3. To evaluate Ennahdha’s campaigning and performance during the 2011 elections, 
critically evaluating the objectives, statements and policies of the Ennahdha movement.  
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4. To trace the changes to Ennahdha’s approach during the 2013 to 2014 electoral period 
and identify the factors which influenced Ennahdha’s approach to the electoral period, 
including venturing into coalition politics.  
   
1.5  Key Concepts 
1.5.1 Political Islam 
The concept of organising people and laws, and how leaders should approach this has always 
formed part of Islamic rule, particularly during the Ottoman Empire as Muslim leaders were 
faced with governing over non-believers as well as believers. As a result of the changing nature 
of world politics during this period as well as the emergence of westernised approaches to 
government and ultimately politics which started to influence Islamic leaders of the time, this 
period allowed for the most development in the theory of political Islam. Political Islam 
developed as a political theory based upon the principles of Islam. Mandaville (2010) provides 
what many scholars of political Islam view as the most comprehensive overview of the 
historical roots of political Islam and its development through religious political and legal 
debate amongst the Muslim communities of the world over several centuries, starting with the 
Prophet Muhammed. In tracing the historical development of political Islam, he also shed light 
on the role of globalisation in influencing the Shia and Sunni branches of Islam as Western 
political practice met traditional Islamic governance. Those that analyse political Islam from a 
Marxist perspective, such as (Meyer, 2002, para.1) argue that it can be defined as “a developing 
world ideology of mobilisation and legitimacy”. In the case of Ennahdha, a more moderate 
Islamic school of thought is pursued, where an emphasis is placed on governance through 
application of the broad principles of Islam rather than a strict interpretation of the Koran and 
Hadith and adoption of Sharia.  
1.5.2 Democracy (or non-authoritarian governance) and its application in Tunisia 
The theory of democracy and its generally accepted definition are critical in establishing the 
baseline against which to measure the application of political Islam in the case of Ennahdha. 
Liberal democracy has been the standard against which democracy in practice has been judged, 
especially by the West. The following 14 tenets of liberal democracy (Konrad-Adenauer-
Stiftung, 2011) are widely accepted, citizen participation; equality; political tolerance; 
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accountability; transparency; regular free and fair elections; economic freedom; control over 
the abuse of power; bill of rights; acceptance of the outcome of elections; Human Rights; multi-
party system; neutrality of state institutions; rule of law. 
Several authors are pointing out that the assumptions upon which democracy itself is based no 
longer hold as firm (Triffit, 2014; Chellaney, 2016; Freeland, 2012). The globalised world takes 
liberal democracy outside of its comfortable assumptions of elections and elected 
representatives dictating the course of action of States (Bellini, 2014). In fact, the tools of social 
media and public opinion precipitated the outcomes of the Arab Spring. The concept of people 
driven democracy has taken on a new avenue through the often-anonymous medium of social 
media. Attempts to steer post-conflict situations towards the adoption of liberal democratic 
values and approaches have had mixed results and bring to question whether liberal democracy 
is a suitable fit for post conflict States or even the Arab world. 
Democracy in the Tunisian context needs to be understood to explain the approach to political 
Islam followed by Ennahdha. Post-Revolutionary Tunisia has a rich history of consensus-based 
governance coupled with a strong desire for multi-party elections and a decentralisation of 
power. The hybrid parliamentary and presidential system was adopted in the belief that it would 
prevent a return to the "presidency for life" tendencies shown by Bourguiba and Ben Ali since 
1956. Joffé (2011:512) points to the argument made by Daniel Brumberg that regimes such as 
that of Ben Ali had adopted and “illiberal democracy” leading to liberalised autocracies. The 
premise being that certain freedoms and rights were conferred upon the citizens, however never 
in sufficient quantities to threaten the autocratic hold of the regime. With the citizen revolt 
displayed in 2010 and 2011 this illusion of a liberal democracy in Tunisia crumbled. Joffé 
(2011:518) highlighting the constitutional tradition in Tunisia since the fight against French 
colonialism, offers the perspective that despite repression from the Ben Ali regime, 
independent movements remained active and were able to resurrect the democratic ideals 
which were initially espoused by both Bourguiba and Ben Ali when they first came to power, 
and which the Tunisian population managed to uphold. The constituent assembly, interim 
technocratic government and the constitution were all adopted based on consensus and broad-
based political dialogue (Chayes, 2014). Ennahdha’s behaviour within the democratic 
transition period is critiqued by Theodorakis (2013), with specific reference to transgressions 
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of freedoms widely associated with democracy, namely freedom of expression, the press and 
women. 
1.6 Study Rationale 
Domestic and international opposition to Islamist parties rising to power in North African states 
requires further study to better understand why in Muslim majority countries political Islam is 
viewed as an opposition to democracy. The use of Tunisia as a case study will provide an 
opportunity to unpack the performance of an Islamist movement through two election cycles 
using the elections results as the data set. The study of the practical application of political 
Islam can only be done if there is an understanding of the theoretical principles of both political 
Islam and democracy. The study will therefore examine the Ennahdha Movement’s adherence 
to political Islam and the principles of democracy.  
Mr Rached Ghannouchi, the leader of the Ennahdha Movement, is widely viewed as one of the 
main defenders of political Islam. The links between his Ennahdha Movement and the Egypt 
based Muslim Brotherhood are strong. The Muslim Brotherhood is considered as the spiritual 
home of political Islam, therefore its influence on the brand of political Islam exercised by 
Ennahdha and its leader is uncontested and will be analysed in the theoretical understanding of 
political Islam. While Turkey is well studied, researched, and often cited as an example for 
political Islam, especially when looking at its gradual Islamisation over the past decade, the 
ruling party under its leader Erdogan, has always shied away from being labelled as a party 
following the principles of political Islam. In addition to the practical study of Tunisia’s 
Ennahdha Movement, the Turkish AKP will be used to provide additional context to the 
theoretical understanding of the principles of political Islam. In the case of Turkey, the initial 
drive to maintain secularism and remove elements of Islamic teaching in schooling went 
against these principles. It is my opinion that Turkey and its ruling party do not provide as pure 
an example of political Islam as Ennahdha in Tunisia. Nevertheless, Turkey warrants some 
discussion around its brand of political Islam. Finally, my proximity and experience of events 
in Tunisia during the study period and to the Ennahdha Movement have given me greater 
insight into the Tunisian case than that of other countries. This will allow me to enrich the field 
of study in this regard and on this topic. 
1.7 Literature review 
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Political Islam 
Political Islam as a political science theory has been developing for centuries. March (2015, 
p.17) correctly points to the fact that an organised political Islam is largely attributed to the 
Muslim Brotherhood movement founded by Hasan al-Banna in Egypt, however since the 1970s 
it has gained a more prominent place within scholarly research, policy discussions and the 
media (Crowder, Griffiths, & Hasan, 2014, p. 120). Political Islam could be considered 
appropriate for the Arab world given the cultural links it has with the region and the ease with 
which it appeals to the masses rather than making use of hard approaches such as police 
oppression (Meyer, 2002). This focus on the cultural appropriateness of political Islam is 
problematic as it dismisses the potential for political Islam to exist out of a necessity to merge 
Islamic principles and values with those of democracy, instead the literature assumes that as a 
result of their belonging to the Muslim faith, majority Muslim countries automatically adopt a 
form of political Islam. This assumption does not account for the differences within the religion 
itself, just as there exist differences within the Christian faith, as well as the possibility that 
many Muslims would prefer to leave politics out of their religion or vice versa.  What Crowder 
et. Al, March and Meyer have in common is the view that political Islam is not a new concept 
and that its development can be traced back to the days of the Caliphates. In providing balanced 
views on the fact that political Islam cannot be judged by the extremist approach of groups 
such as the Taliban or Boko Haram, they instead look at the religiously motivated governance 
practiced in Iran, Saudi Arabia and more recently Turkey. What they fail to do is recognise the 
role and presence of political Islam in North Africa even prior to the Arab Spring. 
Much of the current literature on political Islam outlines the linkages between the emergence 
of political Islam in response to the imposition of Western values and secularism. (Meyer, 
2002) (March, 2015) (Crowder, Griffiths, & Hasan, 2014). This literature is however based in 
the pre-Arab Spring era and mostly does not provide a solid argument based upon the practical 
implementation of political Islam in government. It is perhaps for this reason that the USA and 
the European Union, with the UK in particular, have been supportive of engagement with 
Islamist groups. While seeking to avoid radicalisation and extremism (Wolff, 2015) by directly 
consulting Islamist groups, these Western powers were also not sure what to make of the rise 
in Islamist support. What emerges is that there is a certain expectation by the West that Islamist 
parties should conform to a specific democratic approach regardless of their country context. 
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This approach however has not met expectations of those who have tried to “understand 
political Islam through a Western socioeconomic lens” (Meyer, 2002). The aforementioned 
was even more relevant post the Arab Spring as Islamist movements came to power. 
A common thread that emerges from recent research on Islamism and political Islam is the use 
of Huntington’s “clash of civilisations” theory to focus on an inherent clash between 
democracy and Islam. This reliance on Huntington and a 20th century construct does not take 
into account the rapid progression and development of existing political theory and the 
significant geopolitical developments of the early 21st century. Esposito is a proponent of the 
view that Islam and democracy are in fact compatible. In his 1996 book co-authored with John 
Voll, they examine and refute the western notion of incompatibility with a focus on 
Huntington’s “clash of civilisations” theory. Equally referenced is Huntington’s “waves of 
democratisation” and his assertion that this was not applicable to Arab countries (Esposito, 
Sonn, & Voll, 2016).  
Until the Arab Spring, only a small number of practical examples of political Islam actively 
being applied outside of the Middle East could be cited, such as Pakistan and Indonesia, where 
political Islam was reflective of the State and its power. In Esposito et al. (2016) the authors 
examine amongst others Turkey, Iran, Tunisia and Egypt. What they conclude in all cases is 
that there is an inherent democratic deficit in these countries, but not for the failure of Islamist 
parties to overcome these deficits. Bridging the divide between Europe and Asia, Turkey is 
often grouped as part of the Middle East, especially due to its Ottoman history and Islamic 
history. However, Turkey has also until more recent times been very keen to join the European 
Union. Due to the secular constitution develop under Kamal Atatürk, the governing AKP in 
Turkey is often cited as an example of political Islam, despite its own rejections of such labels 
(Taspinar, 2015) (Crowder, Griffiths, & Hasan, 2014, p. 123).  Political developments in 
Turkey since 2012 have however raised questions about more hegemonic tendencies from the 
AKP (March, 2015) and the emergence of a disconnect between democracy and political Islam. 
With a clear public mandate for the pursuit of democracy, and the presence of significant 
support for Islamist political movements the example of Tunisia provides a more relevant study 
when seeking to find out whether liberal democracy and political Islam can coexist.  
In a region dominated by dictators, the Arab Spring unleashed political pluralism upon 
expectant populations (Gumuscu & Fuat Keyman, 2014). Out of this pluralism, unsurprisingly 
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Islamist parties were the first to take the lead on the back of decades of social investment in 
Arab countries under authoritarian rule (Bokhari & Senzai, 2013) and the popularity and name 
recognition which accompanied their social interaction. While Islamists rose to power across 
North Africa in 2011 and 2012 on the back of mass protests, there is a tendency within the 
research to imply that Islamist movements were behind the initial protests, however the 
evidence has emerged that the protests were coordinated through social media platforms 
(Ramadan, 2012) and led by non-political movements.  While not being an instigating force in 
the Arab Spring the importance of lobbying in exile is understated and required further 
exploration through a case study which could provide insight into Islamist movements and their 
linkages to politics. The degree of political work which accompanied the social interactions of 
Islamists meant that Islamist parties were able to capitalise on the political plurality which 
emerged. 
There remains a certain degree of disconnect between democracy and political Islam in the 
literature, in particular in the first years after the Arab Spring, which requires research into the 
potential compatibility between the two theories. In a global context, there is a trend within the 
literature that the West will remain suspicious and confrontational towards political Islam, and 
that as a result of a desire for democracy from the people that political Islam will have to make 
too many concessions to survive. This study will seek to test whether in fact political Islam is 
under threat as a theory using the Ennahdha Movement in Tunisia as a case study. 
Islamisation of Tunisia 
The literature on Islamism in Tunisia, and in particular the main Islamist movement of 
Ennahdha, has focussed mainly on the historicising of the Islamic movements of Tunisia and 
their activities during the Bourguiba and Ben Ali regimes. The first main study was conducted 
by Waltz in the middle 1980s and sufficiently explores the difficulties faced by the Islamist 
movements in Tunisia during the Bourguiba era. The main critique of Waltz’s work lies in her 
often-confusing reference to radical Islamism amongst the leadership of the then Islamist 
movements while also praising the commitment to democracy shown by the very same leaders. 
Bourguiba embarked on an initial attempt to modernise the Tunisian state, including the 
practice of Islam (Amine Tais, 2015) through a process of adopting more secular practices and 
making the many Islamic rituals and traditions fall outside of the ambit of state control. Under 
increasing domestic socioeconomic pressures by the 1980s, Bourguiba felt threatened by the 
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popular emergence of the precursor to the Ennahdha Movement, the Mouvement de la 
Tendence Islamique (MTI), founded by Rached Ghannouchi (Waltz, 1986). What Waltz does 
however show with conviction is the commitment of the MTI to integrating religion and 
politics into a form of political Islam in Tunisia. With effective appeal to the youth and women, 
the MTI was able to develop a growing base.  
With the abrupt transition into the Ben Ali era in 1987 imprisonment of Islamists, including 
Ghannouchi in the early 80s gave way to a détente under the Ben Ali regime’s early years and 
saw the release of Islamic prisoners. Islamism even took on a more central role in government 
and everyday life (Amine Tais, 2015). Elections in Tunisia in 1989 saw the Ennahdha 
movement come second in the polls, threatening the hold on power of Ben Ali and his party 
and leading him to proclaim that religion and politics required a safe distance of separation 
(King, 2012).   The crackdown in the early 90s on the Islamist movements led to hundreds of 
imprisoned and tortured Islamists filling the Tunisian jails, while leaders such as Ghannouchi 
escaped to exile.  
Since 2011 the focus of literature has changed to analysing Ennahdha’s return to Tunisia, its 
electoral success and its performance in government. King (2012) provides one of the only 
papers looking at the potential rise to power of Ennahdha and what may have influenced the 
results of the 2011 elections. Most other literature just prior to the 2011 elections did not 
provide the focus needed to understand the Ennahdha Movement and its popularity. The post 
2011 literature tries to develop a better understanding of Ennahdha, however remains very 
limited with respect to the political Islam aspects. It takes the approach of placing Tunisia 
amongst a wider study of Islamism and political Islam in the global context and does not study 
at a more intricate level what has informed political Islam in Tunisia and how being in power 
developed that understanding. The work of Amine Tais (2015) takes on an interesting approach 
by offering a critique of prominent Tunisian academic, Olfa Yousef, and her interpretation of 
Islam in Tunisia. The work however fails to provide must understanding into the theory of 
political Islam and its application in Tunisia.  
Only a few authors have been able to write about the Ennahdha Movement to any great degree 
of depth and most of the literature pre-dates the Ennahdha Movement’s time in power. Through 
the use of Ennahdha as the case study, the events and individuals which moulded political Islam 
in Tunisia can be used to answer the research question on the viability of political Islam as a 
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democratic theory, but also to add to the empirical evidence that there exists a close relationship 
between political Islam and democracy.   
Tunisia remains a divided society, as election results from 2014 have shown. Clear divisions 
exist between the more “secular” North and the poorer Southern regions. Many in Tunisia’s 
more affluent Northern cities such as Tunis and Sousse steadfastly cherish the “degree of 
tolerance and secularism” (Dworkin, 2013) considered to be their main resource and which 
they have felt was threatened by Ennahdha and an increase in the visible expressions of Islam 
amongst many of their fellow countrymen. Marks (2015) notes how sentiments were strongly 
expressed about Ennahdha’s identity as being “obscure and its democratic commitments 
suspect”. Marks does however not delve any deeper into the entity which Ennahdha became. 
How Ennahdha traversed the transitional period in Tunisia will be studied, with focus on the 
leader of the Ennahdha Movement, Sheikh Rached Ghannouchi. Under his leadership, 
Ennahdha was able to capitalise on the mass movements which deposed the previous President 
of Tunisia and essentially controlled much of the transitional period to eventually gain power 
(Mecham, 2014). This power however came with many dangers, not least of which was losing 
popular support, something which Sheikh Ghannouchi warned against (Hamid S. , 2014). 
While this did eventually happen in Tunisia, Ennahdha and its leadership have stayed the 
course of seeking to develop a moderate Islamist party that can meet the expectations of both 
a secular and Islamist supporter base. Ennahdha has maintained the need for strong multi-party 
politics in Tunisia and has always been a supporter of the consensus-based approach to 
governance.  
Bayat (2013) argues that Tunisia has entered into a phase of what he describes as “post-
Islamism” a concept which looks at a more plural definition of Islam and Politics rather than a 
narrow view and which has a greater focus on individual liberties. Bayat does an excellent job 
of developing the understanding we have of Ennahda, especially in the early years. Marks 
(2015) concurs with this positing that “Ennahdha itself is “rethinking Islamism” as a local and 
long-term project”. The evidence of long-term thinking will be seen in the policies of Ennahdha 
with a distinct lack of urgency under pressure. Ennahdha in 2011 presented itself as an Islam 
inspired movement seeking to reform Tunisia and modernise it while keeping in mind the basic 
principles and values of Islam (Ennahdha, 2011), thereby creating an Islamic democracy. While 
the term Islamism is put forward and needs to be strongly considered rather than political Islam, 
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it still remains too tied to negative perceptions of radicalism and terrorism. By using political 
Islam throughout the study, it creates a clear delineation between the radical interpretations of 
Islam and the practical political use of Islam. 
1.8 Methodology 
The research will be mostly qualitative with a focused textual analysis of a variety of academic 
papers and opinion pieces on the theory of political Islam in order to discuss the compatibility 
of political Islam and democracy. A further textual analysis of literature on the Ennahdha 
Movement was undertaken in order to provide a historical context of its evolution into a 
political party. The positions, statements and decisions taken by the Ennahdha movement 
during the 2011 electoral campaign, as leader of the coalition government in 2012 and 2013 
and during the electoral period of 2014 have been studied in order to evaluate Ennahdha’s 
campaigning and electoral performance. In addition, this approach allowed the study to trace 
the changes to Ennahdha’s approach during the 2013 to 2014 electoral period and identify the 
factors which influenced Ennahdha’s approach to the electoral period, including venturing into 
coalition politics. Throughout the study an evaluation of whether the presence of the main 
tenets of the theory of political Islam was evident within the Ennahdha Movement was 
undertaken.  
This qualitative approach allowed for the formulation of a definition of political Islam against 
which the political approach of the Ennahdha movement could be measured. There will 
however also be a limited quantitative aspect as the electoral results of the Ennahdha movement 
will be compared to contextualise the position of the movement in the political landscape of 
Tunisia and to gauge its performance as a proponent of political Islam in an electoral context. 
The statements, policies, manifesto and positions taken by the Ennahdha movement will be 
utilised as source material to determine whether the Ennahdha Movement and its leader, 
Rached Ghannouchi, do in fact fit within the theoretical understanding of political Islam and 
the application thereof. The outcome of this critical analysis will assist in answering the 
research question. 
The theoretical conceptualisation of political Islam is the central theme around which this 
research will be conducted. How political Islam is understood by Ennahdha and put into 
practice will be unpacked through a textual analysis of print and online media as well as books 
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quoting Rached Ghannouchi on the topic of political Islam and Ennahdha. A comparison of 
the electoral periods 2010/2011 and 2014 will be conducted to show the evolution of Rached 
Ghannouchi’s discourse as well as that of the party in the study period identified as related to 
the practice of political Islam.  
1.9 Limitations and delimitations 
Significant parts of the research will be based upon the speeches, print and online media 
interviews carried out with the leader of Ennahdha, Rached Ghannouchi by various sources. 
The accuracy and consistency of the aforementioned can therefore not be guaranteed and could 
create inaccurate outcomes and may limit the accuracy of the study. It is common knowledge 
that many politicians can modify their positions or speeches dependent on the audience and the 
objective of their encounter with such audience. This cannot be ruled out in the case of Mr 
Ghannouchi. A second limitation is my perspective as a non-Muslim on a topic that deals with 
the teachings, thinking and developments within Islam. This could influence my view of how 
politics in Islam is considered and viewed as I will have to rely on existing research and 
perspectives on Islam to inform my understanding. I may also be susceptible to developing an 
image of political Islam and its practice based upon the biases of the authors which have been 
consulted during the research. The study will also be limited by a focus on only one case study 
to develop an answer to the question on the viability of political Islam as a democratic political 
approach. This limitation is however justified by the insight offered through personal 
experience of the period under question in Tunisia.  
The research delimitation will be to the electoral periods, 2011 and 2014, and the immediate 
post electoral periods, 2012-2014 and 2015. This delimitation is pursued in order to restrict the 
period of study into manageable periods, thereby allowing comparisons of distinct events and 
Ennahdha’s progression through those periods against the definition of political Islam. By 
delimiting the views of Ennahdha to focus mainly on its leader Rached Ghannouchi, it is 
assumed that as leader of the party he gives direction to its policy and heavily influences its 
Shura council through key placement of lieutenants within this body. The decision to include 
other interviews from party leaders will only serve to support the position of Mr Ghannouchi 
and also adds value to the worth of the study by providing valuable first-hand insight into the 
Ennahdha Movement. 
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The theory of political Islam as discussed in the literature review will ensure that the concept 
and theory is not lost in a multitude of views. The comparison of political Islam used by the 
Muslim Brotherhood and the AKP in Turkey will be dealt with in a limited scope to ensure that 
the key aspects are retained, without diluting the study’s focus on Tunisia. 
1.10 Chapter Outline 
1.10.1 Chapter One: Introduction 
This chapter will set out the introductory, including the background to the research and the 
development of political Islam in Tunisia. It will also look at the problem statement, namely 
that political Islam is not compatible with democratic principles. It will also outline the research 
objectives and questions and discuss the current literature on the subject of political Islam as 
well as Islamism in Tunisia. 
1.10.2 Chapter Two: Mapping (theoretically) political Islam and democracy  
The chapter explores scholarship on political Islam and democracy based upon the premise that 
current literature does not sufficiently weigh political Islam and democracy up against each 
other, particularly within the context of democratic expectations versus the principles of Islam. 
A discussion of the theory of political Islam, from its historical roots to the current 
understanding of the theory will be conducted. This discussion will then be extended to the 
application of political Islam within the context of a democratic state system. In order to do 
this two of the main proponents of political Islam namely the Muslim Brotherhood as well as 
the Turkish AKP will be briefly reviewed. This will provide some context to the case study of 
the Ennahdha Movement in Tunisia as the most successful proponent of political Islam within 
a liberal democracy.  
1.10.3  Chapter Three: Historicising the Ennahdha Movement  
The chapter will take a more focussed look at the evolution of the Ennahdha movement in 
Tunisia from a social movement to a fully-fledged political party. Public statements and 
speeches by the leadership of Ennahdha will serve as the basis for the analysis of this chapter.  
This chapter will look specifically at the increase in political rhetoric and the preparations 
towards participation in elections.  
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1.10.4 Chapter Four: Is the Ennahdha Movement practising political Islam: Analysis using the 
2010-2011 Tunisian Elections  
An examination of the 2010-2011 electoral period in Tunisia and the approach and performance 
of Ennahdha during this period in comparison to the other political parties participating in the 
elections. The campaign promises made by Ennahdha will be examined to establish whether 
they adhere to the principles within the definition of political Islam.  
1.10.5 Chapter Five: Ennahdha Movement reinventing itself? Analysis using the 2014 
Tunisian Elections  
A comparison of the Ennahdha movement’s strategy and approach utilised during the 2014 
elections compared to the 2010/2011 electoral period will be conducted. This chapter will show 
that the Ennahdha movement had taken stock of the failings during its time in power and sought 
to adapt to a changing political landscape which was increasingly hostile towards Islamist 
movements. These adaptations sought to maintain a fine balance between the political Islam 
principles adhered to by Ennahdha and the push back of secular forces. 
1.10.6 Chapter Six: Conclusion – political Islam a viable approach?  
Consolidates the conclusions of the preceding chapters with the aim of answering the question 
of whether the approach to political Islam adopted by Ennahdha in the period 2011 to 2015 can 
serve as a viable model for political Islam in a democratic state. 
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CHAPTER TWO: MAPPING THEORETICALLY POLITICAL ISLAM AND 
DEMOCRACY 
2.1  Introduction 
The chapter will discuss the theories of political Islam and democracy both separately and 
concurrently with a view to securing a working definition for both theories which will be 
applied throughout the study, but also to develop an understanding of what informs current 
conceptualisations of both theories. Current literature is explored and does not pair these two 
theories.  within this chapter as Islamist parties do not consider them separate theories, but 
rather view a dependent or symbiotic relationship with political Islam unable to exist without 
the foundations of a Liberal democracy. Once the definitions have been developed, an overview 
of two main proponents of political Islam, namely the Muslim Brotherhood and the Turkish 
AKP will be offered to exhibit the links between political Islam and democracy in a practical 
application of both theories, given that both parties have vocalised their application of political 
Islam. The chapter will conclude with an explanation of the Islamisation of Tunisia alongside 
the entrenchment of democracy, with a focus on the post-revolutionary period between 2011 
and 2015. 
 
As political theories, political Islam and democracy, have been widely studied to enhance the 
understanding of both theories as well as their application.  The works of Benhenda (2011), 
Achilov (2010), Kubicek (2015) Tamimi (2013) and Islam (2017) to name but a few, provide 
more insight into the relationship between these two theories. When evaluating the 
aforementioned works, a conclusion can be reached that there exists a symbiotic relationship 
between political Islam and liberal democracy, particularly in the eyes of Islamist parties5. The 
                                               
 
5 Islamist parties are political movements which consider Islam central to their political 
approach. They are likely to call for greater inclusion of Islamic laws within the country, 
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MENA region as a result of similarities in culture, history, and in particular religion enjoys a 
greater concentration of Islamist political movements. A differentiation in the application of 
Islam to politics does however occur across the region. The Middle East itself is mostly made 
up of Islamist monarchies, whereby the monarchy is seen as the defender of the faith and acts 
in the interest of the faith. These monarchies seek to suppress a more populist political Islam 
approach such as that of the Muslim Brotherhood. In North Africa, with the exception of 
Morocco, the countries had for many years followed forms of autocratic democracy whereby 
elements of democracy were present but limited to favour the ruling regime. Prior to the Arab 
Spring the MENA region saw a suppression of political Islam in favour of secularism or 
monarchy, however since 2011 Islamist parties and movements in the MENA region have been 
calling for the application of political Islam within a framework of liberal democracy and the 
values and freedoms that are inherent to democracy, including the respect of religion and its 
place in society.   
 
Liberal democracy has become embedded in the politics of the European Union, Canada, India 
and South Africa amongst many others. All these countries subscribe to the main tenets (see 
section on liberal democracy) of liberal democracy and strive to maintain such status. In these 
countries cultural and religious practices are often more diverse which leads to a greater 
separation of religion and politics. Political movements are generally more diverse and cover 
a wider spectrum of ideologies. Some parties or movements are influenced by religion and may 
seek to find legitimacy in their connection to religion however this tends not to be the norm.  
 
Very few states can successfully claim to be applying the theory of political Islam as defined 
in chapter one. As an academic field it has been more narrowly limited to centres for Middle 
Eastern studies in Western nations or to the academic institutions in mostly Muslim majority 
countries. It is also a field of religious study which can weaken the conceptual linkages to 
democracy. With the terrorist attacks carried out by radical Islamists in the USA on 11 
September 2001, the worldwide academic interest in political Islam has increased 
exponentially.  Analysts, the media, politicians and political scientists took a much keener 
                                               
 
defer to religious authorities and contain religious teachings within their manifestos and 
policy documents. 
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interest in the field and helped propel the theory to a more mainstream element in the political 
sciences.  
 
Following the uprisings of the Arab Spring in the Middle East and North African region, 
Tunisia, Libya and Egypt saw their authoritarian regimes deposed. The expectation that 
democracy should replace these regimes was pushed by the West (Anderson, 2014; Smith, 
2011; Maddy-Weitzman, Tunisia's Morning After, 2011). However, when Islamist movements 
entered the political space through Constituent assembly elections in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya 
domestic and foreign observers raised questions about the motives of these Islamists and 
cautioned against a radicalisation and Islamisation of the countries which would eventually 
lead to the application of Shari ‘a in defiance of the calls for democracy. Islamist parties 
however embraced the need for universal suffrage and gaining power through the ballot box. 
2.2  Conceptualising political Islam 
Before defining political Islam, it is necessary to look at Islam in general and the two main 
sects of Islam, namely Sunni and Shiite. Most literature when studying Islam provides its 
origins in the 7th century during the time of the Prophet Muhammed (Mandaville, 2010, p. 28). 
The religion and its teachings are generally developed from that period onward through the 
Qu’ran which was delivered by Mohammed as the messenger of God’s word, and through the 
Sunnah which is based upon the Prophets thinking and behaviour (Mandaville, 2010, p. 30).  
It is important to make the distinction between the Sunni and Shiite sects of Islam as the 
approach to political Islam is heavily influenced by the teachings of the scholars belonging to 
the sects. All Muslims agree on the authenticity of the Holy Qu’ran as the source document of 
their faith (Kabbani, n.d), however divergences have emerged over time in the interpretation 
of the Sunnah or traditions of the Prophet. Of particular interest are the two mains sects as 
mentioned earlier. The first sect of Islam is the Sunni current which is adhered to by the 
majority of the world’s Muslims, also the majority of Muslims in the MENA region are Sunni. 
(Pew Research Center, 2012). As traditionalist followers of the word of the Prophet 
Muhammad, Sunnis believe that the four Caliphs that succeeded the Prophet are the rightful 
leaders of the Muslim faith as it is their belief that Caliphs may be appointed  and are also more 
politically minded in their approach that leadership in the Muslim world is not divinely 
determined (Mandaville, 2010, p. 52). The Shiite branch stems from the followers of Ali, the 
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Prophet’s brother, who they believe was the rightful successor as Caliph. Shiites place a greater 
emphasis on the divine determination of the leadership of the Muslim people. The majority of 
the world’s Shiite population live in Iran, Iraq, Pakistan and India (Pew Research Center, 
2012). The distinction between the two schools of Islam is important as it offers insight into 
the mindset of those Islamist movements who seek to participate politically in their countries.  
In his study of Islamism in the Middle East, Are Knudsen (2003), attempts to clarify and 
quantify the phenomenon of political Islam while looking at the region specifically. He notes 
that there is a general struggle within academia on capturing a definition for political Islam, 
often foregoing a definition or over simplifying the concept. (Knudsen, 2003). Interestingly 
Knudsen and others such as Olivier Roy (1994) prefer to use the term Islamism rather than 
political Islam, as they believe the term political Islam is loaded with preconceptions and that 
Islamism is closer to the Arabic definition of the term political Islam (Knudsen, 2003). The 
approach of these two tends towards a merger between Islamic fundamentalism and Islamism 
in general which contrasts with the brand of political Islam practiced by moderate Islamist 
movements such as the Ennahdha Movement in Tunisia. Since 9/11 the general worldview 
towards Islamist movements has been one which does not distinguish between moderation and 
extremism. At the same time, Islamist groups are enlisted in war zones by Western powers 
such as the USA in Syria or by Gulf States such as Qatar in Libya. Their role was to counter 
the leadership in power in order to create the political space for leaders who would take 
guidance and assistance from these backers (Meiloud, 2014). While these attempts at regime 
change render mixed results, the image of Islamists almost always suffers. The motives behind 
these Islamist movements decision to essentially become mercenaries can be questioned, at the 
same time moderate movements which seek to pursue political Islam should also be asked why 
they do not do more to distance themselves from these activities and instead pursue routes to 
peaceful changes in government. Whether these groups will ever rise to power in those 
countries is unclear as there is often no clear post conflict plan on the part of countries like the 
USA or Qatar. 
When taking an analytical approach to political theory, Andrew March (2015, p. 17.3) offers a 
more holistic definition of political Islam in the more recent context post the 2010/11 Arab 
Spring. He notes that there is something “essentially political about Islam”. This is a simple 
linkage to make, as many majority Muslim countries have seen the principles of Islam 
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politicised to some extent to increase the legitimacy of a more Islamic approach to laws being 
applied. Heywood (2002, p. 38) provides a definition around the creation of theocracy which 
applies religious principles to all elements of society. As a definition for political Islam these 
approaches and views remain too simple and do not really offer a solid definition. Bokhari and 
Senzai (2013) extensively looked at the definition of political Islam or Islamism and have 
drawn on the definition provided by Denoeux in his 2002 article titled: The Forgotten Swamp: 
Navigating political Islam, provides the following definition which will be used as the baseline 
definition for this study; 
Political Islam is a form of instrumentalisation of Islam by individuals, groups and 
organizations that pursue political objectives. It provides political responses to today’s 
societal challenges by imagining a future, the foundations for which rest on re-appropriated, 
reinvented concepts borrowed from the Islamic tradition. (Denoeux, 2002, p. 61) 
In unpacking this definition, the concept of the modernisation of Islam becomes apparent. The 
first element of the definition referring to instrumentalisation of Islam, speaks to the flexibility 
of the religion, in that its elements can be taken, moulded and applied to specific circumstances 
in order to give effect to Islamic teachings. Plurality is also implied through the reference to 
individuals, groups and organisations. Islam does not only focus on the individual, the 
importance of the Umma is central to the faith and therefore politics cannot be only for 
individuals or focused on individuals. This is one of the important elements of political Islam 
as it provides the space for the organisational approach of political parties in pursuing political 
Islam objectives.  Denoeux’s reference to societal challenges and the response of political Islam 
to these challenges is very important. The importance of societal outreach and community 
involvement within Islamic communities is foundational to the ability of political movements 
to have a strong supporter base which in turn informs their policies. This is further enhanced 
through a process of taking Islamic traditions and applying them to the processes of developing 
policies and political responses is key. While Islam is often seen as a religion which has not 
kept pace with modernisation, the definition by Denoeux shows that political Islam is proactive 
rather than reactive, as it seeks to imagine a political future whereby Islamic morals and 
principals become central to governance.  
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What can be stated about political Islam is that it is an attempt to take Islamic traditions, 
thinking and morals and apply them to the modern-day context within which they are being 
applied. March (2015) points out that a rise in populism and democracy in Muslim countries 
leads to a greater reflection of Islamism in the political space. It can however be argued that 
Islam was never outside of the political space, it may have worked on the periphery, however 
political messages and debate can be found in and around any mosque. As an important 
gathering point for Muslims of all walks of life, the social aspect of communal faith plays an 
important role in informing the political point of view within Islamic communities.  
As the theory of political Islam is developed it derives its qualities from the religion and its 
practices and finds its roots in an attempt to apply the values and concepts within the religion 
onto a political approach. Its very existence is borne out of a necessity for many Muslims to 
recognise their identity within politics, but without necessarily eliminating liberal democratic 
gains such as women’s rights, religious freedom and general human rights. The multitude of 
influences and difference amongst Muslim populations is the reason that manifestations of 
political Islam cannot be unified across majority Muslim states. It can be further argued that 
this inherent flexibility within political Islam is what makes it compatible with the liberal 
democracy being sought in the countries affected by the Arab Spring. There are however 
predominantly two sides of a debate in relation to political Islam, the one is that there is no 
compatibility between Islam and democracy, while the other agrees with the definition 
accepted above (March, 2015, p. 17.14).  
The flexibility for which allowance is made in the definition postulated by Denoeux is 
important when looking at the prevailing view of Islamist politics advocated for by the United 
States. The United States almost without fail tends to generalise and group states with their 
enemies on the grounds of shared ideologies (Meyer, 2002) rather than recognising that 
political Islam shares many of the goals that it and its allies seek to promote and protect (Meyer, 
2002). An objective analysis of the role and impact of political Islam in the post - Arab Spring 
context cannot be prejudiced by generalisations and needs to be understood from the 
perspective of its practitioners. Meyer (2002) noted that much of the recent study of political 
Islam was carried out by those seeking to impose Western ideologies without a thorough 
understanding of the socioeconomic and cultural conditions in the MENA region. This further 
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elevates the utility of the definition provided by Denoeux as it specifically calls for a relation 
to Islamic traditions.  
2.3  Democracy and political Islam nexus 
Democracy has its origins in ancient Greece and the city states of the time such as Athens in 
the 5th century BC and essentially refers to the concept of rule by the people (Dahl, 1998). 
When defining democracy certain common elements emerge which are generally linked with 
the theory and practise of democracy. These common elements include, rule by the people, 
government for the people, majority rule, minority rights and separation of powers (Heywood, 
2002, p. 68). Beyond these common elements, there is a widening of the definition which 
covers different applications and degrees of complexity depending on the situation in which 
democracy is being applied. A cursory search of any academic journal will result in a multitude 
of papers on Democratic theories and the various proponents of such theories, pointing to the 
popularity of Democratic theories within academic circles, as within practiced politics. Within 
the classical theories of democracy, one finds three separate types, namely Direct democracy 
as put forth by Jean Jacques Rousseau in the 1700s who argued in book three of “The Social 
Contract” that the closer a country could come to direct rule the better, although he did realise 
the shortcomings of this approach in a large country and admitted that an approach would be 
required where the people are represented by agents who operate with their consent (Rousseau, 
1968). This approach would lead to the development of the Representative or Liberal 
democracy as elaborated by John Stuart Mill, James Madison and John Locke, all of whom 
sought to include more individual rights and collective rights for population groups, including 
freedom of speech and the press as well as minority rights, while also seeking to limit the rights 
of the sovereigns or rulers (Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, 2011, pp. 16-17).  Finally, Pluralist 
democracy such as promoted by Joseph Schumpeter and Robert Dahl, the latter identified eight 
criteria for the definition of democracy closely linking democracy to the processes and 
institutions present in a government which is completely responsive to its citizens (Dahl, 1971, 
p. 2) .  Liberal democracy in particular will be further defined in this section. When looking at 
the countries involved in the Arab Spring, many of them practices a form of democracy known 
as totalitarian democracy which is defined as “an absolute dictatorship that masquerades as a 
democracy, typically based on the leader’s claim to a monopoly of the ideological wisdom” 
(Heywood, 2002, p. 70). In Tunisia, such totalitarian democracy was applied by both 
  
 
 
 
27 
Bourguiba and Ben Ali, both laying claim to the monopoly of ideological and theological 
wisdom.  
As the Arab Spring gripped the region a desire for greater democracy and freedoms was voiced 
by protestors throughout the MENA region. This desire for democratisation enjoyed 
widespread support in Tunisia and was supported by Non-Governmental Organisations 
(NGOs), particularly from the European Union, who sought to support the suddenly 
burgeoning civil society movement in Tunisia in order to ensure that democratic gains were 
maintained (European Commission, 2018). When going to the websites of many civil society 
organisations in Tunisia the support of European governments was almost always mentioned, 
in particular the UK, Switzerland, Belgium and the Scandinavian countries. The reason for this 
support lies within the political priorities of these individual states as well as collectively 
through the European Union. This long-standing support dates back to the Association 
Agreement concluded with Tunisia in 1995 which enshrines support for democracy, human 
rights and economic development (European Commission, 2018). With the fall of the Ben Ali 
regime in 2010 the newly emerging political movements found a willing hand in the European 
Union. Through the influence of the West as discussed above Tunisia naturally tended towards 
becoming a liberal democracy as funding relating to support for democracy put in place the 
necessary building blocks.  
The central features of a liberal democracy include regular elections, political pluralism, and 
tolerance for rival political parties and a distinction between state and civil society (Heywood, 
2002, p. 77). While liberal democracy has variations, there are common features which cut 
across these interpretations. In addition to the central features, fourteen principles of 
democratic rule can be applied as the measurement for democracy. The (Konrad-Adenauer-
Stiftung, 2011) lists these principles as follows; citizen participation; equality; political 
tolerance; accountability; transparency; regular free and fair elections; economic freedom; 
control over the abuse of power; bill of rights; acceptance of the outcome of elections; Human 
Rights; multi-party system; neutrality of state institutions; rule of law. In Tunisia prior to the 
Arab Spring the elements of equality, transparency, free and fair elections, accountability, 
economic freedom and control over abuse of power were non-existent. Many of these elements 
were demanded by protestors in Tunisia. Protestors demanded economic freedom, equality, 
human rights and elections (Dodge, 2012, p. 64). The generally accepted principles of liberal 
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democracy were therefore widely applicable in the Arab Spring context and will be used 
henceforth in this study. 
2.4 The Muslim Brotherhood and Turkey – models of political Islam? 
Practical implementation of the principles of political Islam are seen around the world in 
majority Muslim countries6. Within these examples the variation is noticeable. In the Islamic 
Republic of Iran, which is an Islamic state with a Shia majority, political Islam is practised as 
the framework for governance and reflects a close relationship between religion and politics 
whereby religious decrees influence the administrative and legislative work of the countries 
politicians (Bruno, 2008). Far eastern countries such as Malaysia and Indonesia also have a 
strong political Islam focus and according to Hamid (2016) Shari’a plays a stronger role in the 
legal framework of these countries and yet both function as recognised democracies. Morocco 
places the protection of the faith within the hands of the Monarch, yet political plurality exists, 
and Islamist parties are permitted. However, the strong influence of the monarchy on politics 
in the country diminishes the powers of the Islamist political movements which results in a 
divergence from the political Islam definition put forward by Denoeux (2002). Generally, the 
example of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and the AKP in Turkey are cited in most literature 
as the most relevant examples of political Islam. Both these parties have sought to enshrine 
greater rights and freedoms into the laws of their countries while also seeking greater respect 
for the principals and morals of Islam. Similarly, they have also sought to have frequent 
elections and sought political tolerance, all tenets of liberal democracy within a political Islam 
environment. 
2.4.1 The development of political Islam in Egypt; the Muslim Brotherhood 
The Muslim Brotherhood originated in Ismailia, Egypt in 1928 where its founder Hasan al-
Banna rejected democracy and secular government in favour of a return to an Islamist society 
based upon Islamic laws, morals and values (Laub, 2014, p. 2). Initially politically active in the 
fight against British rule the Muslim Brotherhood came into direct opposition with the Egyptian 
military establishment following the rise to power of Gamal Abdel Nasser (1952-1970), a 
                                               
 
6 Indonesia, Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, Morocco are widely viewed as countries with Muslim 
majorities who apply political Islam to varying degrees. 
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renowned advocate of pan-Arabism and secularist (Laub, 2014, p. 3). An assassination attempt 
on Nasser in 1954 by a member of the Muslim Brotherhood led to the imprisonment of the 
Muslim Brotherhood leadership as well as its banning. The Muslim Brotherhood subsequently 
renounced violence after being given space to operate its social agenda by President Anwar al-
Sadat (1970-1981) in the 1970s. As early as 1984 independent candidates linked to the Muslim 
Brotherhood were deployed and participated in elections, actively implementing a political 
Islam aimed at cultivating a political elite which would Islamise society (Laub, 2014, p. 4). 
Since its formation, the Muslim Brotherhood developed an extensive network throughout 
Muslim majority countries such as Jordan, Algeria, Tunisia, Indonesia, Malaysia and Kuwait, 
but has maintained its strong core in Egypt, its birthplace. In these countries they have often 
existed as community based social movements providing support to the community and 
carrying out outreach programmes. Their involvement in the political activities was however 
not their main priority and they have often utilised “independent” politicians as a result of 
crackdowns on religious political parties. Instead since its inception the Muslim Brotherhood 
preached the comprehensive nature of Islam and its role in both private and public life (Paison, 
2008).  As political landscapes changed so did a realisation for the need to become more 
politically active in order to achieve its goals and support its programmes (Laub, 2014). As the 
Muslim Brotherhood understanding of political Islam developed, it gained prominence as a 
political force, Paison (2008) recounts the strides made by the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt 
in 1984 under the “Islamic Trend” banner where it entered elections of various associations in 
order to expand its influence eventually extending to national politics by 1987. The Muslim 
Brotherhood has however often been relegated to the periphery of the political realm by the 
autocratic regimes in countries where it has a significant presence such as Egypt under the 
Mubarak regime (Laub, 2014). 
The Muslim Brotherhood attained political prominence in Egypt when it participated in the 
2005 parliamentary elections under the banner of Independent candidates and won 20% of 
seats. In an attempt to contribute to the opening of the political environment and challenging 
the Mubarak regime through the polls, the Muslim Brotherhood’s parliamentarians suspended 
open attempts at practicing political Islam (Otterman, 2005). This is however contestable as 
the participation in the parliamentary democratic processes was in itself a practical 
implementation of political Islam, as was the focus on political reform through democratic 
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means. Otterman (2005) expressed caution that while the Muslim Brotherhood at the time 
embraced democracy, its interpretation of political Islam in many cases went against the tenets 
of liberal democracy and that its democratic credentials were yet to be tested. This was a true 
reflection of the political environment at the time, as democracy was preached but poorly 
implemented. 
When the Muslim Brotherhood participated in the protests challenging the regime of Hosni 
Mubarak during the 2010 Arab Spring (Darrag, 2016), and supported the occupation of Tahrir 
Square, it made its intentions clear to organise itself as a viable alternative to the autocracy of 
Mubarak and his family. In Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhoods’ Justice and Freedom Party was 
the first officially registered Muslim Brotherhood affiliated political party. According to the 
party’s election platform (Freedom and Justice Party, 2011) it campaigned on the fundamental 
principles representing Shari’a, namely freedom, justice, development and equality. When 
comparing this platform to the definition of political Islam as well as the tenets of liberal 
democracy there is a clear overlap relating to freedom and equality as well as justice in the 
sense of respect for laws. It was however unclear at the time to what extent Shari’a would be 
implemented as a source of law and whether there would be an infringement of accepted human 
rights. 
The stated objective of the Muslim Brotherhood is a return to Islamic values and the centrality 
of the Koran (Kull, 2011, p. 167). Politically this objective has hurt Muslim Brotherhood 
aligned parties as the populace became fearful of the imposition of Islamic law. In the case of 
Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood proceeded to push through its policies and appointments with 
little regard to nation building, reconciliation and respect for electoral results bringing into 
question whether political Islam and liberal democracy were able to coexist in Egypt. The 
approach by the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood was also questionable in terms of their 
credentials as political Islamists. Their lack of flexibility, their inability to focus on societal 
needs and instead seeking to jump straight to a complete overhaul of the constitution and laws 
to be more Islamic saw them being likened to more conservative and extremist Islamist groups 
such as Al-Qaeda by the secular movements in Egypt and the powerful military establishment. 
Field Marshal al-Sisi, with support of many of the other half of the electorate, eventually took 
power by a coup and essentially wiped out the Muslim Brotherhood political presence through 
mass arrests of its leadership (Laub, 2014, p. 6). 
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2.4.2 The development of political Islam in Turkey 
Since the 1930s Turkey has been a strictly secular state with a Muslim majority and has been 
seen as an interesting case study for the compatibility between Islam and democracy (Toros, 
2010 , p. 254). The collapse of the Ottoman Empire spurred on Kamal Atatürk to transform 
Turkey into a secular state and remove Islam from the state in order to compete with the West 
(Mason, 2000, p. 59). Ataturk believed that Islam was to be respected and practiced in private 
with no influence over the state (Osman, 2015). The full separation of religion and state was 
achieved in 1937 when secularism was enshrined in the constitution. Islamist parties have 
always formed part of the tapestry of Turkish politics, despite secular reforms in the country, 
proving that significant portions of the Turkish populace remained connected to their faith 
(Osman, 2015). In 1996 the Islamist Prosperity Party even succeeded in forming a coalition 
government, before being forced to resign by the Turkish military, seen as the guardians of 
secularism in Turkey (Toros, 2010 , p. 254). The continued interference of the military 
negatively impacted on the democratic credentials of the Turkish state. Respect for electoral 
results, political plurality, transparency, respect for human rights and basic freedoms were 
amongst the tenets of liberal democracy frequently ignored and justified by protecting the 
secular state.  
In 2002 the rise of the AKP and its once banned leader, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, saw a new 
opening for political Islam, given the AKP’s roots within the banned Islamist Prosperity Party. 
The AKP won the November 2002 elections on a platform promising European Union 
membership and the rooting out of fraud and corruption in government (Toros, 2010 , p. 254). 
This platform established the AKP’s political Islam credentials as it relied on its Islamic morals 
and belief system to plot a future course for the Turkish people as well as to address societal 
problems. At the same time evidence of liberal democratic tendencies were revealed through 
the push for transparency and respect for laws. By gradually rolling back the stringent respect 
for secularism and embracing greater involvement of religion in state affairs, political Islam 
and liberal democracy became more and more intertwined, much to the dismay of the 
entrenched secular political establishment of the state (Toros, 2010 , p. 255). Initially the AKP 
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distanced itself from the label of an Islamist party, however by the 2007 elections the party line 
sought increasingly to directly target the large Muslim voter base, with Erdogan using 
parliamentary majorities to entrench his position as first Prime Minister (Toros, 2010 , p. 255) 
and then as President in 2014. While religion played an important role within the AKP and for 
President Erdogan, he generally viewed democracy only as elections and electoral success 
(Taspinar, 2015, p. 50). Erdogan’s Islamist roots however do not remain out of the political 
sphere. As Taspinar (2015, p. 51) points out, with successive electoral victories, the rhetoric of 
Erdogan became more conservative and moralistic, translating into legislative changes 
regulating public life towards a more Islamist way. Over time, and through shrewd coalitions, 
the AKP managed to weaken the role and power of the army, reducing its position as the 
guardians of secularism (Taspinar, 2015, p. 54). A trend can be observed that wherever the 
military plays a strong role in state, such as Algeria, Turkey and Egypt, it finds itself in 
opposition to political Islam and Islamist movements and favours a more secularist approach 
and often also in opposition to democracy. This is an important observation to make as Tunisia 
is an outlier as the military has never intervened in the political sphere.  
Whilst electoral democracy remained a pillar of the political environment in Turkey, liberal 
democracy continued to be eroded as it became more difficult to identify its tenets. Political 
Islam reached a point in Turkey where its initial future looking approach and the flexibility and 
morals of Islam have been replaced by a more conservative interpretation of the Koran and 
rigid application of elements of Shari’a which started to break down the relationship between 
political Islam and liberal democracy. The Ennahdha Movement in the initial post-revolution 
years often cited the AKP as an example of a political Islam party which promoted Islamic 
values in society whilst also being respectful of the tenets of liberal democracy. As the AKP 
pursued a more conservative application of Islam in Turkey, Ennahdha entered into 
government in Tunisia and started conversations about Shari’a, women’s role in the family, 
censorship of art. It becomes understandable that the secular political movements in Tunisia 
feared that eventually Ennahdha would follow a similar path and start to tend towards a more 
conservative approach if it were to win an outright majority in future elections. Political Islam 
in Tunisia was under pressure as it transformed in Turkey and Egypt and brought into question 
whether political Islam and democracy could coexist in a majority Muslim state. 
2.5 The symbiotic relationship between political Islam and democracy 
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Benhenda (2011) studied the linkage and relationship between political Islam and liberal 
democracy. He concluded that more often than not the relationship became one where 
democracy was practiced, but within the limits of Islam, thereby giving the notion of political 
Islam. His study provides a comprehensive analysis of both political Islam and the practice of 
democracy in Islamic states. His first observation was that the initial conception of democracy 
within the Islamic context was focussed more on procedural aspects such as elections 
(Benhenda, 2011, p. 89). The outcome of his study is a proposed political Islam regime which 
seeks to incorporate elements of democracy, although reveals the limitations of such an 
approach (Benhenda, 2011, p. 91). What Benhenda makes clear is that liberal democracy 
cannot be taken wholesale and merged with Islamic principles. This is also not in fitting with 
the definition of political Islam adopted by this study. Denoeux’s definition which is unpacked 
earlier in this chapter speaks to a flexibility and borrowing of Islamic principles and applying 
them to societal situations. This also means that within a democratic environment when 
political Islam is pursued the tenets of liberal democracy also need to include a degree of 
flexibility.  
In order to develop an understanding of political Islam that accepts some basic tenets of liberal 
democracy, one needs to untangle the procedural elements from the issue of rights as 
understood by the liberal democratic theory (Benhenda, 2011, p. 98). While classical liberal 
democracy offers individual rights to citizens and protects these rights through laws conceived 
by government, the Islamic understanding recognises the need for individual rights but is more 
complex as it does not confer such rights upon the individual. Individual rights are limited by 
Shari’a or the laws of God, taken from the Koran and the practices of the Prophet, known as 
Sunna, individuals therefore cannot have access to rights which are contradictory to these 
sources of Islamic law. Rights may also be interpreted differently in a majority Muslim country 
as compared to countries with more religiously diverse populations.  It is assumed that in 
majority Muslim countries there is absolute respect for the Koran and the Sunna, therefore the 
focus on individual rights will prioritise rights related to the practice of the faith ahead of 
generalised rights such as freedom of expression or equality between the sexes. This does not 
mean that other rights are ignored or refused, however they carry less weight. What we can 
conclude is that within political Islam, the practice of liberal democracy can be adopted only 
in so far as it does not go contrary to the laws of God, thereby offering democracy within the 
limits of Islam (Benhenda, 2011). 
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In contrast to the study by Benhenda, Solomon provides his argument that the political Islam 
is currently not compatible with liberal democracy, while indicating that there is an intensified 
search for a middle ground of compatibility (Solomon, 2015). He describes political Islam as 
serving narrow interests relating to gaining power and not being recognisable from the tradition 
in Islam of tolerance. (Solomon, 2015, p. 89). Solomon criticises the Muslim Brotherhood as 
an authoritarian movement seeking to glorify jihad and seeking to use tactics such as violence 
and intimidation to achieve its ultimate goal of obtaining power, with naught consideration for 
any of the principles of liberal democracy and a rejection of pluralism, in this regard he uses 
the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) in Egypt as an example of what he sees as the real objective 
of political Islam, power based on narrow ideological underpinnings (Solomon, 2015, pp. 91-
95). There is a serious oversight on the part of Solomon as in that initial statement he fails to 
take into account the impact of years of oppression, violence and torture on the psyche of the 
leadership of the FJP and its followers. The FJP showed their political naïveté by pushing too 
hard and too fast, blinded by their rise to power and a belief that they had won an overwhelming 
electoral victory, despite the narrow margin with which they prevailed. In a more balanced tone 
Solomon goes on to argue that this end game of capturing power without any proper 
understanding or strategy of the proper function of the bureaucracy of state is at the heart of 
the failure by parties considered as adherents of political Islam. This argument does however 
have a flaw in the sense that often parties who practice political Islam have a deep 
understanding for the need of organisation and therefore bureaucracy, as they have mostly had 
to operate outside of legal existence in their countries, and can therefore understand the need 
to maintain a credible and functioning state (Lefèvre, 2016). Solomon does however correctly 
identify the common thread of a tendency towards centralisation exhibited by Islamists, 
examples of which could be seen in Egypt and Tunisia (Solomon, 2015, pp. 95-96). This can 
however be explained by the lack of trust with the existing state and its functionaries, who in 
both cases had been loyal to the deposed regimes. 
Benhenda and Solomon provide solid but not incontestable evidence of an uneasy relationship 
between political Islam and liberal democracy. Both authors have used Egypt and Tunisia as 
examples, yet their analysis fails to delve deeper into the electoral periods in both countries in 
order to understand the influence of political Islam in the democratic practices of both the FJP 
and Ennahdha. There is however also value in understanding the shortcomings they identified 
as these offer insight into why Ennahdha in Tunisia has been more successful than other 
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Islamist parties in the MENA region. Solomon (2015, pp. 101-102) provides us with a basis 
upon which to potentially measure the performance of a party such as Ennahdha in Tunisia, 
namely that at the basis of Islamic norms such as freedom, equality, justice and consultation, 
all slogans of the Arab Spring, we find the building blocks of the liberal democratic theory. 
When this is coupled to the failures of states in the Muslim world to meet the needs of their 
people, seen through continued low economic growth, unemployment and security problems, 
as well as the fact that Islamists in Egypt did not succeed in their first iteration in power 
following the Arab Spring, there is the distinct opportunity to accept that an approach that in 
practice allows political Islam and democracy to synergise will result in a positive benefit of 
the people in majority Muslim states whether they are Islamists or secular. 
2.6 Political Islam: Tunisia’s salvation or a threat to democracy? 
Chapter one (pages 10 and 11) offered a background to the historical development of political 
Islam in Tunisia following the end of French rule in 1956. What was illustrated is that Islamists 
have always played an important role in the politics of Tunisia and that Islam had been an 
influential tool under the administrations of Habib Bourguiba and Zine El Abidine Ben Ali 
spanning 1956 to 2010 which steered the country in a specific direction and strengthened their 
own personal stature. The emergence of the precursor to the Ennahdha Movement, MTI, 
signalled the attempt to bind religion and politics in Tunisia. As the MTI evolved into 
Ennahdha, it became the only political movement seen as a protector of the principles of Islam 
and the vehicle for its entrenchment within various levels of society.  
Generally, two forms of political Islam were experienced in Tunisia. The first was the 
moderated approach followed by MTI and subsequently Ennahdha, the second was the more 
conservative and radicalised approach of the Salafist movements such as Ansar Al-Sharia. 
Since its official establishment in 1981 the MTI sought to convince the Tunisian people as well 
as the government of the time that there was a space for Islam and society to coexist within the 
highly secular state created by Bourguiba. Co-founded by Rached Ghannouchi and Abdelfattah 
Mourou, the MTI was established with the goal to revive Islamic thought and principles as well 
as its political identity (Amine Tais, 2015, p. 3). What set this Islamist movement aside from 
its peers in the Arab world was that it sought to advance their goals within the ambit of a 
democratic system (Waltz, 1986, p. 658). Through these attempts the early signs of political 
Islam assimilating democracy were seen, however they were frustrated by the repressive 
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policies of Bourguiba who, following protest activities in Tunisian universities, threw 61 
members of the MTI in prison in 1981 and started serving jail terms. His actions were however 
miscalculated and resulted in an increase in support for the Islamist movement (Amine Tais, 
2015, p. 4). This was not a surprising development as community involvement was already a 
central philosophy of the MTI and through its involvement a broad support base was developed. 
As the support for MTI increased the government entered into private discussion with the MTI 
leadership which eventually led to a presidential amnesty in 1984 for the remaining imprisoned 
members and what was viewed as recognition by the government of the MTI within the 
political sphere of Tunisia (Waltz, 1986, p. 654). Three years later in August of 1987 the 
Islamist movement had become a political force to be reckoned with, however following 
violence in Tunisia, Bourguiba returned to the oppressive tactics against the Islamists and 
arrested Ghannouchi and 89 other members of MTI on charges of inciting violence. When the 
death sentences passed against Ghannouchi and his co-accused were commuted, Bourguiba 
insisted on a retrial (Tamimi, A, 2013, p. 217). Then Prime Minister Ben Ali read the situation 
in the country and saw that the President’s decision would likely lead to revolt. He instituted a 
palace or constitutional coup under Article 57 of the constitution and took over as President on 
7 November 1987 (King, 2012, p. 6).  
The initial years of the Ben Ali presidency provided the Islamists with suitable conditions 
within which to operate at a political level. Starting in the spring of 1988 Ben Ali introduced 
measures around health care, education and social assistance aimed at shoring up support for 
his government and seeking support from the Islamists. The release of Rached Ghannouchi and 
over 600 members of the MTI were significant first steps in this process (King, 2012, p. 6). 
The Zeitouna religious school was given independence again and the right to produce Islamic 
scholars, in addition mosques were given more financial support (Amine Tais, 2015, p. 4). 
Several concessions were made by the MTI in a show of good faith to the acceptance of Islam 
within the public societal sphere by government. The most significant of these was the 
renaming of the MTI to the Ennahdha or “Renaissance” Movement prior to the 1989 elections 
(Louden, 2015) to seek legitimacy with the government by adhering to prescripts that political 
parties could not have any reference to religion in their names. Here the newly named Ennahdha 
Movement reinforced their political Islam and liberal democratic credentials by showing 
flexibility, respecting the rule of law, supporting free and fair democratic elections and looking 
to the future through its actions in the present. The strong showing of Ennahdha members who 
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ran as independents in those elections initiated renewed oppression of the Islamist movement 
by Ben Ali who felt threatened by the rise of Islamists who officially won 14.5 % of the national 
vote, challenging his policy of placing the State as the sole guarantor of Islam (McCarthy, 
2014, p. 743). The Constitution was changed to forbid any political parties based on religion 
and cementing Ben Ali’s views that religion and politics needed to be separated (King, 2012, 
p. 7). Mass imprisonment ensued as the official clampdown was announced by the Interior 
Minister in May 1990 following suspected Islamist cells operating in the country and plotting 
to overthrow the government. This was the official linkage created between Tunisian Islamists 
and terrorism, and remains a perspective held by many older Tunisians today (Esposito et al., 
2016 p. 186). Oppression levels appeared to have surpassed those of the Bourguiba era and by 
the end of 1991 any proponents political Islam had been wiped out (King, 2012, p. 7).  
With the leadership of Ennahdha forced into exile, including Rached Ghannouchi and his 
family, Ennahdha was forced to operate from exile, and with this forced a moderation in its 
policies (King, 2012, p. 7) following its first overseas congress held in Belgium in 1996. While 
an underground movement could not flourish under the repression of the Ben Ali security 
forces, the movement in exile continued to develop and strengthen its standing as a moderate 
Islamic movement seeking to operate within the democratic space. The descriptor of moderate 
specifically refers to the degree of implementation of Shari’a and the veracity with which 
Islamists pursue the Islamisation of society. In the case of political Islam within a liberal 
democratic environment, only a moderate approach can reconcile Islam and democracy. 
It can be argued that with the application of the general amnesty following the removal of Ben 
Ali as President in January 2011, Islamism and political Islam took its rightful place within 
Tunisian society. The crowd of several thousand supporters which welcomed back Rached 
Ghannouchi to Tunisia on 30 January 2011 provided sufficient evidence, that despite his and 
Ennahdha’s absence from Tunisia, support for a more involved role for Islam in society was 
evident. Initially, Ghannouchi indicated that the priority for Ennahdha was to rebuild and not 
to participate in the elections in Tunisia that were due in October 2011 (AFP, 2011).   
The second form of political Islam manifested in stark contrast to Ennahdha in the form of the 
hard-line Salafist movements which worked on more extreme interpretations of Islam and 
sought to apply these to society. In this respect parties such as Ansar al Sharia and Hizb-ul-
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Tahrir were initially provided with a license to operate in Tunisia as political parties following 
the departure of Ben Ali and with the support and encouragement of Ennahdha.  
Salafism only emerged into the mainstream of Tunisian society following the revolution. They 
started to infiltrate the mosques which had been under strict state control during the Ben Ali 
regime and radicalised the sermons, especially during Friday Salaat ul Jumma prayers. State 
control over Mosques was rapidly waning, especially in the less well-off neighbourhoods of 
the major cities. The Imams approved by Government were moved aside in favour of a more 
radical and stricter Islamic discourse by the members of the Mosques.  Many in the opposition 
suspected that Ennahdha were behind this gradual infiltration of the Mosques and the 
emergence of extremism. Ennahdha made attempts to take these more radical elements under 
its wing to moderate their calls of the application of Shari’a and the rejection of democracy. 
This was an important effort on the part of Ennahdha as it sought to secure its credentials as a 
proponent of political Islam seeking to champion liberal democratic principles.  
Despite Ennahdha’s efforts, a radicalisation of the youth was underway in Tunisia’s poorer 
neighbourhoods and challenging the democracy demanded by the protestors in 2010 and 2011. 
These pressures on the liberal democratic aspirations of not only Tunisia but also Ennahda 
added to the argument against the compatibility of political Islam and democracy. With 
freedoms, rights, elections, respect for the rule of law all under threat Tunisia was likely to 
become another example of the failure of Muslim majority countries to adopt liberal democratic 
principles. 
 
  
2.7 Conclusion 
The debate on the compatibility of political Islam and democracy will inevitably continue for 
the foreseeable future. The debate is likely to be driven by a lack of willingness to accept that 
democracy is not the sole property of the West and that there is room for other religions and 
cultures to adapt the theory in applying it to their own circumstances. As has already been 
shown, there is an accepted notion that political Islam can be flexible and adaptable, while still 
seeking to maintain the bedrock of the Islamic faith in its sight. Unfortunately, narrow 
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interpretations and generalisations of political Islam will persist and continue to negate any 
progress made by Islamist political parties. To give political Islam an opportunity to take hold 
in Muslim majority countries, its proponents will need to distance themselves from any 
linkages to radical and fundamentalist strands within Islam. 
When looking at the three broad examples discussed above it is clear that within Muslim 
majority countries the interpretation and understanding of democracy remains ambiguous at 
best. In the example of Turkey, the AKP has staunchly fought for the entrenchment of electoral 
democracy as a counter balance to the military’s guardianship of secularism. What the Turkish 
model has shown is that political Islam when applied as a long-term strategy, such as the one 
favoured by President Erdogan, can exist alongside democracy. The question that does arise 
however is whether there is any compatibility with Liberal democracy or does the acceptance 
by political Islam of democracy only extend to the offer of choice through the ballot. At this 
stage the continuing developments in Turkey require further study before such a question can 
be properly answered. 
In the case of Egypt, a completely different approach to political Islam was observed. Based 
upon a short-term strategy of gaining power through the ballot, the FJP, perhaps naively 
thought that the support they had received had was a mandate to impose their view on the 
Egyptian population. What they failed to take into account was that 50% of the population were 
not in favour of religion driving politics and sought to maintain the secular nature of the state, 
but without the Mubarak family at its head. The FJP had misread the democratic voice of the 
people and showed very little respect for democracy upon taking power. Through centralisation 
of power with the President, the FJP did not seek to reconcile democracy with political Islam. 
Diametrically opposed to the situation in Turkey, the Egyptian military remains the guarantor 
of secularism and is deeply entrenched in society, their continued strength resulted in the 
military retaking control of the country following a return to protests against the FJP and 
President Morsi. With the MB and the FJP weakened and international support for the current 
Egyptian regime strong, political Islam in Egypt has been returned to its civil society role.  
In Tunisia, a sort of hybrid approach to political Islam and democracy was followed. The 
Ennahdha movement had very little influence over the political environment prior to the events 
of December 2010. The Tunisian military was also weakened by President Ben Ali in favour 
of a stronger police and National Guard. The political elite were the guarantors of secularism, 
  
 
 
 
40 
and once they were deposed an open playing field appeared. Ennahdha cautiously moved into 
that space with a primary objective of forming part of the Constituent Assembly. Through 
coalition politics it was able to secure power and made several attempts to impose a more 
religious tone to Tunisian politics. Where it was able to succeed compared to Egypt and Turkey 
was the placement of Ennahdha members in key bureaucratic positions throughout the Public 
Service. This allowed them to control developments and to take a slower approach to 
transforming the government. From their return to Tunisia, the leaders of Ennahdha spoke 
positively in favour of democracy and rights for Tunisians. Their approach extended beyond 
simply electoral democracy but sought to entrench a more liberal democratic regime which 
drew heavily from the morals and values of Islam.  
What can be concluded is that for political Islam to succeed as a viable option in Muslim 
majority states with a strong history of secularism, a new approach will need to be followed. 
Whether this is the case in Tunisia, will require an examination in the following chapters of the 
approach followed by the Ennahdha movement during the two elections held in Tunisia, and 
understanding how the Tunisia population has reacted to the evolution of the Ennahdha 
movement in that period between 2011 and 2015. 
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CHAPTER THREE: HISTORICISING THE ENNAHDHA MOVEMENT 
3.1 Introduction 
In Chapter two the application of political Islam in Tunisia was discussed, including the 
emergence of the MTI and its initial political activity, followed by the transformation and 
development of the MTI into the Ennahdha Movement. The background on Ennahdha was 
covered in order to offer insight into the movement, however more detail is required on the 
movement’s time in exile as it is during this time that the influences of liberal democracy on 
the leadership in exile of Ennahdha was greatest. 
 
This chapter will take the elements of political Islam which were unpacked in chapter two and 
by focussing on Ennahdha and its activities in exile leading up to the return of Rached 
Ghannouchi to Tunisia in January 2011 determine whether Ennahdha can truly be considered 
a political Islam party. This chapter will also look more closely at the main leadership figures 
of the Ennahdha movement both in Tunisia and those in exile and determine their adherence to 
the principles of political Islam and how they influenced the direction of the Ennahdha 
movement going into 2011. The work of Anne Wolf on the history of Ennahdha will provide 
the core of this chapter given her extensive study of the movement over a four-year period. 
3.2  Ennahdha in Exile and Underground  
Much of Ennahdha’s leadership, under threat of imprisonment, was forced into exile in the late 
1980s following the crackdown by the Ben Ali regime and spent almost 20 years in various 
countries around the world. The core of the leadership stayed close to home in Europe, with 
Rached Ghannouchi settling in London. Being in exile offered some advantages according to 
many Ennahdha leaders as they experienced multi-party politics and democracy (Wolf, 2017). 
By remaining in proximity of Tunisia the leadership was able to remain informed of 
developments through visits from supporters. This also allowed them to develop 
communication networks that could not be monitored by the intelligence services of the 
Tunisian Interior Ministry. A political bureau under the leadership of Ghannouchi was set up 
in London in 1989 to oversee the work of Ennahdha internationally. Additional offices were 
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opened, especially in France and other French speaking countries where large numbers of 
Ennahdha members were exiled (Wolf, 2017). While in exile these leaders were able to speak 
freely on conditions in Tunisia as well as criticising the Ben Ali regime. They were able to 
raise funds to support their efforts through membership fees as well as donations from 
sympathisers and supporters. Ennahdha’s demands towards the Tunisian government was the 
need for democratic elections as well as independence of the media and press freedom 
(Elgindy, 1995). These early signs of an appetite for democracy would continue to influence 
the activities of Ennahdha in exile as they saw benefits in freedom of expression, political 
plurality and the need for free and fair elections. The movement held its first major party 
conference outside of Tunisia in 1992 in Germany where a Shura Council was elected to guide 
the party forward. Many supporters also settled in Germany as the country welcomed those 
escaping political persecution in the first years after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. While 
being granted exile in many cities, the Ennahdha members were nonetheless still restricted in 
their movements for the initial years of their exile. The reasons for these restrictions, included 
the financial constraints they faced being left without employment opportunities in their new 
homes.  
The movement in exile was cautiously active through the early 90s because of the ability of the 
Ben Ali regime to extend its reach beyond Tunisia’s borders. Ennahdha members recounted 
stories of being followed or even under surveillance whilst in exile. Furthermore, the exiles 
needed to create new lives and identities for themselves and their families and needed to focus 
on this task before they could fully dedicate themselves to the task of ensuring the growth of 
the Movement abroad and its effective support to supporters still in Tunisia.  
Ennahdha members in exile held a party congress in Germany in 1992 and deliberated on the 
steps needed in order to ensure the Movement would survive the exile period. Amongst the 
decisions taken, was to set up a commission tasked with re-thinking the movement’s strategies, 
including its views regarding human rights, democracy and multi-party politics. During this 
congress Ghannouchi, who did not attend, was confirmed as the leader of the Movement (Wolf, 
2017, p. 87). In 1996, the party’s sixth congress was organised in Belgium where the decision 
was taken to favour moderation over confrontation (King, 2012, p. 7). The seventh congress 
was held in London in 2001 and in the Final Declaration of the Seventh Congress of Ennahdha 
(Wolf, 2017, p. 200) noted that the reasons for Ennahdha holding its congresses in secret and 
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in exile included “rejection of the principles of democracy, human rights, independence of civil 
society, transparency of governance and rules of accountability by the authorities, and their 
persistence in dictatorship and wide-spread corruption”. This declaration provides the strongest 
evidence of the liberal democratic values of the political Islamist Ennahdha Movement and that 
Ennahdha would continue to pursue its political Islam objectives within a liberal democratic 
political environment. The commitment to dialogue with the Ben Ali regime resulted in 
political discussions with other opposition movements and leftist groups in Tunisia, concluding 
in Ennahdha’s participation in the 18 October Movement7, which called on greater political 
freedom and freedom of the Tunisian press (Allani, 2009, p. 265).  
The early exile years (1989-1992) also proved challenging for Rached Ghannouchi. Being 
restricted to the UK and London as he awaited official asylum status, he was not able to take 
the message of non-violence directly to the large group of supporters in France. In France, the 
Movement’s leader, Salah Karker led a group of dogmatic exiles who held a different view 
from Ghannouchi about non-violence (Wolf, 2017, p. 93). Karker felt strongly that the use of 
violence could not be completely ruled out and preferred the original approach of the Muslim 
Brotherhood. His views led him to engage with more radical Islamists in Afghanistan and 
Algeria, eventually leading to his arrest by the French authorities under suspicion of 
maintaining contacts with the Algerian Islamists behind a 1995 Paris metro bombing (Wolf, 
2017, p. 94). Senior leadership of Ennahdha presented Karker with an ultimatum to come 
around to their position or risk exclusion. Karker was eventually pushed aside and out of the 
Movement as a result of his support for the violence in Algeria and Afghanistan, positions 
which the Ennahdha Executive Bureau could not condone. Karker’s approach did not sit well 
with the majority of the Ennahdha exiles as it was contrary to their efforts at calls for the 
restoration of the faith through democratisation of Tunisia, and it also did not fit with the 
definition of political Islam developed for this study. 
Switzerland played host to the Movement’s 1995 congress (Wolf, 2017, p. 94) where internal 
reflection was the main order of business. There was criticism of the Movement’s efforts at 
social uprising or revolution, when there appeared to be very little appetite from within the 
country. The lack of allies amongst opposition parties was also criticised by the participants of 
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the Congress. Ghannouchi however continued to encourage non-violence and dialogue, an 
approach which would eventually lead to the joining of the 18 October Movement. 
The mid-2000s were important years for the Ennahdha Movement and its survival as a 
structure. At that time the principal Ennahdha structures in exile consisted of the General 
Congress which was the highest decision-making body, and which elected a President of the 
Movement and a consultative Shura Council. An Executive Council was also created to 
implement decisions of the Shura Council and comprised of the President and nine other 
members (Wolf, 2017, p. 50). A significant development and turning point followed the release 
of Hamadi Jebali in 2006 from jail. Jebali was promoted to leader of the MTI in the early 1980s 
while the main leadership was imprisoned. He was the editor of Movement’s newspaper, al-
Fajir and prior to his imprisonment he also headed the clandestine underground structures of 
the MTI. His expertise made him the ideal person to create new underground efforts at re-
establishing the domestic structures of Ennahdha along with Ali Larayedh, leader of the 
Political Bureau in the late 1980s and former political prisoner (Wolf, 2017, p. 115).  
Clandestine meetings of the released Ennahdha leadership took place between the cities of 
Tunis and Sousse on a relatively regular basis, despite heavy surveillance by the Tunisian 
authorities, were legitimate. The release in 2007 of Abdelhamid Jlassi, formerly chief organiser 
of the Movement, provided additional impetus to efforts to set-up a domestic presence. Despite 
positive sentiment developing for the Movement, the exiles felt that conditions were not yet 
ripe for their return, deciding instead on a dual structure in Tunisia and London. This would 
allow the external pressure to be continued through leaders such as Rached Ghannouchi, while 
Jebali and Jlassi were tasked with building the image of the Movement in Tunisia and engaging 
with the international presence in Tunis (Wolf, 2017, p. 116). During these years Ennahdha’s 
Tunisian members were in clandestine contact with foreign diplomats resident in Tunisia, 
including diplomats from the USA who visited Jebali shortly after his release (Barrouhi, 2011). 
According to Jebali, these meetings took place regularly and were simply concerned with 
gaining a better understanding of the Ennahdha Movement (Barrouhi, 2011). It is critical to 
note that despite the efforts of the Ben Ali regime, Ennahdha sought to maintain its 
organisational integrity and to pursue its commitment to democracy through an approach 
informed by its Islamic principles. 
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While Jebali and Laarayedh were active members of the 18 October Movement, Jlassi was 
tasked with ensuring that the structures of Ennahdha were rebuilt across the country, admittedly 
under difficult conditions. Security was not the only obstacle to an effective structure, the 
disagreement between the leadership and rank and file members over the direction of the 
Movement would also pose problems. By late 2009 Tunisia was in a difficult place. The 2008 
riots in the mining centre of Gafsa had enhanced the notion of the security state, while the 
elections of 2009 served to entrench the regime of Ben Ali. Around this time it is reported that 
350 members of Ennahdha held discussion sessions where it emerged that the membership felt 
that the focus of the Movement should be to enhance its social and community work ahead of 
political aspirations and goals (Wolf, 2017, p. 118). This included ensuring that the financial 
position and assistance which Ennahdha could offer would be strengthened along with a focus 
on teaching Islamic values in society. The latter preference was a difficult prospect for the 
Ennahdha leadership as Tunisia was combatting a strong increase in Salafist activity.  
The re-establishment of Ennahdha’s underground network proved a positive development for 
the movement as it offered the leadership access to the views and aspirations of its supporters 
in Tunisia. The fact that the underground membership felt that the political ambitions should 
be secondary to the societal needs of the people at the time, was a timely reminder of the need 
for Ennahdha to refocus its political Islam approach to not merely pursue democratisation, but 
also to merge this pursuit with its Islamic principles. It can therefore be argued that the 
underground movement strengthened Ennahdha’s political Islam credentials. 
Two main political movements that can be classified under the Salafist umbrella in Tunisia are 
Hizb ut-Tahrir and Ansar al-Shari’a. The Salafist movement in Tunisia was first formed in the 
early 1980s under the banner of Hizb ut-Tahrir and has essentially been underground ever since 
(Zalin, 2011). Hizb ut-Tahrir tend to prefer not being called Salafists and view themselves as a 
purely political movement with the aim of re-establishing the Caliphate in Tunisia. During the 
1990s and 2000s when the Ben Ali regime cracked down on Islamist movements, Hizb ut-
Tahrir also saw many of its leaders and supporters imprisoned alongside the leaders and 
supporters of Ennahdha (Zalin, 2011). Ansar al-Shari’a was only formed in 2011 and its leader 
Abu Ayyad has verified links to extremist organisations, including Al-Qaeda in the Islamic 
Maghreb (AQIM). Ansar al-Sharia has expressed a desire to only focus missionary work, 
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however it has been involved in inciting violence and protests against media freedom and 
freedom of expression (Zalin, 2011).  
Both Hizb ut-Tahrir and Ansar al-Sharia follow a stricter interpretation of the Koran and seek 
to impose Islamic law within Tunisia. Ennahdha has been cautious of both organisations while 
not side-lining Salafism as a legitimate form of Islam. Rached Ghannouchi and other leaders 
of Ennahdha preferred to seek legitimisation for Salafist movements as long as they were 
willing to abide by the laws of the country and seek democratic means to achieve their goals 
(Churchill & Zellin, 2012). This sparked criticism from the Salafists and from the more 
conservative elements within the Ennahdha Movement. However, the need to condemn 
extremist views while still showing tolerance to the Muslim values was an important policy 
position for Ennahdha heading towards the 2011 elections.  
The Salafist movement in Tunisia had the potential to derail Ennahdha’s ambitions for 
democratisation. Rached Ghannouchi’s views on inclusion and rehabilitation of Islamists who 
tended towards violence were misread by Tunisian public as well as the West. In his attempts 
to reintegrate former members who sought more militant avenues with the Salafist movements, 
Ennahdha and by extension political Islam in Tunisia was seen as accepting the desire for a 
Caliphate in Tunisia and the supremacy of Shari’a. These views however are contrary to what 
we have already established of Rached Ghannouchi and the objectives of the Ennahdha 
Movement. 
3.3  The 18 October Movement 
Earlier in this chapter reference was made to the 18 October Movement. This multi-party 
umbrella body is significant when looking at the influences on the Ennahdha Movement during 
its years in exile. While Ennahdha merely participated in the Movement it remained a beacon 
and example for its leadership. Ghannouchi as late as 2011 felt that the 18 October Movement 
was still an important conduit for the united opposition (Ghannouchi R. , 2011). It is therefore 
important to unpack the Movement below and highlight its impact on the views of Ennahdha 
as well as the perceptions of Ennahdha as a result of its participation in the Movement. 
In 2001 the first tentative steps towards a united opposition against the Ben Ali regime were 
taken. The initial engagement took place between the Ennahdha Movement and the Congress 
for the Republic (CPR), founded by Human Rights Activist, Moncef Marzouki, following his 
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exile in France after being released from jail in 1994. In 2003, the opposition forces had 
managed to reach agreement on several positions, including the need for proper democracy, 
the release of political prisoners as well as the respect for the Arabo-Muslim identity of 
Tunisians and an increase in the intensity of the fight against corruption. The statement was 
dubbed the Call of Tunis Agreement8 and was signed in France (Wolf, 2017, p. 101). This first 
tentative step to a unified opposition laid the foundation for the establishment of the 18 October 
Movement. Tunisia was designated the host of the 2005 World Summit on Information Society 
(WSIS) by the UN, much to the dismay of opposition movements who saw it as condoning the 
oppression of the Ben Ali regime. A group of left-wing parties, along with several journalists 
and members of civil society decided to protest the government’s actions and embarked on a 
hunger strike on 18 October 2005. Their demands resonated with those of the Call of Tunis 
Agreement, namely freedom of organization for all, freedom of information and expression, 
the release of political prisoners and the urgent adoption of a law on general legislative amnesty 
(Hajji, 2006). The strike was viewed by its participants as a success and sparked the creation 
of the 18 October Coalition for Rights and Freedoms which included the Ennahdha Movement. 
The creation of the Coalition was based upon exhaustive discussions held between all the 
relevant role players. There was a lot of initial opposition to the inclusion of Islamists, as the 
perceived threat of Islamism was still strong, especially amongst the far-left groups who held 
secularism and democracy as unequivocal rights (Hajji, 2006). The overwhelming sentiment, 
however, was that the Islamists were a part of the political scene in Tunisia and could not be 
excluded (Wolf, 2017, p. 101). Unfortunately, the unity shown after the success of the hunger 
strikers in raising the profile of the conditions in Tunisia was short lived. Leading members of 
the Movement started to compete against each other with a view to contesting 2009 Presidential 
elections, while other prominent leaders such as Moncef Marzouki of the CPR publicly 
questioned the effectiveness of the Movement (Wolf, 2017, p. 100).  
While it can be concluded that the 18 October Movement ultimately failed in its quest, it 
nevertheless laid a strong foundation for future opposition cooperation, and also showed the 
Tunisian people that the Islamist movements such as Ennahdha were able to understand the 
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greater need for political freedom from the Ben Ali regime and place this goal ahead of their 
own goals. The influence on Ennahdha as a political Islam movement can also not be ignored. 
This was a first experience at collaboration or coalition with non-Islamist parties and trying to 
manage different ideologies. The need for flexibility in positions, concessions on issues of 
divergence and the ability to compromise were all important experiences would all reappear in 
Ennahdha’s thinking and approach in 2011. The 18 October Movement also helped to change 
perspectives on Ennahdha, which showed that its approach was to pursue the best interests of 
the Tunisian people. 
3.4 Rached Ghannouchi in exile: from Islamist to Muslim Democrat 
While exiled in London, Rached Ghannouchi remained an influential Islamic scholar. This 
influence allowed him to engage with other leading scholars as well as the academic 
community in London. His Islamist school of thought developed substantially in London as he 
spent the time writing. A major focus of his writing was pointing out the failures of the Western 
world to properly comprehend the impact that oppression and injustice were having on the 
Arab World (Wolf, 2017, p. 97). He further argued that the leadership of Ennahdha was well 
placed to advance modernity by striving for freedom, dignity and sharing of power.  
Ghannouchi’s first proposal for a political Islam or Islamist democracy emerged as he argued 
for the need to maintain religion within the public sphere as an inherent component of 
democracy. In his widely-revered publication Al-Hurriyat al ‘Ammah Fid-Dawlah al-
Islamiyyah9  published in 1993 he states that Islam and democracy are not contradictory, 
instead they complement each other and are able to coexist (Tamimi A. , 2001, p. 80). His 
proposal included the need for Shari ‘a to be followed as the supreme law of the country and 
enforced by publicly chosen institutions. The power would therefore lie with the Islamic 
community, or Uma. Ghannouchi however did not outright reject multi-party democracy, as he 
believed it had a place if it did not result in the promotion of secularism at the expense of the 
religion. When discussing multi-party democracy Ghannouchi appears in favour of the 
principle, even extending it to a political Islam view whereby competing views seek to obtain 
the favour of the Uma (Tamimi A. , 2001, p. 83). He continues by expressing that pluralism 
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exists within Islam and that its presence in an Islamic political system should be welcomed to 
stimulate debate. Quite surprisingly he also softened his stance on the progressive Personal 
Status Code of Tunisia which offered equal rights to women (Ghannouchi R. , 2011). 
Ghannouchi’s views on political Islam do not deviate far from the elements of the definition 
used to conceptualise the theory in this study. He takes accepted Islamic principles and re-
invents them within the modern context of society. His early work however still placed a greater 
emphasis on the centrality of Shari’a and the need for it to be enforced by the state.  
Ghannouchi’s views on democracy have been heavily influenced by the situation in Tunisia, 
starting from the colonial rule of the French to the autocratic regimes of both Bourguiba and 
Ben Ali. As an overarching theme within his discussions on democracy, he consistently refers 
to the need to avoid despotism, hence his acceptance of liberal democratic theory giving the 
power to the people (Tamimi A. , 2001, p. 84). When describing his ideal form of government 
and democracy, Ghannouchi wanted to see a system which includes a focus on education, the 
protection of dignity (rights) which recognizes the dignity of man and empowers the electorate 
to have power over the government (Tamimi A. , 2001, p. 84). While Ghannouchi widely 
accepts democracy, he does offer several warnings about the way that it has been applied. 
While he supports the theory, the practice to him lacks a grounding which he believes can be 
found in Islam. Political Islam offers an accountability of a civilian authority to the public. It 
is for this reason that he sees a strong compatibility between democracy and Islam (Tamimi A. 
, 2001, pp. 85-88). It could be argued that the acceptance of the principles of liberal democratic 
theory happened much faster for Ghannouchi, as he was quickly able to reconcile the tenets of 
liberal democracy with Islamic principles and morals.  
The concept of political Islam and Islamic democracy are extensively developed and explained 
by Ghannouchi in his 1993 book, as well as lectures he delivered while in London. The 
discussions of subsequent Ennahdha Congresses revolved around many of the positions which 
Ghannouchi argued. He also argued for the need for freedoms to be enshrined in the State, and 
important element of liberal democracy (Esposito et al., 2016, p.181). The strength of his 
position within the Movement is clear in the extent to which much of the approach of Ennahdha 
is based upon his writings and teachings. Importantly, Ghannouchi defines the concept of 
Shari’a as a set of guidelines rather than law (Tamimi A. , 2001, p. 91), an important distinction, 
especially for a Western understanding of the concept of political Islam. By defining Shari’a 
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in this way, Ghannouchi has added impetus to the concept that Shari’a is an organic concept 
derived from God and that it needs to be adaptable to the modern context. He continues by 
expressing the understanding that the guidelines are so broad that they offer sufficient space to 
encompass existing laws and rights that are often sought within the democratic system.  
The views of Ghannouchi on Islamic democracy and political Islam do not carry much of the 
extremist or fundamentalist views generally associated with Islamists in Western media. He 
defies not only the West but also Islamists and his own followers to broaden their thinking and 
views and not to fall into the stereotypical thinking which is associated with Islamists.  
According to Wright (1996, p. 72) Ghannouchi put forward that Islamists have a duty to find 
the balance between modernity and Islamic principles through interaction. He proceeds to 
express support for pluralism and tolerance within Islam (Wright, 1996, p. 74) and defines a 
realist approach within Islam whereby the texts of Islam can be balanced with the current 
modern reality. This approach places Ghannouchi firmly in the defined political Islam space 
where he is challenging the dominant thinking within Islam and political science by providing 
well-argued and developed alternatives for Islamist movements to share a space with 
democracy. Ghannouchi’s views on democracy and Islam have been attributed to his 
encounters with Islamist scholar Malik Bennabi who was one of the first to put forward the 
notion of an Islamic democracy, even claiming that it would be better than the Western concept 
of democracy (Tamimi A. , 2007). 
The development of his positions and the moderate approach he espoused created positive 
sentiment towards the Ennahdha Movement in Europe, ensuring that a steady stream of 
financing and support became available. Equally important was Ghannouchi’s condemnation 
of the 9/11 attacks in the United States and his disgust at the perpetrators of the attacks. During 
a time when Islamists were viewed negatively, Ghannouchi could secure meetings with 
politicians in Europe and push Ennahdha’s agenda of highlighting the oppression of the Ben 
Ali regime (Wolf, 2017). 
3.5 Ennahdha’s return to a liberated Tunisia 
A general amnesty was enforced following the removal of Ben Ali as President in January 
2011. This encouraged exiled leaders from all political movements to return to Tunisia. 
Ghannouchi indicated in an interview with the FT that the reason for his exile was gone and 
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that he felt compelled to return to his country (Rachid Ghannouchi, 2011). A crowd of several 
thousand supporters welcomed back a leader many had not seen in 20 years when he set foot 
in Tunis on 30 January 2011 (RFI, 2011). This unknown factor would be one of the main 
motivators for Ghannouchi, who indicated that “we will go back to organising ourselves and 
contribute to the education of the new generation through our moderate, democratic thought 
(Ghannouchi R. , 2011). In an article published in February 2011, the Tunisian daily 
newspaper, Le Temps, quoted Ghannouchi as indicating that the Personal Status Code was 
derived from Shari’a, a statement in strong contrast to the popular opinion held by many 
Tunisians, especially from civil society that Ennahdha would seek to abolish the Code. Once 
Ghannouchi returned to Tunisia it was almost as if his homeland reset something in his political 
outlook. His statements carried a very strong Islamist message at the expense of a more 
conciliatory democratic tone, which would have been expected based upon his track record in 
Europe. It can be argued that this was a calculated risk taken by Ghannouchi in order to gauge 
the appetite for political Islam in Tunisia. 
Initially, Ghannouchi indicated that the priority for Ennahdha was to rebuild and not to 
participate in the elections in Tunisia that were due in October 2011 (AFP, 2011). The 
challenge for Ennahdha was that many of the electorate had no real knowledge of the 
Movement and were uncertain of its programmes going into the 2011 elections. Ennahdha 
would participate in the legislative elections and seek to form a coalition with other parties in 
an attempt to build a broad consensus (Gouëset, 2011). When working towards the elections, 
Ghannouchi the Muslim Democrat came to the fore as his understanding and promotion of 
liberal democratic values with an Islamist undertone started to reveal a political movement 
which could meet the demands of the revolution. 
Rached Ghannouchi gave several interviews in the period between his return to Tunisia and 
the 2011 elections. During these interviews his message remained relatively consistent and 
remained true to the manifesto launched by the Ennahdha Movement on 14 September 2011.   
3.6  Conclusion 
Since its establishment as the MTI in 1960s and eventual renaming to the Ennahdha Movement 
in 1981, Islamism and political Islam in Tunisia has been synonymous with Ennahdha. The 
initial period of détente following the removal of Habib Bourguiba was short lived following 
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the results of the 1989 elections and the fear of Ben Ali and his followers that a strengthening 
of the Islamist movement would result in an erosion of the secular way of life they had become 
accustomed to. After being forced into exile, Ennahdha and its leader Rached Ghannouchi 
experienced a period of introspection and development not seen in other Islamist movements.  
The numerous congresses held through the 1990s and early 2000s throughout Europe helped 
to develop Ennahdha’s policies and positions with a respect for democracy and the ability of 
Islamism or political Islam and democracy to coexist. This acceptance of liberal democracy 
was revolutionary in the region and amongst Islamist movements. The decision to renounce 
confrontation and violent struggle proved important in ensuring that Ennahdha maintained 
support from outside Tunisia and in the West, which ultimately ensured that the Movement 
could continue its activism abroad. This was also a period where the symbiotic relationship 
between political Islam and liberal democracy grew the most. The leadership of Ghannouchi 
drove Ennahdha towards the development of an approach to political Islam that embraced the 
influence of exile on its leadership and its future vision for Tunisia, thereby strengthening its 
political Islam credentials. 
Despite pressures from other Islamist groupings as well as the general degradation of relations 
with Islamists following the 9/11 attacks on the USA, Ennahdha continued to show maturity 
and non-discriminatory tendencies as it sought to create goodwill between Islamists, secularists 
and democrats. At the forefront of all these efforts has been Rached Ghannouchi. The 
development of his positions, theories and interactions over years in prison and exile have been 
widely lauded by Western nations. His acceptance and even promotion of democratic values 
alongside the moral values instilled and promoted by Islam were key in ensuring the survival 
of the Ennahdha movement through its years in exile, but also in attracting non-Islamists to the 
party as it entered into the electoral campaign of 2011. 
The Ennahdha Movement decision to join and even drive the October 18 Movement would be 
an important one in securing a captive audience for its platform, and would assist in ensuring 
that upon its return from exile, Ennahdha enjoyed popularity amongst large parts of the 
Tunisian population, who saw Ennahdha as a moral compass and an honest party which would 
not lie to them or grab power as the Ben Ali regime did. The October 18 Movement would 
further strengthen the view of Ennahdha that consensus, compromise and wide consultation 
were the most effective tool to promote political Islam. 
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The electoral period in 2011 would however prove to be a difficult and volatile one for Tunisia 
with Ennahdha facing strong opposition to its Islamist views and general fears that Ennahdha 
would be seeking to impose Islamic law in Tunisia. This fear developed despite the Ennahdha 
message denying this and seeking an open democratic process.  
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CHAPTER FOUR: IS THE ENNAHDHA MOVEMENT PRACTISING POLITICAL 
ISLAM: ANALYSIS USING THE 2010-2011 TUNISIAN ELECTIONS 
4.1 Introduction 
The return of Rached Ghannouchi to Tunisia at the end of January 2011 marked the return of 
Islamist politics to Tunisia. As shown in Chapter three, the Ennahdha Movement’s leader spent 
his time in exile refining the positions of the Movement and encouraging his fellow adherents 
to accept democracy as the only viable way forward for the country. This introspection, by both 
Ghannouchi and the Ennahdha Movement, would place it on course to become the majority 
party in the first post-revolution elections of Tunisia.  
 
This chapter will cover the period stretching from the registration of Ennahdha as a political 
party in March 2011, through the launch of its manifesto, the electoral period and the October 
2011 elections themselves. The electoral cycle will be used to demarcate the phases of pre-
electoral, electoral and post-electoral periods, with a central theme being the centrality of the 
electoral process to democratic theory. By examining the aforementioned periods, the study 
will show the democratic principles within which the Tunisian elections are rooted and thereby 
providing sufficient evidence of liberal democracy against which the political Islam approach 
of Ennahdha can be studied. The reaction of local and international media and other parties 
towards Ennahdha’s campaign will be utilised in order to gauge the level of tolerance for 
political Islam. In addition, some polling data10 will be referenced and compared to the eventual 
outcomes of the elections. Post-elections reports by the Carter Centre observer mission, as one 
of the largest missions during the elections, will also be used to assess their analysis of the 
elections and whether or not specific trends were identified which led to the success of 
Ennahdha in the elections. Of particular interest will be the political Islam message that 
Ennahdha put across throughout its campaign and assessing whether the message aligns with 
the definition of political Islam put forward by this study. Ennahdha’s participation in the 
government and Constituent Assembly will briefly be studied within the context of the 
                                               
 
10 Polling data is only available for the pre-electoral campaign period, once campaigning 
started polling was not allowed. 
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definition of political Islam in order to establish whether or not Ennahdha was able to translate 
its campaign manifesto developed on the basis of political Islam into government.  
4.2  Operating in the shadow of Ben Ali: Tunisia’s interim governments  
Following the departure of Ben Ali in January 2011, the constitution provided for power to be 
vested in the speaker of the assembly, Mr Foued Mebazaa, as interim President. Under his 
instruction, the sitting Prime Minister Mohammed Ghannouchi was tasked with the formation 
of an interim government. This first interim government announced only days after the 
departure of Ben Ali was hugely unpopular due to it containing many members of the former 
President’s Rassemblement du Courant Democratique (RCD) party. This prompted protestors 
to return to the streets demanding the removal of any traces of the RCD from government 
(BBC, 2011). Over the coming days and months, the interim government struggled for 
legitimacy. Prime Minister Ghannouchi resigned on 27 February 2011 following several 
ministerial resignations and reshuffles in the preceding weeks, ultimately succumbing to the 
pressure of 100,000 protestors taking to the streets of Tunis and who were violently opposed 
by the police. The resignation of Mohammed Ghannouchi coincided with the dissolution of the 
RCD party, the disbanding of the secret police and the decision to declare that the Ennahdha 
Movement would be able to register as a political party. (Maddy-Weitzman, 2011, p. 12).    
On 1 March 2011 a decree law passed by the interim government officially legalised the 
Ennahdha Movement as a political party (Basly, 2011). This was the first time that Ennahdha 
was actually a registered political party and able to contest the elections as such. It should be 
recalled that in the 1989 elections Ennahdha was not a legitimate party and had its members 
participate as independents. Ennahdha immediately formed part of the High Commission for 
the Realisation of Revolutionary Goals, Political Reforms, and Democratic Transition (High 
Commission). This wide ranging commission was tasked with developing new proposals for 
laws and reforms in line with the demands of the protestors, oversight of the interim 
government of Beji Caid Essebsi and to prepare the electoral law and appoint an electoral 
commission (Maddy-Weitzman, 2011, p. 13). Ennahdha did not waste any time in exercising 
its democratic credentials by supporting the efforts to democratise Tunisia. In keeping with its 
political Islam base, it sought to form part of a wider consultative process which would also 
provide a platform for Ennahdha to be forward looking and try and influence the political 
environment in Tunisia to suit its purposes. 
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The High Commission, formed on 5 April 2011, was comprised of as wide ranging as possible 
actors from political parties, civil society and the legal profession. The High Commission had 
to overcome the many differences inherent in its composition of 155 members to draft the 
necessary laws that would allow the elections to take place on 24 July 2011, as had been 
announced officially by interim Prime Minister Essebsi to protestors on the Kasbah square in 
downtown Tunis on 3 March 2011 (Usher, 2011). Ennahdha was at the forefront of the Kasbah 
protests which saw several thousands of Tunisians protest against the two interim governments 
of Mohammed Ghannouchi for aiming to derail the revolution and being too close to and filled 
with the remnants of the RCD. Notably these Kasbah protests were conducted in a peaceful 
manner and did not see the violence of the street protests. While Ennahdha was absent as an 
entity from the 2010 protests, it was now in a better position organisationally to seek to make 
clear their demands through the presence of their supports amongst those of other political 
movements during these protests. The strong showing of Ennahdha during these protests and 
their desire for peaceful protest resonated with the people of Tunisia. Once again, the symbiotic 
relationship between political Islam and liberal democracy is evident as the concept of protest 
and the will of the people being expressed aligns with the realisation of the societal demands 
and influences which are generated from the Muslim community. 
On 23 March 2011 the interim government passed decree law 14 of 2011, which served as the 
interim constitution of Tunisia and was titled Provisional Organisation of Public Authorities11. 
This decree law would remain in force until the promulgation of the Constitution of 2014, much 
longer than anyone had envisioned. The High Commission functioned on two levels, the higher 
level was a group of experts who were tasked with drafting legal texts, while the second was 
the broad based grouping of politicians, civil society and other groupings who commented on 
the texts and approved or rejected them prior to approval by the interim President (Mohsen-
Finan, 2012). Despite the divergent views within the High Commission, it was able to propose 
and have passed an electoral law on 11 April 2011, followed by a decree law establishing the 
Higher Independent Electoral Commission (ISIE) on 12 April 2011, tasked with preparing the 
                                               
 
11 A translated English text of Decree Law 14 of 2011 is available at 
http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=245403  
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elections of a Constituent Assembly, as demanded by the Kasbah protests (Carter Centre, 
2011). 
Ennahdha’s participation in the work of the High Commission became strained as it started to 
openly criticise the lack of consensus within the Commission. Ennahdha felt that many of the 
members were deviating from their main tasks and seeking to gain personal benefit, going 
against the principle of popular rule. They also criticised the decision taken to change the 
election date to October 2011, with the ISIE citing logistical challenges, and Ennahdha feeling 
that this was an effort to give less organised parties time to organise themselves in order to 
compete against Ennahdha. Further disagreements on political party financing and the 
inclusion of a republican pact eventually saw Ennahdha suspend its participation in June 2011 
(Online, 2011). Ennahdha was seeking a more representative governing structure that would 
show a clean break from the past regimes, but also responded to their continued efforts at the 
coexistence of political Islam and democracy. This lack of consensus especially irked Rached 
Ghannouchi as he was a firm believer in the principle of consensus-based decision making.  
 
4.3  Electoral manifesto 
In September 2011, Ennahdha launched its electoral manifesto with much pomp and ceremony. 
In an exhibition of its reach and brand presence, the party leader, Rached Ghannouchi, along 
with the Secretary-General and other leaders within the party took to the stage to present the 
22 founding principles and 365 measures that made up Ennahdha’s electoral programme 
(Leaders, 2011).  
In his opening statement to the thousands of guests present for the launch, Ghannouchi 
reiterated that the electoral programme was not only for Ennahdha but for all Tunisians and 
that it would seek to meet the objectives of the revolution and deviate from the failures of the 
fallen regime, while presenting an example to the world (Leaders, 2011). The tone and content 
of the presentation pointed towards an Islamist party seeking to establish itself as a moderate 
party in the eyes of the Tunisian public. In a later article written just prior to the 2011 elections, 
Ghannouchi stated that in Ennahdha’s manifesto “we call for protecting the rights of women 
and promoting their public and political participation, on the basis of citizenship and equality” 
(Ghannouchi R. , 2011). This was a strong message, especially to the female constituents who 
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enjoyed unprecedented freedoms in a Muslim county and feared the rise of an Islamist party. 
With this statement Ghannouchi showed that there was room for a more open society under the 
leadership of a morally guided Islamist party which would embrace democratisation of society 
with Islam at its core. The manifesto provided a wide range of positions covering the political, 
economic, social and cultural aspects. The various leaders who took to the stage reiterated the 
belief that Ennahdha would provide a progressive approach to addressing the problems of the 
country and would succeed where a capitalistic system which ignored Islam couldn’t (Leaders, 
2011).  
Ennahdha’s manifesto contained strong references to the cultural history of Tunisia and its 
influence on where Tunisia has been and where it is heading. Interestingly in the preamble of 
the manifesto, there is recognition of the advances and modernisation of western civilisations 
in contrast to that of Tunisia and the desire for Tunisia to embrace modernity and advancement. 
Ennahdha refers to “ijtihad” or creative interpretation of Islam as the tool for modernisation. 
This is an important pillar of Ennahdha’s manifesto, and the thinking developed by Rached 
Ghannouchi while in exile. What Ennahdha is making very clear is that as much as it recognises 
the traditional morals and values of Islam, it recognises the need to shape itself with the times 
and to interpret the teachings of Islam within the current modern context (Ennahdha, 2011, p. 
4). The flexibility which is called for by political Islam is evident in the preamble and also 
speaks to the application of democratic principles. Its reliance on the history of Tunisia to be 
forward looking and seek modernisation provides evidence of the continued efforts of 
Ennahdha to shape a new Islamic future for Tunisia which does not rely on historical Islamic 
views, but instead seeks to re-integrate Islamic teachings into a modern world view. 
This notion of creatively interpreting Islam does fit within the parameters of the definition of 
political Islam provided in Chapter one. In addition, it is pursued in order to ensure Islam’s 
political relevance within the context of developments in Tunisia after the revolution. 
Ennahdha goes even further in its manifesto to uphold democracy as a key component of its 
programme. The first of its key objectives speaks to the tenets of a democratic system and 
setting up the necessary institutions and prescripts to uphold such a system. These include basic 
rights as demanded by the protestors during the revolution, namely dignity and freedom, as 
well as rule of law and good governance based upon a supreme constitution (Ennahdha, 2011, 
p. 6).   
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To lend further legitimacy to its political Islam credentials, the manifesto points to the views 
that Tunisia is an independent republican state with Islam as its religion and with the state 
playing a public role in respecting the freedoms and rights of the individual and playing the 
role of guarantor of these rights and liberties (Ennahdha, 2011, p. 7). These principles are 
further supported by the call for a parliamentary system entrenching power with the people or 
their elected representatives. Such parliament would guarantee freedom of expression and 
religion, would be supported through a multiparty electoral system and would underpin the 
separation of powers and respect for human rights (Ennahdha, 2011, p. 9).  
A key element of the manifesto which led to much debate in Tunisia, was that of the rights of 
women. As previously mentioned, Rached Ghannouchi has spoken out in favour of at the very 
least maintaining the gains of women in Tunisia and where possible strengthening them. In the 
Ennahdha manifesto, this position is clearly stated and even progressed further. Importantly 
they seek to strengthen the role of women, respect the equality of women to men and to reject 
any forms of discrimination or marginalisation of women on any grounds, including the 
imposition of dress codes (Ennahdha, 2011, p. 23). When viewed in conjunction with priorities 
around the strengthening of the family unit and encouragement of the youth to pursue education 
and employment (Ennahdha, 2011, p. 24) Ennahdha maintains the importance of the role of 
the family unit and its components within Islam, while reconciling these with the 
democratically gained rights and freedoms, especially for women. 
When examining the manifesto of Ennahdha it provides a solid and clear foundation from 
which to build a strong democratic state with respect for rights and freedoms, yet still within 
the confines and moral obligations of the Islamic faith. The manifesto therefore met the criteria 
established within the definition for political Islam to give credence to Ennahdha as a proponent 
of political Islam. Within the manifesto the tenets of liberal democracy such as respect for 
human rights, the need for regular and free elections, respect for the rule of law and seeking 
economic freedom are all clearly visible. This provides sufficient evidence that Ennahdha has 
an established baseline of being both a political Islam movement and respectful of the tenets 
of liberal democracy. It can therefore be concluded that at the very least Ennahdha entered the 
electoral period confident in its political Islam and democratic values and that these two 
theories could co-exist within the movement. The programme nevertheless remained an 
ambitious one, aimed at tackling all the challenges of the Tunisian state and people. With the 
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manifesto launched, Ennahdha would now have to sell its positions to the Tunisian people. 
Importantly, as the next section will examine, would be the public reaction to the manifesto 
alongside that of other political movements, especially those considered secular.  
4.4 The electoral campaign and selling the manifesto 
The Tunisian electoral laws are an important starting point when determining the compatibility 
and complementarity of political Islam and liberal democracy. In order to evaluate the electoral 
campaign of any party in the 2011 elections, it is important to understand the electoral laws 
which were in place, specifically those relevant to campaigning. Decree Law 35 of 10 May 
2011 established the electoral law for the 2011 Constituent Assembly elections (ACEProject, 
2011). Part two of the electoral law from Article 37 onward, deals with the campaigning rules. 
The general provisions such as impartiality of the media and administration are present as well 
as prohibition of using religious sites or government offices to campaign. Furthermore, the law 
stipulates the time frame for campaigning as starting 22 days before voting day and ending 24 
hours before voting day (ACEProject, 2011). The Electoral law provides the necessary 
framework for the ISIE to determine the rules surrounding campaigning and the fair and equal 
distribution of media airtime. The ISIE in its Decision of 3 September 2011 on the Rules and 
Procedures of the Electoral Campaign (Jendoubi, 2011) set out the necessary guidelines for all 
participants in the electoral campaign. One of the challenges faced by the parties was that with 
the date of the election set for 24 October 2011 campaigning could only start on 30 September 
2011. With only 22 days of campaigning parties were given a very narrow window within 
which to operate as all propaganda, promotion or electoral activity was prohibited starting from 
12 September 2011 according to article 2 of the code of conduct (Jendoubi, 2011). Designated 
areas were established for parties to place electoral posters which were strictly controlled in 
terms of their size and appearance. Media ads were limited in time and airplay was given on 
an equitable basis and following a draw for their order of appearance on national stations. 
Private stations were required to adhere to the same system. The use of electronic media sites 
was allowed, however within the parameters set out by the ISIE and needed to be aligned to 
the campaign calendar (Jendoubi, 2011). 
Within this heavily regulated space, political parties needed to draw on their strengths to try 
and convince voters of their manifesto and credentials. It should be recalled that although this 
was technically not a legislative election, the election of the Constituent Assembly would 
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determine the direction Tunisia would take and the type of Constitution it would gain. This 
however tapped into the fears and apprehensions of many Tunisians, especially those who 
considered themselves secular, that Ennahdha would seek to impose Shari’a Law through a 
new constitution. 
Ennahdha, in contrast to many other parties could draw on its wide network at grassroots level 
to lead an extremely effective electoral campaign (Churchill, 2011). While many parties chose 
to make use of the free media exposure offered by the national television and radio stations, 
Ennahdha chose to make use of it grassroots network and supply voters with practical 
information on the electoral processes, ballot papers and party symbols, rather than focussing 
solely on its manifesto (Churchill, 2011). This approach ensured that when potential voters 
entered the voting booth, they were able to easily identify Ennahdha on the ballot paper. 
Coupling these public education sessions with being almost the only party to ensure that its 
campaign posters were placed in nearly every designated area, provide Ennahdha with even 
more visibility amongst the voting public when compared to many of the existing and new 
political forces in the country (Carter Centre, 2011, p. 37). Ennahdha’s efforts at ensuring a 
transparent campaign and also being transparent and open in its electoral approach once again 
provided further evidence of its democratic nature and showed that political Islam was not only 
compatible with democratic theory, but that in practice political Islam was characteristically 
democratic. 
The regulations put in place by the ISIE were perhaps the greatest stumbling blocks to a really 
competitive election and also clouded the truly democratic nature of the elections. It could be 
argued that overly restrictive electoral laws could be used to guide elections in a specific 
direction by restricting the freedoms of political parties to put across their message. As Murphy 
(2013, p. 237) points out, the efforts to ensure a level playing field and to maintain legitimacy 
in the eyes of the public created unnecessary pressures on both the ISIE and the parties. While 
freedoms should be respected during elections, the equality of political parties and ensuring 
this equality is an important responsibility of the electoral commission towards the electorate.   
The late application of decisions and inability to effectively apply the rules was observed by 
the Carter Centre in its electoral report (Carter Centre, 2011, p. 35). The inefficiencies in the 
electoral campaign period, in particular relating to public debate and the use of media, meant 
that substantive debate on the main issues facing Tunisia was not prioritised by political parties 
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who would rather focus on trying to convince the electorate whether or not Ennahdha would 
impose an Islamic State in Tunisia (Murphy, 2013). Ennahdha’s biggest battle throughout the 
campaign period was trying to convince the Tunisian population, political analysts, the media 
and their political opponents that they were sincere in their manifesto and that political Islam 
did not mean Shari’a and an Islamic State. In this sense the opposition were successful in 
detracting from the real issues facing the average Tunisian as was articulated during the 2010 
protests. 
During the pre-electoral period, Ennahdha would come under scrutiny form the local media 
and opposition in an effort to discredit their democratic aspirations and to expose political Islam 
as an affront to the democratic aspirations of the Tunisian people. In an opinion piece in the 
influential weekly magazine, Leaders, Samy Ghorbal (2011), expressed great doubts about the 
proposed parliamentary system put forward by Ennahdha in its manifesto. The parliamentary 
system Ennahdha proposed was based on the Westminster model and appealed to the desire by 
many Tunisians to avoid a return to a dictatorial president by removing power from the 
presidency and vesting it in the parliament and a prime minister representing the majority party. 
From a democratic theory perspective Ennahdha could not be faulted for pursuing a system of 
political plurality, transparency and accountability to the people. The Leaders article was based 
on the premise that Ennahdha would win a majority in parliament and use a parliamentary 
system to take control of the country as it pleased, or to create a deadlock if no real majority 
emerges. The point of view expressed by Ghorbal was baseless, in the sense that it revealed 
more a complete lack of understanding of parliamentary systems from a product of the 
autocratic elitism fomented under Ben Ali than a true analysis of the Ennahdha proposal. In 
fact, Ennahdha’s parliamentary proposal was echoed by most other parties as the most effective 
solution to neuter the presidency, the position where Tunisians felt power should no longer be 
centralised. 
Surprisingly the general reaction to Ennahdha’s manifesto was muted in the local media. With 
a solid proposed platform and a strong focus on ensuring religious ambiguity (Piser K. , 2016) 
much of the criticism levelled against Ennahdha surrounded the historical activities of its 
leaders, questions about its economic projects and the creation of doubt that the programme 
was sincere and that the lack of language supporting Shari’a law was merely a ruse. This 
approach however did not succeed in diminishing Ennahdha’s support. Polling leading up to 
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the election continued to show Ennahdha at 40% (Soudani, 2011). This would ensure that 
although Ennahdha would not secure an absolute majority, it would be in a strong position to 
be asked to form a government. At the time though, these polling results were not taken as 
strong indicators by the public. These results contrasted strongly from an early poll also 
conducted by Sigma Conseil in February 2011 (Clémençot, 2011) showing that the Tunisian 
people had very little knowledge of political movements in the country. Apart from the RCD 
the Ennahdha Movement was cited by nearly 26% of respondents. The reason for this was that 
the electoral code contained a provision which prevented polling from taking place during the 
electoral campaign period (LM, 2011). The rationale behind such a decision was that there was 
an absence of a legal framework for opinion polling, and also the lack of a watchdog body to 
ensure fairness and compliance with transparency. 
In an attempt to counter the doubt surrounding the sincerity of its electoral programme and its 
commitment to democracy and equal rights, Ennahdha’s leaders spoke in favour of a 
Government of National Unity and strong coalition government in order to ensure that the 
transitional period would address all concerns. Ennahdha also signed up to the electoral pact 
which sought to limit the transitional period of the Constituent Assembly to one year, during 
which a new Constitution would be drafted (Ghali, 2011). These steps were aligned with the 
rhetoric of the Movement both prior to the revolution as well as the period immediately after 
the revolution. Ennahdha remained true to its political Islam identity and its desire for 
democratisation of Tunisia. 
As previously mentioned, many observers noted in their post electoral reports that Ennahdha’s 
visibility and door to door efforts during the electoral campaign period are likely to have been 
the greatest contributor to its high vote count. Such observations support the claims that 
Ennahdha secured electoral victory through sheer street level presence and superior 
organisation throughout the territory when compared to all other parties. In addition, as the 
most prominent historical opponent of the Ben Ali regime, Ennahdha was seen as a vote in 
opposition of the Ben Ali years while also being viewed as a trustworthy and moral vote on the 
basis of its religious credentials. (Gana, Van Hamme, & Ben Rebah, 2012). This latter view 
fits well with the notion that political Islam brings a different perspective to democratic politics, 
in that the moral code and ethics of Islam translate into a politics of trust and accountability to 
the community of faithful or Ummah. In a country where the legacy of corruption, nepotism 
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and propaganda were still fresh in the minds of the voters, Ennahdha’s platform would prove 
enticing to the undecided voters.  
4.5 The 2011 elections, Ennahdha rises to power 
Following a short electoral campaign period, Tunisians were called to the ballot boxes on 23 
October 2011 for the electoral period. Queues at polling stations were long and surprisingly 
patient. Following years of elections with no political plurality or with preordained outcomes, 
a sense of optimism gripped the country. Despite only being elections for a Constituent 
Assembly, this first exercise of democratic freedoms carried more than just symbolic 
significance. For the first time party lists in a large number of constituencies saw a large number 
of female candidates participating, with a number of female candidates at the head of lists. 
Efforts to encourage parity by the ISIE were deemed a relative success. A number of youths 
were also represented, a clear nod towards the important role the youth had in the fall of Ben 
Ali and recognition of the contribution they could make to building a democratic Tunisia.  
Of particular significance was the neutrality of the military, who were deployed to secure 
polling stations, but who also chose to remain silent observers. Interestingly the police, 
National Guard and military forces are not allowed to vote in Tunisia (Dreisbach & Ben Said, 
2014). This is done in an effort to ensure their political neutrality and to ensure loyalty to the 
Republic above all else. This decision was also important in the context of the police state 
present during the Ben Ali era and the high level of mistrust of the police by the Tunisian 
public. 
According to the figures reported to the media by the ISIE on 14 November 2011, of the nearly 
8.3 million eligible voters, just over 4.3 million voters registered in Tunisia and abroad. Only 
2.7 million or 68% of the votes were sufficient for seats in the Constituent Assembly. Official 
turnout was approximately 52% of eligible voters, or around 4 million eligible votes (Gamha, 
2011). 
Initial results pointed to a close correlation of results to preliminary polling (Bustos, 2011, p. 
6). Ennahdha appeared to be heading for 40% of the vote, indicating effective success in the 
electoral campaign and also strong belief in a new order form the Tunisian electorate, although 
some observers have analysed the result being as a consequence of protest voting against any 
parties linked to the old regime (Guazzone, 2013, p. 31). Ennahdha received 89 seats in the 217 
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seat Constituent Assembly, ahead of the CPR with 29 seats and Ettakatol with 20 seats (Gamha, 
2011).  While Ennahdha and the CPR improved on their polling predictions it is important to 
contextualise the results within an election where only five political parties fielded candidates 
in all 33 constituencies, both in Tunisia and abroad (Bustos, 2011, p. 6).  
The result however meant that Ennahdha would need to seek coalition partners in order to form 
a government. The Movement was however prepared for this scenario and it was one with 
which they were comfortable as they had shown through the 18 October Movement 
participation as well as in their support for a Government of National Unity. Preliminary 
discussions commenced almost immediately with the CPR movement of Moncef Marzouki, as 
well as the Ettakatol party of Mustapha Ben Jaafar (LeMonde.fr, 2011). The Decision by 
Ennahdha to align with leftist parties, may have come down to the fact that neither party ran 
an anti-Ennahdha platform during the electoral campaign (Le Roux, 2011). A further 
consideration would be the lack of former government officials within the ranks of the two 
parties, as the election clearly showed that the Tunisian population were seeking alternatives. 
The coalition between Ennahdha, CPR and Ettakatol would become known as the Troika 
government. The agreement reached on 21 November 2011 between the three parties was that 
Ennahdha would take up the powerful position of Head of Government or Prime Minister, 
while Ettakatol would be given the position of President of the Constituent Assembly and the 
CPR would be given the largely ceremonial position of interim President of the Republic 
(AlBawsala, 2012). The first order of business following the elections would be the 
establishment of the National Constituent Assembly (NCA) which would oversee the drafting 
of the Tunisian Constitution. Initially elected for only a year, the NCA held its first sitting on 
22 November 2011 during which session Mustapha Ben Jaafar was elected President of the 
Assembly by 145 votes to 68 (AlBawsala, 2012). The first Deputy President of the NCA was 
Meherzia Laabidi of Ennahdha, the most senior woman in government and a strong proponent 
of Women’s Rights in Tunisia, despite her Islamist roots. Amongst the first orders of business 
of the NCA was the adoption of the internal rules and regulations and what became known as 
the “mini-constitution” in the form of Constituent Law no 6 of 2011 on 16 December 2011. 
This law was titled the Provisional Organisation of Public Powers and would remain in effect 
until the adoption of the new constitution, which at the time was thought to be only a year away 
(AlBawsala, 2012). 
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Chapter IV of the Constituent Law sets out the articles for the election of the Executive, 
including the President and Prime Minister. Amongst the conditions to be met for candidature 
to the Presidency are Tunisian citizenship and parental lineage as well as the important 
requirement that the successful candidate renounce any party-political roles and activities, a 
complete departure from the norm in Tunisia (Tunisian Presidency, 2011). Out of ten 
candidates who were nominated, only Moncef Marzouki met the criteria set out, and he was 
subsequently appointed as interim President on 12 December 2011 (AlBawsala, 2012).  
As per the regulations set out in the Constituent Law, President Marzouki held consultations 
with the leadership of the leading party, Ennahdha, and asked its preferred candidate for Prime 
Minister, Hamadi Jebali, to form a government on 14 December 2011. Mr Jebali announced a 
provisional cabinet and presented the governmental programme to the NCA on 22 December 
2011. Following heated debate and criticism over some appointments, the NCA provided its 
approval of the government of Prime Minister Jebali by 154 votes in favour, 38 against and 11 
abstentions (AlBawsala, 2012).  
4.6  Ennahdha in government 
The previous section was needed in order to show that Ennahdha as a political Islam movement 
understood the need to be inclusive in its governance approach and to reinforce their position 
that while they seek to restore the importance of Islam in society, this would be approached 
through a multi-party coalition approach to ensure that there is widespread agreement on how 
a post-revolutionary Tunisia should look.  
Prior to the announcement of his cabinet, Prime Minister Jebali elaborated on the proposed 
programme of his government. The main points remained true to the Ennahdha manifesto and 
the challenges facing a post Ben Ali Tunisia. Specifically mentioned were the challenge of 
overcoming unemployment by exploiting cooperation with Tunisia’s neighbours, the need to 
prioritise development and investment in the inland areas of the country, and the respect for 
human rights and enforcing political freedoms (Ghribi, 2011). The tenets of liberal democracy 
were once again clearly highlighted through this programme proposed by a political Islam 
movement and supports the symbiotic relationship between the two theories in practice. 
The composition of the first Jebali government saw Ennahdha dominate a list of 30 Ministers 
and 11 Secretaries of State. Ennahdha supplied 19 members of the Government, CPR 6 and 
  
 
 
 
67 
Ettakatol 6 with 11 Independents. Despite the electoral calls for female representation only 3 
members of the Government were female (Nawaat.org, 2011). Ennahdha ensured that it 
secured the prized portfolios of Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister of Justice and Minister 
of the Interior. These appointments were not without criticism. The Minister of the Interior, Ali 
Laarayedh, was a former political prisoner who endured many years of the severest torture 
under the Ben Ali regime and is known to be one of the more conservative members of the 
Ennahdha Movement. The most contentious appointment was that of Ghannouchi’s son in law, 
Rafik Abdessalam as Minister of Foreign Affairs (Mzioudet, 2011) with questions about his 
competency and knowledge of foreign affairs being raised alongside fears of nepotism, the 
latter being common practice in the Ben Ali era. Post-revolutionary Tunisia appears to favour 
technocrats over political appointments. This was frequently mentioned when speaking to 
Tunisians on the streets and in the cafés of the capital Tunis12. It appears that this desire for 
technocrats is a remnant of the bureaucratic nature of the state adopted from France during the 
time of Habib Bourguiba. However, in a multi-party state as emerged after the revolution, it 
was to be expected that political parties and movements would source from within their ranks 
when choosing Ministers and heads of government departments, regardless of competencies or 
experience. 
In this post electoral phase, Ennahdha would be watched very closely on two fronts. The first 
would be as the government, the second in the NCA. As government, Ennahdha was expected 
to immediately start the task of addressing the challenges facing Tunisia in a post Ben Ali era. 
As previously elaborated, many of these challenges were identified and outlined in the electoral 
manifesto of Ennahdha, the task at hand was now to develop and implement strategies or 
policies aimed at addressing these challenges. Of particular interest in this phase would be the 
influence of Islam on the approach adopted by the government. 
Almost three months after its appointment the government of Prime Minister Jebali presented 
its programme of action to the NCA. With a strong slant towards creation of employment and 
an economic recovery, the programme was widely welcomed. The interior and South of the 
                                               
 
12 From June 2012 to June 2016 the author was stationed at the South African 
Embassy in Tunisia and held numerous discussions with Tunisians during the course 
of his work on various subjects relating to the political situation in the country. 
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country would stand to benefit the most in an effort to address inequalities created by the Ben 
Ali and Bourguiba regimes. Keeping true to its Islamic fundamentals, Ennahdha pushed for 
service delivery improvements for the poor and increasing the social security reach to the 
poorest areas. These activities sat well with Ennahdha and were a comfortable fit in 
implementing these efforts with the additional funding of government now within its power. It 
is in this area specifically of poverty alleviation and improving access to public services where 
Ennahdha showed its true political Islam credentials. The principled approach and cornerstones 
of Islam which advocate caring for those less fortunate and aiming for equality were well 
merged with the democratic approach where poorer constituencies saw potential in receiving 
assistance by voting for Ennahdha. Ennahdha also ensured that key bureaucratic positions went 
to its members in order to assist in implementing their programme. Ennahdha’s success was 
however often curtailed by the challenging economic situation which prevailed in Tunisia. An 
economy reliant on tourism revenues and agricultural exports along with foreign investment in 
infrastructure and human capital was struggling to find its feet. Despite the optimism achieved 
through the 2011 elections, uncertainty continued to dampen economic prospects in difficult 
global economic circumstances. Difficult economic conditions would not be the only challenge 
to Ennahdha’s aim of creating an Islamic democracy. 
In her brief on Ennahdha’s first nine months in office, Sarah Feuer (2012) identifies three key 
challenges faced by Ennahdha in trying to implement its vision. The first of these is named as 
the threat of secular opposition parties and NGOs who provided stern opposition on matters of 
religion and the state, women’s rights, free speech and the political system to be adopted in the 
constitution (Feuer, 2012). Contrary to its electoral campaign and the position taken by Rached 
Ghannouchi, several conservative members of Ennahdha’s bloc in the NCA put forward a 
proposal to include Sharia as the source of law in the constitution (Feuer, 2016). Rached 
Ghannouchi distanced the party from the position and the Members of the NCA were called to 
order. However, when this proposal is seen in conjunction with the protests by several thousand 
Salafis on the streets of Tunis in support of the inclusion of Sharia in the constitution on two 
occasions (Lamboley, 2012) the outrage of secularist parties becomes evident. In response to 
outrage over art exhibitions which were deemed blasphemous, the Ennahdha Bloc proposed a 
law which would outlaw Blasphemy. This proposed provision came despite assurances that 
Ennahdha supported freedom of expressions and religion, as long as these did not go against 
the Islamic morals and identity of Tunisia (Sadek, 2013). Ultimately, despite cleavages within 
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the secular opposition and even amongst the members of the Troika, the proposal was 
withdrawn, as had been done with the earlier proposal for Shari’a to be the ultimate source of 
law (Feuer, 2012).  
Towards the middle of 2012 Ennahdha would bear witness to the creation of the Nidaa Tounes 
(Call of Tunisia) party under the leadership of former interim Prime Minister Beji Caid Essebsi. 
The octogenarian politician had a well-established political pedigree and despite links to the 
regimes of Bourguiba (his mentor) and Ben Ali, his credentials were strengthened by his 
resignation from the Ben Ali government. Essebsi credits the confusion in the ranks of the 
opposition and the ineffectiveness of Ennahdha and the Troika government with his decision 
to re-enter politics. Nidaa Tounes offered a home to former RCD politicians, the Destourian 
(constitutional) movement and secularists who feared the rising power of the Ennahdha 
movement and its Islamist policies.  
Despite criticism that it was allowing former RCD members back into public life, Nidaa Tounes 
quickly saw a rise in membership and even attracted some defectors from parties within the 
NCA, leading to a Nidaa Tounes bloc forming in NCA despite it not contesting the elections. 
Service delivery protests and general unhappiness in the interior region of Siliana which saw a 
violent crackdown by security forces, prompted Nidaa Tounes to form a grand coalition of 
opposition parties who sought to dethrone the Troika.  
This posed an immediate challenge to the Ennahdha led government and its ability to maintain 
law and order, as well as to respect freedom of expression. It also pointed to the very clear 
Islamist/secular divide which would continue to permeate Tunisian society (Berman, 2014). 
How Ennahdha would respond to these demands was under close scrutiny by the media, 
opposition parties and the international community, looking to Ennahdha as a moderate Islamic 
party and proponent of political Islam. An organised secular opposition questioning the ability 
of democracy and Islam to coexist would place enormous pressure upon the leadership of 
Ennahdha to not compromise its positions and ideals. 
The second challenge identified by Feuer (2012) is that of the divisions within the Ennahdha 
movement. Despite showing unity in the run-up to elections, the practice of governing and 
legislating opened up some cleavages within the Ennahdha movement. In particular between 
the more moderate and centrist leadership of Rached Ghannouchi and his followers and a more 
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conservative emerging youth within the movement such as the Members of Parliament who 
proposed the inclusion of Shari’a in the constitution, Habib Elouz and Sadek Chourou (2012, 
p. 6). While diverging views emerged, the ability of Ennahdha to compromise internally and 
maintain democratic traits should be highlighted. The 2012 Ennahdha congress saw a more 
balanced and mixed crop of leaders emerge within the Shura council of the movement in order 
to accommodate the different views. Such a decision by Ennahdha members ultimately shows 
that the movement remains committed to democracy on the basis of Islamic principles, in other 
words, political Islam (Zahar, 2012). 
The third, and potential most problematic, challenge faced by Ennahdha was that of the 
Salafists (Feuer, 2012). Even before the elections, the Salafi movement started agitating for 
Tunisia to turn towards an Islamic state with Sharia as its source of law. As Marks (2015, p. 5) 
points out the rise of a radical Salafi movement in Tunisia was strange even to Ennahdha, who 
had only known a quieter Salafi movement. Ennahdha was quick to lay blame at the feet of 
Bourguiba and Ben Ali for side lining the Zaytouna School and undermining moderate 
Islamism to the extent that the youth in 2011 became influenced by more extremist thinking 
from the Gulf States. Following the elections attacks against art galleries and other symbols of 
a more secular society were carried out in June 2012 leading to major riots and the imposition 
of a curfew (Feuer, 2012).  
The Salafi movement also occupied the University of Tunis calling for a removal of the ban on 
wearing of headscarves and the niqab. As mentioned before large-scale protests calling on 
Ennahdha to implement Sharia were also held. Ennahdha’s approach to the Salafi movement 
was one of internalisation and allowing them to express their views yet urging them to work 
within the democratic electoral system. This approach included attempts at Islamic re-
education for the youth and exposure to more moderate schools of thought (Marks, 2015). 
Whilst the Salafist movements such as Ansar al Sharia enjoyed the support of the more 
conservative wing of Ennahdha, Ghannouchi and his support structures within the movement 
were more cautious and tried to convince the Salafis to reign in their anger.  In September 2012 
international events impacted Tunisia dramatically. A day of rage across the Muslim world 
following a cartoon depicting the Prophet Mohammed emerged, led to a mass march towards 
the US Embassy in Tunis, as the crowd grew violent elements within the crowd started 
attacking the embassy. Fires erupted in the parking area and the neighbouring American 
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International School was looted. The Government’s lack of response was heavily criticised, 
especially aimed at the Minister of the Interior, Ennahdha’s Ali Laarayedh (Marks, 2015, p. 7). 
Facing mounting opposition and with efforts to control the Salafist movement, Ennahdha had 
no option but to denounce the movement and to withdraw Ansar al Sharia’s licence to operate 
as a political party in April 2013, including labelling the movement as a terrorist organisation.  
4.7 Political assassinations and terrorism 
Unrest and criticism of Ennahdha in 2012 would give way to open revolt against the Troika 
government in 2013. Early in 2013, opposition politician, secularist and vocal opponent of the 
rise of Islamism in Tunisia, Chokri Belaid was gunned down outside his home in a Tunis 
suburb. The assassination rocked Tunisians across the country and visibly impacted upon the 
psyche of the middle class. Tunisians would visibly weep at their workplaces or would be 
staring into the distance in contemplation. Anger mounted as media reports started emerging 
pointing the finger of blame at Islamist militants13. Nidaa Tounes, now the leading opposition 
bloc in the NCA led the calls for the government to step down. Prime Minister Jebali appeared 
to be in favour of resignation, however Ennahdha’s Shura Council felt otherwise, believing 
that a resignation would hamper the political Islam project. When Mohamed Brahmi was 
assassinated in a similar style to Belaid, and stronger indications pointed to Islamist militants 
being behind the assassinations, Tunisia was thrown into turmoil. With public perceptions 
fuelling tensions against Ennahdha, opposition parties rallied around Nidaa Tounes and took 
to the streets of Tunis. The general sentiment was that Ennahdha had not done enough to secure 
the country from the threat of Islamist militants, in fact statistics started to emerge on numerous 
Tunisian nationals having joined the jihad in Syria and the newly formed “Islamic State” or 
Daesh as it is known in Tunisia. The optimism of 2011 and 2012 quickly disappeared as the 
economy was not recovering as the government had hoped, tourism, one of the mainstays of 
the economy was under threat from terrorism and instability and the government seemed 
incapable or if the opposition was to be believed, unwilling to take effective steps to address 
these challenges. Inflation at the tills was steeply up with some indications of inflation above 
15%. Unemployment continued to rise, and the bulging university graduate unemployment rate 
was a particular problem for the Ennahdha led troika. Rapid increases in public sector 
                                               
 
13 Personal observations and experiences while working in Tunisia 
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employment placed the budget under strain, along with a mostly accurate trend of Ennahdha 
members being put into top positions in most ministries. A general sense of unease reigned 
over the country. The Ennahdha democratic project was under threat as it failed to guide the 
NCA towards a completion of its tasks within the designated one year. With no sign of a new 
constitution being agreed upon, the opposition labelled the NCA and Government as 
illegitimate, as it initially only had a one-year mandate. Blame for the failures of the NCA 
could not be placed at the feet of Ennahdha alone. Ennahdha’s members had some of the 
highest rates of attendance amongst all members of the NCA. The Ennahdha bloc appeared to 
be disciplined and organised. While disagreements in committees over various articles of the 
constitution, it was by no means the fault of Ennahdha that the constitutional project was not 
advancing. Discord amongst secular opposition parties and calls for greater allowances and 
benefits, unhappiness at working conditions and lengthy holiday breaks by NCA members 
contributed to the frustratingly slow pace of work at the NCA.  
Calls from all corners of Tunisia for a technocratic government to be installed became more 
prominent. The NCA effectively shut down as a result of the walkout by opposition members 
and the Troika’s hand was forced. These calls for the democratic will of the people to be put 
on hold, raised more questions about the democratic credentials and respect for democracy of 
the opposition than it did about Ennahdha.  
4.8 Conclusion 
Ennahdha’s first taste of power and ultimately democracy was not what its members had 
expected. The push back against the inclusion of Islamist principles in all areas of work in line 
with the theory of political Islam was generally not welcomed. Ennahdha was forced to concede 
on a number of issues which essentially nullified its political Islam credentials. Ennahdha as a 
political party was able to claim that it fought for the inclusion of Islamic principles in the work 
of government and the drafting of the new constitution, however it learnt that its slim majority 
was no guarantee that its approach would be adopted. As predicted by Feuer the threat of 
secularism on Ennahdha’s moderate Islamist project would turn out to be a hurdle it could not 
overcome. While secular parties were disorganised in their political activities, the enjoyed the 
support of the people, and a more accurate picture emerged of the Tunisian electorate than that 
of the 2011 elections. The understanding and support of the electorate for a liberal democracy 
did however need to be questioned. Ennahdha’s electoral manifesto, campaign and government 
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programme remained true to its political Islam foundations and to its efforts to merge these 
with the ideals of a liberal democracy. Ennahdha’s failure to take into account public opinion 
is the biggest mistake that it made during this period. Believing that it had a majority support 
despite only half of the eligible electorate turning out to vote showed Ennahdha’s lack of 
political maturity and provided glimpses of a failure to learn from the miscalculations of the 
Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. When more conservative and often radical Islamists despite not 
enjoying the full support of Ennahdha, were widely associated with the Movement, the people 
of Tunisia started to view every activity with suspicion and with a rising fear of the fledgling 
signs of an Islamic state. The assassinations of two popular opponents of Ennahdha and the 
inability of the government to effectively track down the perpetrators rapidly deteriorated any 
remaining trust in the Movement. Despite retaining the position of Prime Minister and keeping 
the Troika in charge of the Presidency and the NCA, effective power was lost by Ennahdha.  
Despite these setbacks, it can be reasonably deduced that Ennahdha followed a political Islam 
approach to the 2011 elections and when entering government. Their relative success during 
this period also points to the ability of political Islam to succeed in a democratic electoral 
environment.  
The following chapter will look at the difficult period of 2013 and the elections of 2014 and 
whether Ennahdha were able to remain consistent on their political Islam approach and how 
events in the country may have pressurised them. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: ENNAHDHA MOVEMENT REINVENTING ITSELF? ANALYSIS 
USING THE 2014 TUNISIAN ELECTIONS 
5.1 Introduction 
The period spanning July 2013 to December 2014 was nearly as tumultuous as the events of 
the Arab Spring. Tunisia had seemingly managed to emerge unscathed out of a revolution and 
was on track to complete its democratic transition following elections for a Constituent 
Assembly in October 2012. The political assassinations of opposition leaders in February and 
July 2013 however pushed the country to the brink of potential collapse. For the Islamist 
Ennahdha Movement this period would be a defining moment for the Government which it led 
and the attempts by the Movement to prove the value and place of political Islam in the 
Tunisian context of democratisation.  
 
The 18-month period would test the resolve of the leadership of Ennahdha, the opposition, the 
security forces of the country as well as the Tunisian people. What became evident during this 
period was the need for compromise on all sides. Absolute positions would not resolve the 
challenges facing the country and its rulers and would not satisfy an angry population who had 
thought that turmoil was behind them. This period would also experience the added pressure 
of an increasingly real and present terrorist threat to a peace-loving nation. 
 
This chapter will attempt to establish the impact of the events of the period on the Ennahdha 
Movement throughout the electoral phases ending in the election of Tunisia’s first 
democratically elected President in December 2014. This chapter will rely on the observations 
of the author during the aforementioned period during which time he was stationed in Tunisia. 
These observations will provide support to the other sources referenced in this chapter. 
  
5.2  Democracy through the streets  
The assassination of Mohamed Brahmi on 25 July 2013 under very similar circumstances to 
those surrounding the assassination of Chokri Belaid, only six months prior, rattled the 
Tunisian people. The shock was palpable on the faces of ordinary Tunisians. Local media 
rushed to provide coverage of the assassination and to try and piece together eyewitness 
accounts. Not a single café, shop or office at the time did not have at least a radio or TV on a 
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news channel. Social media, as it did during the 2011 revolution, provided almost immediate 
access to the news and a healthy dose of speculation.  
As the day progressed, reports of emergency meetings of opposition parties at the Bardo 
parliamentary precinct emerged. It was clear that democracy was under attack and that the 
opposition and the people of Tunisia had lost faith in the government. The public reaction was 
immediate and significant. People poured onto the streets of Avenue Habib Bourguiba in 
central Tunis, especially in the area directly opposite the Ministry of the Interior. In scenes 
reminiscent of the Arab Spring protests, the people of Tunisia again put blame at the foot of 
the security forces and of the Islamist Ennahdha party. The government had announced the day 
before that on the 25th of July – Tunisia’s Republic Day – it would release details of the 
perpetrators of the Belaid assassination. There was a real sense of shock and anger amongst 
many Tunisians.  Media outlets reported that around 500 protestors embarked on a sit-in in 
front of the Interior Ministry and when they attempted to close off the street, the security forces 
resorted to using tear gas to disperse the crowd (Le Monde, 2013). Earlier in the day these 
protestors had gathered in front of the offices the UGTT. The UGTT called for a general strike 
on the following day, 26 July 2013, which led to Tunisair cancelling all its flights into and out 
of the country for that day. In Sidi Bouzid, the birth place of Mohamed Brahmi and the town 
where the Arab Spring started, the people again showed their anger by protesting and clashing 
with police and setting on fire the local Ennahdha office (Le Monde, 2013). 
Ennahdha tried to allay the fears of the protestors, however with very little information the 
people were not convinced. The Prime Minister issued a call for calm, while Rached 
Ghannouchi was quoted on his Facebook page, condemning the assassination as a cowardly 
act and calling upon the government and Ministry of the Interior to capture those responsible 
and to find the people behind them who are aiming to destabilise the country. He also called 
upon all political parties and movements to show restraint and to act responsibly (DM, 2013). 
To worsen matters for the regime, a suspected terrorist attack took place only four days later, 
killing 8 soldiers (TAP, 2013). Terrorism had been a foreign concept for many years under the 
Ben Ali regime, where the strong-arm tactics of the police and their informant networks did 
not create much opportunity for terrorism to enter Tunisia. The influx of weapons from Libya 
and the growing strength of Islamist groups such as Islamic State (IS) and the extremist nature 
of the Salafist movement in Tunisia started to undermine the security forces (Haugbølle, Ghali, 
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et al., 2017, p. 23) For the general population on the streets of Tunisia’s cities, the evidence 
that the Government was no longer in control of security was mounting. 
Under difficult circumstances it is noted that Ennahdha remained true to their democratic 
approach through a respect for the laws of the country, the freedom of citizens to protest and 
made attempts to remain as transparent as possible with information on the investigation into 
the assassination. Once again, the question of whether the Tunisian people were totally 
comfortable with democracy had to be considered as they were seeking solutions that would 
be similar to those deployed during the Ben Ali regime and not in keeping with basic rights 
and freedoms. 
Following the assassination of Chokri Belaid in February 2013 the then prime Minister, 
Mohamed Jebali ended up resigning after he drifted away from the party line in his response 
to the political crises that erupted at the time (Haugbølle, Ghali, Yousfi, Limam, & Grønlykke 
Mollerup, 2017). His successor, the former Interior Minister, Ali Laarayedh, was not a popular 
appointment, especially amongst the political opposition (Amara, 2013). Mr Laarayedh was 
widely blamed for the rise in extremism gripping the country and the ineffective approach by 
security forces. The events at the USA Embassy and American School in September 2012 
happened during his tenure as Interior Minister and damaged the reputation of the country. 
Under his watch as both Interior Minister and Prime Minister very little progress had been 
made in solving the murder of Chokri Belaid. The Tunisian economy was also not performing 
as the government had predicted, or the population had expected. Growth was contracting, and 
inflation was rising. Investments into the country were not at expected levels and the tourism 
industry was taking strain as security concerns started to put off tourists. The major partners of 
Tunisia such as the European Union and the Gulf States were facing financial troubles of their 
own (ECA, 2014; Haugbølle, Ghali, Yousfi, Limam, & Grønlykke Mollerup, 2017). Economic 
freedom was becoming one of the tenets of liberal democracy with which Ennahdha was not 
able to see sufficient progress and which hurt its public image the most. As a key demand of 
the revolution, Tunisia was not registering meaningful growth, unemployment and inflation 
were both rising, and the people were starting to turn away from Ennahdha.  
With the assassination of Mohamed Brahmi, Laarayedh faced the most extreme opposition to 
his position from outside the party. The government had blamed Salafist extremists for the 
assassination of Chokri Belaid, but the opposition and many people who protested on the streets 
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of Tunisia following the Brahmi assassination accused the Ennahdha led government of failing 
to act decisively against Salafi extremists, an accusation which haunted Ennahdha throughout 
2012 and 2013 (Amara, 2013). However, the Prime Minister and Rached Ghannouchi remained 
steadfast in opposing calls for the resignation of the government. Ghannouchi would not give 
up his belief that the elections were to be respected and that Ennahdha had been given a 
mandate to implement the demands of the revolution. Ghannouchi widely condemned the 
assassination and publicly called on the government to find the perpetrators. Prime Minister 
Laarayedh proposed to open up membership of his cabinet to other parties and to hold elections 
on 17 December 2013 (ATS, 2013). This proposal was in line with Ennahdha’s principle of 
consensus and power sharing, a position it had reiterated since 2011. However, despite the offer 
on the table opposition to the Ennahdha led government remained strong. Ennahdha made 
efforts to increase the scope of its consultations by meeting with parties outside of the Troika, 
these meetings however did not meet the expectations of the protestors on the street (Haugbølle, 
Ghalie et al. 2017 p29). 
Several opposition members of the Constituent Assembly announced that they would be 
suspending their participation in the constitution drafting process. Mostly from fringe political 
movements who identified with the leftist political movements of Chokri Belaid and Mohamed 
Brahmi, several Members announced their resignation, throwing the Constituent Assembly into 
disarray (Schneider, 2013). This move was seen by the public in solidarity with the demands 
of the thousands who took to the streets outside the hospital where Brahmi was taken and those 
that had filled the streets outside the Bardo precinct. Thousands took to the streets once the 
heat of the day broke until the early hours of the morning. Key opposition figures worked up 
the crowds and drove the call for the government to resign. The local cafés became meeting 
rooms for discussions with politicians. The opposition movements became organised, stalls 
were erected around the Bardo traffic circle and young people used these as rallying points. 
The cross section of the Tunisian political spectrum was represented, united under a common 
banner.  
Following the nationwide strike called by the UGTT, a sit-in by 60 members of the Constituent 
Assembly continued and the opposition forces joined into a grouping called the Front du Salut 
National (FSN) or National Salvation Front which comprised the Union for Tunisia (coalition 
of Nidaa Tounes, Al Joumhouri and the Democratic Voice) and the coalition of parties falling 
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under the ambit of the Popular Front from which the assassinated Chokri Belaid and Mohamed 
Brahmi both came. The aim of the FSN was to establish a Constitutional Commission which 
would be made up of experts with the aim of drafting the constitution within two months. Their 
second objective was to establish a government of national unity made up of experts and 
reduced in size, with the power to implement drastic measures to save the economy and security 
of the country. This government would be led by an agreed upon national figure and none of 
the members would be paid or contest the elections (FSN, 2013). The FSN would be one of the 
main participants in a march organised on the 6th August 2013, in response to a gathering 
organised by Ennahdha on 3 August 2013. Ennahdha managed to gather several thousand 
supporters outside the Prime Minister’s offices in a show of support for the government and in 
opposition to the numerous verbal and physical attacks suffered by the Ennahdha Movement 
following the assassination of Mohamed Brahmi (ATS, 2013).  
The demands of the FSN were elaborated upon - they called for the dissolution of both the 
NCA and the government, the appointment of a National Salvation government made of no 
more than 15 Ministers with competencies in their portfolios and no political affiliation. The 
NCA was to be dissolved at a sitting of the members and replaced by a committee of experts 
who would be responsible for resolving the problems highlighted by the opposition and 
international experts with the final draft of the constitution. They would then hand over the 
constitution to a political committee which would vote in block on the articles which consensus 
was reached upon and only deal with debate on the articles which remained contentious. They 
were also to finish their work by 23 October 2013 in order to prepare the way for elections 
(Carter Centre, 2014). The FSN put forth a unified position and roadmap for an exit from the 
political stalemate. The first part of the roadmap involved a continuation of the sit-in and 
preparation for the week of departure to start on 24 August where the FSN movement called 
“Rahil” called for civil disobedience and the removal of the government appointments across 
the country through increased protests and sit-ins outside governor’s offices and government 
buildings.  
Several days of protests from secularists and Islamists culminated in a veritable show of force 
on 13 August 2013 with around 40000 people packed into the Bardo precinct calling for the 
removal of Ennahdha from power at the same time as several thousand Ennahdha supporters 
took to the main avenue of Tunis to show their support for the Ennahdha government (Reuters, 
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2013). Ennahdha were fearful of the Egyptian scenario replaying itself in Tunisia. With that in 
mind Rached Ghannouchi sought to find a solution. 
On 15 August 2013 a significant moment in the political history of Tunisia occurred. A 
clandestine meeting arranged by opposition politician Slim Riahi in a Paris hotel room put 
Rached Ghannouchi and Beji Caid Essebsi (BCE) together for the first time since efforts at a 
national dialogue was launched. According to sources close to the meeting the two leaders were 
keen to meet to find a way out of the political deadlock and had agreed for the need to have a 
national dialogue. Nida Tounes confirmed that the meeting was at the insistence of foreign 
partners, including Qatar, the USA and Germany. A key outcome of the meeting was that 
Rached Ghannouchi and Ennahdha were inadvertently recognising the role and importance of 
BCE and Nida Tounes in the Tunisian political landscape (Dahmani, 2013). Preceding this 
important meeting, Ghannouchi held various meetings with opposition politicians from all 
parties but with little progress. The USA Ambassador attempted to mediate, while Houcine 
Abassi, the Secretary-General of the UGTT continued to engage Ennahdha. At all times 
Ennahdha remained open to a process of national dialogue, however it was not willing to 
renounce its control over government (Haugbølle, Ghalie et al. 2017 p30). At stake for 
Ennahdha was its legitimate claim to political power as a result of the elections in 2011. The 
challenge it was facing was that relying on that legitimacy would not translate into popular 
support, and therefore would lead to a contested constitution and put the transition at risk.  
The Deputy President of the NCA, Mehrezia Labidi emphasised this realisation by Ennahdha 
during an interview conducted with her on 27 August 2013. Mrs Labidi indicated that the 
demand for the dissolution of the NCA would only worsen the situation. She recalled that the 
NCA is the result of the legitimate will of the Tunisian people and it would send a very bad 
signal for democracy if it were to be dissolved. Mrs Labidi explained that many people have 
failed to accept the success of Ennahdha at the polls in 2011, particularly by the political elite 
that failed. She goes on to accuse this political elite of having benefitted from the old regime 
and wanting to destabilise the country and return to a situation where political Islam is side 
lined and labelled as a failure. She elaborated on the notion of these political elite as having 
control over business, the media and artists, control which they use to influence public opinion.  
The role of outside forces was discussed, with other Arab countries being accused of fearing 
the success of political Islam as it would prove that democracy and religion can coexist and 
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would threaten their autocratic dictatorships. She believed that these parties would continue to 
support the forces in the opposition who would like to side line Ennahdha and who would then 
fill the void and complete the work that has already been done and take the credit for it. They 
would then allow Ennahdha to exist but in a very restricted sense and not as full participants to 
democracy in Tunisia. 
When asked about the statements released at the time by her party leader Sheikh Ghannouchi, 
she expressed agreement that he had extended a conciliatory hand but did raise the prospect 
that maybe he had overextended himself. She shared that Ennahdha had been trying to ensure 
that violence did not interrupt attempts to dialogue, by ensuring that its supporters stayed away 
from the sit-in. She expressed concern at the incitement to violence and hate speech from 
opposition members such as Mongi Marzouk, Hamma Hammami and Samir Bettaieb who had 
all described Ennahdha members as not being Tunisian. She was particularly concerned that 
this tendency would lead to what was seen in Rwanda, and even more so that the West saw the 
aforementioned people as defenders of democracy. She also raised the example of the amount 
of money being spent by the opposition on the sit-in with examples of members of the 
Assembly being offered money to join the sit-in.  
Mrs Labidi was of the opinion that the greatest challenge for Tunisia at that stage was the 
political situation, made worse by a lack of trust between the role players. Her view was that 
only through the guarantee of Tunisia’s friends, could compromises and agreements be made 
to take the country out of the situation. She admitted that the fears of the opposition were 
legitimate in many cases, however, was concerned about who could guarantee the good faith 
of the FSN if Ennahdha were to make more concessions. Mrs Labidi felt that the UGTT was 
not a credible mediator as it maintained its own position and had a very militant wing opposed 
to Islam. 
Mrs Labidi expressed with evident despair the fact that on 24 July 2013, a day before the 
assassination of Mohamed Brahmi, great strides had been made with regard to the constitution 
and that consensus had been reached on the articles relating to rights and liberties and that they 
were very near to consensus on the preamble and founding principles. Mrs Labidi also claimed 
that the youth of the revolution were all employed and that is why they were not on the streets, 
to the great despair of the opposition. The law which was passed to offer employment to the 
injured of the revolution was one of the best pieces of legislation the NCA passed according to 
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Mrs Labidi. She again reiterated that the crisis was a political one and that she felt that Sheikh 
Ghannouchi had the experience to take unpopular decisions in the best interest of Tunisia due 
to his exposure to the UK system of democracy. 
In here assessment of the situation at the time Mrs Labidi as a leading member of the Ennahdha 
Movement provided evidence of the influence of liberal democracy on the approach of a 
political Islam movement. At no time were the views expressed divergent from either the tenets 
of liberal democracy or of the principles of political Islam. In fact, she was effective in showing 
that Ennahdha would continue to pursue democracy within a context of respect for the morals 
and beliefs that underpin Islam. Her fear of a Rwandan genocide scenario supported 
Ennahdha’s approach of respect for religious beliefs of others and further showed that 
Ennahdha had accepted the plurality of views which existed in Tunisia. 
In the face of Ennahdha’s refusal to dissolve the government, the walkout by a third of 
opposition Members and the mounting pressure from the streets of Tunisia on the NCA to act, 
the President of the NCA, Mustapha Ben Jaafar unilaterally suspended the activities of the 
NCA. This was a surprise decision by a member of the Troika, but one that led to all parties 
reassessing their positions and the way forward (Business News, 2013). Ben Jaafar made a 
direct plea to the political parties and the UGTT to find a solution to the impasse that had been 
blocking the work of the NCA prior to the assassination. The decision by Ben Jaafar would 
also impact on Prime Minister Laarayedh’s ability to stick to the timetable he had committed 
of elections by December 2013. The decision to suspend the work of the NCA was met with 
criticism by the Ennahdha and CPR members of the Troika, who labelled the unilateral decision 
to be illegal. The Ettakatol party still remained part of the Troika, however they supported the 
decision by their leader as two members of the party joined the sit-in, effectively preventing 
the NCA from moving forward on any issues. The UGTT undertook a role as mediator to the 
political crisis and held a number of discussions with both Ennahdha and representatives of the 
FSN.  
On 21 August 2013 the author met with the International Relations Coordinator of Nidaa 
Tounes, Dr Zied Mhirsi as well as a member of the Executive Bureau of Nidaa Tounes, Mrs 
Wafa Makhlouf. A discussion on the political situation was held and clarity sought on Nidaa 
Tounes’ vision for a resolution of the current stalemate as well as the way forward. They 
indicated that Nidaa Tounes was sticking to the position of the FSN and that they did not see 
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any other viable solution for Tunisia. They remained sceptical about the possibility of elections 
in 2013 and also indicated that their electoral plan and campaign had been put on hold as they 
did not see the need to prepare for an election which was not going to take place in the short 
term. When pushed for more details on the meeting between the leader of Nidaa Tounes and 
the leader of Ennahdha, they were not willing to elaborate other than to indicate that the 
rumoured plan discussed during the meeting of putting Beji Caid Essebsi in the Presidency was 
not on the table. 
The UGTT formally proposed a national dialogue on the basis of certain conditions which were 
very close to the demands of the FSN, except that they did not call for the dissolution of the 
NCA. On 22 August following his third meeting with the UGTT Secretary General, Rached 
Ghannouchi announced that Ennahdha had accepted to commence dialogue on the basis of the 
UGTT proposal. The national dialogue called for by the UGTT could only commence if all 
sides agreed to the proposals on the table for discussion.  
On 22 August 2013 the author visited the sit-in outside the NCA to meet with parliamentarians 
and protestors to get more views on the situation in Tunisia at the time. Mrs Nadia Chaabane 
from the El Massar party and one of the NCA members participating in the sit-in was positive 
that the pressure being put on Ennahdha and the Troika by the FSN would pay off. She noted 
that the presence of around 30 young men who maintained a constant vigil and presence at the 
sit-in “camp” was an example of the problems of Tunisia and the inability of the current 
government to resolve them. Most of these young men were university graduates including 
engineers and an English teacher among those spoken to. The people present at the sit-in were 
never more than around 50, however the numbers reached several hundred in the evenings. The 
members of the NCA were adamant that the NCA had failed and that it needed to dissolve itself 
if Tunisia was ever to get out of the current situation. Mr Selim Ben Abdesselem formerly from 
Ettakatol and representing Nidaa Tounes shared some of the tactics employed by Ennahdha to 
try and dissolve the sit-in. He referred to a taxi strike which occurred during the day of the visit 
and noted how the reason for the strike – the blockage of traffic at the site of the sit-in – was 
not relevant as other routes existed around the area and traffic was flowing through the sit-in 
area which was situated on the sidewalk. He also produced a letter printed on the official 
letterhead of the employer’s union, UTICA and having the round stamp of UTICA, calling for 
taxi drivers to participate in the strike. UTICA however was adamant that they did not support 
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the strike and supported the FSN position. A taxi driver who came over to the sit-in reported 
receiving payments from local Ennahdha offices to join the strike. The divergence of political 
views and ideology present at the sit-in was eye opening as the broad spectrum of political 
views was present but united in its demand for the removal of the government. Rather than 
create doubt over the viability of political Islam within a democratic system, the evidence that 
was presented pointed to a respect for differing political views as the sit-in was allowed to 
proceed. Allegations of meddling by Ennahdha through payments and instigation of strikes 
could not be corroborated but did show that the Tunisian political class were still divided by a 
secular/Islam divide. 
On 24 August 2013 the “week of Departure” campaign was launched with much expectation 
(HuffPost Maghreb, 2013), however social media commentary on the event was generally 
filled with disappointment, as attendance was low and the political speeches made did not seem 
to inspire those who were present. The campaign took place across the country with varying 
degrees of success. Media reports noted several small protests marches as well as sit-ins in 
front of municipal offices and Governor’s offices. While one of the aims was to force the 
resignation of Governors, this move was countered by the government as new Governors were 
announced in most of the governorates in Tunisia on the 23rd of August. This announcement 
coupled with the announcement on 22 August of several changes within the Military hierarchy 
took the opposition and its supporters by surprise.  
Rached Ghannouchi appeared on the private television station, Nessma TV, for the first time 
on 25 August (Nessma TV, 2013), whereby he was interviewed on the situation in Tunisia and 
efforts at exiting the political status quo. By all accounts he took a conciliatory tone during the 
interview with the main points of interest being his reiteration that Ennahdha had accepted the 
UGTT proposal as the basis for national dialogue and that they were willing to have an 
“Elections Government” appointed which would guide the country through the elections. He 
stated however that this would only happen once the constitution was completed, the electoral 
commission elected, and the electoral law adopted.  
He further indicated that the independent and technocratic members of this new government 
would not be able to participate in the elections. He also expressed his desire that President 
Moncef Marzouki should also not be eligible to stand for the elections, unless he chooses to do 
so, at which point he would need to step down immediately. This statement was not well 
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received by the CPR, who responded through the Secretary-General, Mr Imed Daimi, who 
called on Ennahdha to respect its partners in the Troika and to not make unilateral statements 
outside of the agreed upon positions taken during consultative meetings (HuffPost Maghreb, 
2013). 
Significantly, Mr Ghannouchi also indicated that Ennahdha would no longer push for the 
adoption of the so-called immunisation law that would exclude former RCD members from the 
elections, claiming that Ennahdha wanted to use dialogue and reconciliation during this 
difficult time in Tunisia to resolve differences. The CPR, who strongly favoured the law, 
reacted negatively to the statement as did Ennahdha members on social media platforms 
(HuffPost Maghreb, 2013). Within his own party the statement was heavily criticised, including 
by the conservative Minister of Health at the time, Mr Abdelatif Mekki. Mr Mekki indicated 
that the position was not that of Ennahdha, but the personal opinion of Mr Ghannouchi. 
Minister Mekki further went on to indicate that the immunisation law would be debated in the 
NCA, but only after more critical items had been handled. During his interview, Mr 
Ghannouchi also painted a very positive picture of Tunisia and claimed that detractors should 
stop saying the country is in trouble, as access to amenities and infrastructure as well as full 
hotels proved otherwise. 
On 26 August 2013, a meeting was held with Mr Seyyid Ferjani a senior member of Ennahdha 
and also adviser to the former Prime Minister, Hamedi Jebali, to discuss the current political 
and security situation in Tunisia. Mr Ferjani reiterated much of the elements exposed by his 
party leader during the Nessma TV interview. He added that for Ennahdha a government of 
Elections would mean that all leadership in government would have to step down as well, 
including the President and President of the NCA. He indicated that for his party the 
continuation of the work of the NCA was critical. He expressed a positive view of Ennahdha’s 
current support and cautioned at the true level of support for the opposition who do not have 
the numbers being claimed and are also composed of many small parties. Mr Ferjani expressed 
his view that Saudi Arabia, Jordan and the UAE are behind efforts to destabilise the region and 
especially in Egypt and Tunisia.  This analysis provides insight into the cleavages that exist 
within the Muslim community of states. While sharing common religious foundations, the 
political application of Islam has been handled differently across the MENA region, as has 
been explained in Chapter two. Mr Ferjani has confirmed this when he indicated that support 
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from Qatar and Turkey was being received as both countries had invested in the Tunisian 
transition and were seeking to maintain their involvement, especially given their side lining in 
Egypt. Apart from Turkey, the other countries mentioned are all monarchies and supports the 
general view that the monarchies of the MENA region are not ready to accept a linkage between 
Islam and politics. This could however be as a result of their reluctance for liberal democracy 
in their monarchies and a fear of the close nature of the relationship between political Islam, 
such as that in Tunisia and democratisation. 
He felt confident however that Tunisia could avoid the Egyptian scenario as the government 
and Ennahdha had made sure that through careful appointments made within the security 
structures and military on 22 August 2013 that the Egyptian scenario would not unfold in 
Tunisia. Mr Ferjani also confirmed the involvement of the Germans and the European Union 
in pushing for negotiations. He further noted the involvement of the USA at all levels in Tunisia 
and that it was seeking to reestablish its footprint in the region. Mr Ferjani, like Nidaa Tounes 
denied that any plans to have the leader of Nidaa Tounes named President were on the table. 
Despite the confidence expressed by Rached Ghannouchi and Mr Ferjani in the process going 
forward, Ennahdha remained under pressure from several camps.   
As protesters persisted with their activities during the long hot summer evenings and days, a 
quartet of influential non-partisan and technically apolitical organisations stepped to the fore 
with a political roadmap for Tunisia to complete its democratic transition. The heavyweight 
UGTT, UTICA, the Tunisian Human Rights League (LTDH), and the Tunisian Order of 
Lawyers became known after the fact as the National Dialogue Quartet. The UGTT led the way 
following the success of its national strike on 26 July 2013. Listening to the street, the 
opposition and Ennahda, the Quartet launched a proposal for a National Dialogue process and 
put on the table a roadmap. The big problem for Ennahdha was that none of these four 
organisations was in favour of religion in politics. In fact, the Quartet were more in sync with 
the political leanings of the opposition and in particular Nidaa Tounes. 
5.3  The Quartet sets the course 
The UGTT itself started to engage with civil society, realising that the task of mediating the 
National Dialogue was too heavy a burden on its structures, but that it also needed to provide 
a balanced approach to the Dialogue in order for it to succeed. UTICA under the leadership of 
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Wided Bouchamaoui, the first female leader of the employer’s union, was as concerned about 
the direction of the country as the worker’s union and an unlikely alliance would emerge 
through the engagements with the UGTT (Haugbølle, Ghali et al. 2017 p31-33).  
In a decision that would lead to the Quartet winning the Nobel Peace Prize in 2015, a road map 
was developed by the respected members of the Quartet which would set the course towards 
elections and an end to the transitional period. The Quartet were not elected officials and as 
such had only the legitimacy of the support it was enjoying from the streets of Tunisia, and 
outside the Bardo parliamentary precinct in particular (Ben Hamadi, 2015). Their objective 
was rather simple, a clear timetable with the commitment from all political parties for the 
conclusion of the constitution drafting process and the holding of presidential and legislative 
elections within the shortest reasonable period possible. Their argument was simple yet 
effective, Tunisia was sliding backwards into complete failure and only brave and decisive 
leadership could put it back on track (Haugbølle, Ghali et al. 2017 p35).  
The National Dialogue under the guidance of the Quartet needed to get the buy in of the 
Ennahdha led government and the Ennahdha Movement itself. Haugbølle, Ghali et al. 
interviewed several leaders of the various stakeholders and Ennahdha’s leaders were clear that 
the initial proposals by the Quartet were not in their interest as they favoured the opposition, 
however over time the proposal was toned down and took on board some of the conditions 
requested by Ennahdha (2017, p35). 
What would follow over the next months were long and difficult discussions, debates and 
negotiations between the Quartet and the political forces of the country. During this period 
Ennahdha found itself isolated. Clearly at a disadvantage against a growing united opposition 
movement consisting not only of the political opposition, but also the powerful historically 
influential groupings of the Quartet, Ennahdha became fearful of a return of the Ben Ali regime 
through an Egypt style coup d’état or the eruption of civil war. This fear was heightened by the 
emergence of the Nida Tounes movement and its membership consisting of former regime 
elements (Reuters, 2013). 
Ennahdha’s political Islam programme was under threat from all quarters. Its proposals for an 
Islamist leaning constitution and the creation of an Islamic State were rolled back after pressure 
from the opposition and the Tunisian people. Its principled position around legitimacy of the 
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democratic process and the need to develop strong democratic institutions to support the 
transition were contested by the opposition, who accused Ennahdha of double discourse 
(Haugbølle, Ghali et al. 2017 p36). Secular forces in the country became emboldened by the 
support of the Quartet who strongly favoured the retention of the historically secular character 
of the state. Tunisians were also now realising that Ennahdha had ballooned the size of the civil 
service, now filled with thousands of Ennahdha sympathisers and supporters. Women started 
to wear headscarves in government departments, believing that this would ensure that they 
would have upward mobility if they were seen to be supportive of the Ennahdha way. The 
Hijab or headscarf became a more prominent sight all over Tunisia as women felt more 
harassed (Dettmer, 2013). Ennahdha however continued to dismiss fears of an Islamisation of 
Tunisian society.  
Even before the assassination of Brahmi, Ennahdha became deeply concerned by developments 
in Egypt. Strongly entrenched in the teachings of the Muslim Brotherhood, Ennahdha found 
comfort in the rise to power of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. Having a partner in the region 
ignited a sense of belief amongst the Ennahdha members and leadership that their brand of 
political Islam could succeed and that the people of the region were in fact supportive to a 
return to Islamic principles in government. Unlike Ennahda though, the Egyptian Muslim 
Brotherhood enjoyed a much greater margin of support and believed that it had a mandate for 
rapid change. This would prove to be the undoing of the Brotherhood in Egypt as the other half 
of the Egyptian population favoured a secular approach. The Egyptian Tamarod (Rebellion) 
movement mobilised millions to the streets of Egypt calling for the removal of the President 
Mohamed Morsi (Akhbar, 2013). When the Egyptian General Abdel-Fattah al-Sisi seized 
power in a military coup on 3 July 2013, Ennahdha’s aspirations were made that much more 
difficult.  
A support movement that started in Egypt found support amongst the youth of Tunisia and 
even before the spark of assassination ignited the opposition, Ennahdha’s popularity started to 
wane. The Tamarod movement in Tunisia found support through a petition that garnered over 
a million signatures calling for the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly and the removal of 
the Ennahdha led government. The movement accused the Assembly and Ennahda of trying to 
force Islam upon all aspects of Tunisian society (Akhbar, 2013). Rached Ghannouchi from an 
early stage dismissed the movement and its objectives, stating that Ennahdha’s conviction 
  
 
 
 
88 
towards a democratic consensus approach would ensure that the Egyptian scenario could not 
playout in Tunisia (Akhbar, 2013). 
In August 2013 Ennahdha was battling within itself on the decision of whether or not to join 
the National Dialogue. The legitimacy of Ennahdha’s victory at the polls was a strong base for 
some members of the party, while the leadership under Rached Ghannouchi were insistent on 
finishing the work that they had started (Haugbølle, Ghaliet al., p34, 2017). Following the 
meeting with BCE in Paris it appeared that there was movement in the thinking and position 
of Ennahdha. In September the roadmap was presented to all parties with the Quartet as its 
sponsor and mediator. Ennahdha reluctantly signed up to the National Dialogue, following an 
intervention by the UGTT (Carter Centre, 2014, p. 30). The roadmap would serve as a platform 
for negotiations on contentious issues which the Quartet had identified through its consultations 
with the political stakeholders. These issues covered three areas, namely the governmental, 
constitutional and electoral (Haugbølle, Ghaliet al., p35, 2017). The process of the National 
Dialogue was by no means smooth and on numerous occasions it appeared as if the process 
had failed. The main stumbling block was the resignation of the Troika and the appointment of 
a technocratic government. Ennahdha’s position all along had been that it would only 
relinquish power once the constitution was adopted. It is understandable that they would take 
this position, as it was in their political interest to be at the helm when the constitution was 
adopted, and to ensure that it was still inputting into the constitution. When the NCA resumed 
its work on 12 September 2013, Ennahda started to feel more comfortable with the National 
Dialogue process.  
The author attended a meeting with Mr Ghannouchi on 6 September 2013 wherein he reiterated 
the position of Ennahdha of having accepted a neutral government to be appointed once the 
process of drafting the constitution was completed and the Electoral Commission had been 
appointed along with an adopted electoral law. A date could then be announced for elections 
and the Ennahdha led Troika government would then step aside. Mr Ghannouchi criticised the 
opposition calls for the dissolution of the NCA as it would be of no use to do so. On the question 
of the UGTT mediation of the national dialogue, Mr Ghannouchi expressed satisfaction and 
indicated that more meetings would take place and that they would hopefully be more 
successful. Mr Ghannouchi further expressed his position that the Ennahdha Movement would 
not allow the country to descend into an Egyptian scenario, and that Tunisia remained the only 
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beacon of hope for political Islam in the region. He remained convinced that democracy and 
Islam could coexist in the region and in Tunisia in particular. 
On the 5th of October 2013 the National Dialogue was officially launched, and the parties 
engaged in the negotiations around the three aspects mentioned earlier. The governmental track 
was the most difficult as the negotiations around who would become Prime Minister were 
heated and lengthy (I.N, 2013). On 14 December 2013 Houcine Abassi of the UGTT 
announced that a vote had been taken and that Mehdi Jomaa, the former Minister of Industry 
in the Laarayedh government, would become the Prime Minister of the technocratic 
government. It is notable that Nidaa Tounes did not participate in the vote as they did not agree 
on the nomination (France24, 2013). Shortly after the agreed upon deadline of 12 January 2014, 
on 26 January 2014 the Constitution was adopted by a significant majority of 200 votes for and 
12 against, and with the electoral law in place Tunisia could head towards elections in October 
and November 2014(Haugbølle, Ghaliet al., p38, 2017). 
5.4 Ennahdha regroups and focuses on the 2014 elections 
Once Ennahdha realised that there was a real and dangerous threat of implosion in Tunisia, it 
took a decision in line with its initial political leanings following the revolution, namely that 
of consensus and compromise. This decision would ultimately suit the political Islam approach 
favoured by Ennahdha, as compromise, understanding and respect for differing views were key 
to the Islamic approach favoured by Ghannouchi. This approach, which epitomised moderate 
political Islam, was solidified during various meetings of Ennahdha’s Shura Council, whereby 
conservatives within the Ennahdha Movement were outvoted on the issue of enshrining Sharia 
in the constitution (Hamid S. , 2014, p. 200). Ennahdha would seek to strengthen its political 
position and rebuild the trust deficit which had led to its decision to concede to the demands of 
the people through the negotiated roadmap. Instead of viewing this as a defeat, Ennahdha 
decided to take lessons out of it. Its dedication to the political Islam driven project of 
democratisation would be concretised through the campaign period. 
The electoral campaign period of 2014 would prove radically different from that of 2011. The 
first difference was that there was now a stronger and more organised opposition in the form 
of Nida Tounes to contend with. Ennahdha needed to adjust its approach to the campaign. The 
Ennahdha electoral program however did not show much change from its 2011 version. 
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Ennahdha remained true to the objectives which it had set itself in 2011, and despite making 
an effort to note its achievements since 2011, it did not go into any great depth as to how it 
hoped to achieve these objectives. This could be interpreted in one of two ways. Firstly, 
Ennahdha believed that in the development of its first manifesto it had sufficiently addressed 
the challenges faced by the country and provide sufficient information as to how it would 
achieve these. In remaining true to the original manifesto, it would not create confusion and 
would also retain some of its initial support. The references to the role of Islam in society had 
therefore not changed nor had the desire to implement a process of democratisation in Tunisia. 
Secondly, Ennahdha had not been able to relate to the changing situation in the country and 
could not relate to a change in opinions towards its approach. The latter interpretation also 
raises the question of whether Ennahdha ever really wanted to return to power or was it a 
deliberate attempt to seek to rather exert influence from an opposition perspective without the 
demands of leadership and governance. 
During a seminar discussion with two leaders of Ennahdha, Mr Abdellatif Mekki and Mr Lotfi 
Oueslati hosted by the Centre for the Study of Islam and Democracy (CSID, 2014), the 
Movement’s electoral platform was unpacked. One of the main areas of focus was that of 
security. Given the country’s troubles during 2013 and into 2014, it is no surprise that this was 
one of the Movement’s priority areas. According to Mr Mekki, Ennahdha’s respect for 
fundamental rights and the rule of law would underpin a comprehensive strategy to combat not 
only terrorism but other forms of criminality, including corruption. This strategy includes a 
consolidated approach whereby there is one overarching security structure rather than the two 
structures that existed at the time, one with the Presidency and one with the Ministry of the 
Interior (CSID, 2014).  
Ennahdha’s electoral programme provided a strong impetus on economic reform and 
addressing social issues. Overall the socioeconomic reforms would form the central focus of 
the 50-page document covering the period 2015-2020. The introductory pages focused on 
achievements to date under Ennahdha’s rule. At the launch of the programme it was also 
announced that Ennahdha would not be fielding a Presidential candidate from within the party 
(Dejoui, 2014). This was a calculated decision by Ennahdha as the new constitution still 
provided very limited powers for the President, a hangover of years of autocratic presidential 
rule, and instead meant that power was vested in the Assembly of Representatives of the People 
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(ARP). Ennahdha’s focus was therefore to ensure that it obtained a strong majority in the 
legislature (Verghese, 2014). Ennahdha provided its reasons for pursuing the path of a 
consensual candidate in a statement released on 19 June 2014, citing its continued effort to 
“contribute to the protection of the democratic process and to provide the appropriate 
environment to face the major challenges facing Tunisia” (Ghannouchi M. , 2014). Ghannouchi 
continued by indicating that the consensus candidate would form part of a “national project 
based on the principle of participatory governance by building a broad central role of 
government within the framework of a national unity government that continues the major 
reforms … and guarantees political and social stability” (Ghannouchi M. , 2014). 
In an interview with the Turkish Anadolu Agency prior to the elections, Ghannouchi reiterated 
his Movement’s position regarding the need for a consensus-based approach to governance and 
having as wide as possible a governing coalition to represent all Tunisians. Ghannouchi 
emphasised the need for reconciliation as part of Ennahdha’s political Islam approach and 
philosophy. He noted the Egyptian example as both a warning and a lesson for the need to both 
not monopolize power and for reconciliation (Oguz, 2014). These statements by Ghannouchi 
show a consistency in the approach of Ennahdha since the 2011 elections. Despite the turbulent 
political and security environment between elections, Ennahdha has remained true to its 
original path. In another interview conducted by the French media house, Europe 1, 
Ghannouchi explained that Ennahdha “views the Tunisian model as an alternative to Daesh, 
and it regroups Islam and secularism, Islam and democracy and Islam and women’s rights” 
(Hoffman, 2014). He proceeded to explain that were Ennahdha to win the election it would be 
seeking the widest possible coalition and were it to come second it would not focus on 
ministerial posts, but rather focus on a consensus approach for the next 15 years to secure the 
democratic transition. 
As an observer during the Legislative and Presidential elections in 2014, the author noted that 
Tunisian electoral fatigue was a real problem for all the political parties. Out of a possible 7.5 
million potential voters, only 5.3 million eligible voters were registered for the 2014 elections, 
an increase of only 990 000 compared to the 2011 elections, and this despite two registration 
drives (National Democratic Institute, 2014). The ISIE announced the final results of the 
legislative elections on 21 November 2014, with Nida Tounes obtaining 89 seats and Ennahdha 
69. This meant that Nida Tounes obtained nearly 40% of the votes (ISIE, 2014). Ennahdha’s 
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performance while in power would ultimately be the greatest decider in determining the 
election results, the Nida Tounes party preyed on this performance during its campaign by 
calling for the population to rally its votes behind Nida Tounes rather than spreading their votes 
amongst the numerous opposition parties, under the banner of a “useful vote”, in an attempt to 
draw voters away from Ennahdha (National Democratic Institute, 2014, p. 35). 
Ennahdha accepted the outcome of the legislative election and proceeded to enter negotiations 
for a coalition government. For such a coalition to succeed Ennahdha and Nida Tounes needed 
to put aside their differences. Fortunately, the relationship that had been developed in July 2013 
between Beji Caid Essebsi and Ghannouchi would facilitate the agreement on a coalition. Nida 
Tounes however opted to wait for the outcomes of the Presidential Elections in November 2014 
before entering into serious talks about forming a government (National Democratic Institute, 
2014, p. 36).  Ennahdha needed to make several concessions, however they also felt that they 
were contributing meaningfully to the negotiation process, as is evidenced by statement 
emanating from their 34th Shura Council meeting on 11 January 2015. In the statement the 
Chairman of the Shura Council, Mr Fathi al Ayadi, indicated that “the Council expressed its 
satisfaction with the success of the transitional process, the peaceful transfer of power and the 
acceptance by all parties of the results of the elections and the integrity of the electoral 
process. Despite the great difficulties experienced by the Ennahdha Movement, it contributed 
to overcoming them by positions that sided with the supreme interests of our country and the 
objectives of the revolution of freedom and dignity expressed through dialogue and consensus” 
(Ayadi, 2015). This statement clearly aligns with the Movement’s consistent position as well 
as its understanding and interpretation of political Islam. 
In a paper he wrote for the UNDP as a contribution to a compendium on the Tunisian 
Constitution, Rached Ghannouchi reflects on the evolution of political Islam during Tunisia’s 
transition. In his overview he strongly emphasises the need for pluralism and the fact that 
Ennahdha had already adopted this approach since 1981 (Ghannouchi R. , 2016). He 
particularly refers to the dominant trends in Tunisia of moderate Islamism and moderate 
secularism and how in the view of Ennahdha any government would need to encompass both 
of the trends. In his view Ennahdha followed a cross-ideological approach which developed 
into an elaborated concept of transitory democracy in order to oppose an authoritarian and 
majoritarian approach (Ghannouchi R. , 2016). When discussing the national dialogue and the 
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constitution, he admits that Ennahdha could not surmount all the challenges, however through 
concessions and sacrifices to preserve unity and part of a realisation that exclusion and 
imposition of a majority view would not succeed in Tunisia, where he felt that the country was 
not yet ready for a system where a majority and minority existed (Ghannouchi R. , 2016). 
5.5  Conclusion 
The protests and violence which permeated Tunisia during the summer of 2013 were essentially 
the end of the period of euphoria ignited by the Arab Spring. The leadership vacuum created 
by popular protest and stagnant governance was a major causal factor in the horrific emergence 
of Islamic terrorism in Tunisia. Ennahdha did not emerge from this period unscathed. Its 
supporter base was weakened, especially in its rural strongholds, a trust deficit with its political 
partners as well as the public was created, and its resolve as a party following tenets of political 
Islam was tested. However, the 2014 elections showed that Ennahdha was still a relevant 
participant in the ongoing democratic transition of the country. The party remained true to its 
practice of seeking consensus and coalitions, ultimately forming a partnership with its fiercest 
rival, Nida Tounes. 
The reaction by the public to the assassination of Mohamed Brahmi could to a certain extent 
have been predicted by the Ennahdha led government, however the paralysis of the constituent 
assembly would have caught Ennahdha off guard. This could be seen in their reaction to the 
weeks long protests and strike action. Ennahdha’s attempts to recover the situation eventually 
led to their abdication of power in favour of an effective government of national unity. This 
also provided Ennahdha with an opportunity to regroup and assess the failures, but also 
successes in its first taste of power. Returning to the definition of political Islam and the 
conceptualisation thereof in chapter two, the 2014 electoral period provided sufficient evidence 
that Ennahdha was not only a political Islam movement, but that it was a political Islam 
movement seeking to develop an understanding of the close relationship that Islam could have 
with democracy, and that the linkages were stronger than the divergences. 
The interviews conducted with key role players in the unfolding political situation during the 
summer of 2013 provided valuable insight into the strained relations between political role 
players. Even at the time the finger pointing, and blame game were strong between Ennahdha 
and Nida Tounes. However, it becomes evident in the positions put forward by the various 
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Ennahdha leaders either in person or via the media that there was a general consensus within 
the leadership of the party that dialogue and consensus was the only way to avoid a catastrophic 
scenario. The number of concessions made by Ennahdha throughout the process of the National 
Dialogue remains significantly higher than that of the opposition. In a testimony to the moral 
principles of Ennahdha’s political Islam, the Movement and its leaders were able to look at the 
bigger picture and what was in the best interest of the people and the country, a trait which is 
often missing in Western democracies. 
The most accurate assessment of Ennahdha, especially during the turbulent years of 2013 and 
2014, is provided by the Foreign Policy website which states, “For the sake of Tunisia’s 
political transition, Ennahda has straddled a delicate line of rejecting repression, forging 
democratic legitimacy, and maintaining the mantle of Islam against those would either pervert 
or deny it — all while willingly building coalitions with other political parties” (Piser K. , 
2016). Piser is able to very accurately sum up Ennahdha’s style of political Islam. As has been 
shown in the preceding chapters, Ennahdha and its leadership went to great lengths to listen to 
the fears of the Tunisian people, to address the accusations of the opposition publicly and to 
moderate a rising tide of extremist thinking within the country’s Muslim community. During 
the period of 2013 and 2014, Ennahdha fully developed an approach to political Islam14 which 
was predominantly based upon a participatory approach and seeking widely based consensus, 
ultimately proving that the centre of the Movement, under the guidance of Rached Ghannouchi 
remained strong. 
 
 
 
                                               
 
14 Whilst falling outside the scope of this study, it should be noted that Ennahdha decided to 
split into a religious and political wing during its 2016 Party Congress. During this process the 
Ennahdha Movement also decided to rebrand itself as a Muslim Democratic party. This change 
is summarized by Rached Ghannouchi in his article, “From Political Islam to Muslim 
Democracy: The Ennahdha Party and the Future of Tunisia” which appears in Foreign Affairs 
Volume 95, Number 5 September/October 2016. This significant event requires a separate 
study and is deliberately left outside the scope of this study. 
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CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSION – POLITICAL ISLAM A VIABLE APPROACH? 
At the outset of this study the stated aim was to investigate and discuss the understanding of 
current literature on the theory of political Islam. The result of which would lead to a 
determination of the compatibility of political Islam with respect to the general principles of 
democracy. In chapter two the concept of political Islam as a political sciences theory was 
examined by first identifying its roots within the Sunni beliefs of Islam, which was the more 
politically minded sect of the faith. It was then shown that the term Islamism is preferred by 
some authors as being closer to the true meaning of political Islam (Knudsen, 2003) as well as 
the negative perceptions which exist around political Islam in the West in particular. However 
the need to have a unified definition for political Islam led to the work of Denoeux and March 
(Denoeux, 2002) (March, 2015) both of whom saw the inherent political inclinations within 
Islam, as well as the desire to apply Islamic practice and morals to democratic rule and 
governance. Denoeux was also able to show that there is flexibility in Islam that has come with 
time and evolution of the faith which allow it to mould political Islam into an Islamised 
democratic approach to governance.  
The origins of democracy and its widely accepted use were discussed prior to identifying the 
tenets of liberal democracy as the form of democracy which most closely matched the demands 
of the protestors of the Arab Spring. In order to better understand how political Islam works in 
practice, the examples of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and the AKP in Turkey were 
examined. It was important to lift out these two examples as they played a major role in 
influencing the ideological and practical approaches of Ennahdha. The initial victory of 
political Islam in Egypt gave way to a return to autocracy mainly due to an over eagerness of 
the Muslim Brotherhood to take full and total control of the state, mostly as it feared the 
persistence of the previous regimes hold on to government ministries and state institutions, but 
also in an attempt to remove the spectre of the military and its extensive footprint. As the study 
shows, the Muslim Brotherhood were seeking a more dramatic Islamisation of the state and 
erred in not taking into account that they only garnered 50% of the vote in Egypt and therefore 
did not have total support for their approach. In the context of the study it can therefore 
concluded that the approach of the Muslim Brotherhood deviated from the understanding 
developed and put forward in chapter two of political Islam and tended towards Islamisation 
with only modest elements of democratisation.  
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In Turkey a more gradual approach to the Islamisation of the state is practiced. While the 
objectives ostensibly appeared to be similar to those of the Muslim Brotherhood, the AKP 
under the leadership of Recep Tayyip Erdogan has shown a better understanding of the 
potential for political Islam to offer a majority Muslim population democratic politics 
influenced by religion. The main difficulty for the approach taken by the AKP is that it has 
gone hand in hand with a gradual degradation of rights and freedoms, in stark contrast to the 
tenets of liberal democracy. While the AKP has sought to hold regular democratic multiparty 
elections, it has managed to build up a reputation of intimidation and crowding out of the 
opposition as well as cracking down on criticism. The staunchly secular Turkish military and 
its role as the protector of secularism in Turkey has also been challenged and whittled away. 
When looking at the Turkish example it becomes more and more difficult with the passage of 
time to still see both the traces of a liberal democracy but also the principles and morals of 
Islam as understood in the definition of political Islam. These two examples present two 
different approaches to political Islam that have both met variable success. It is in the space 
between these two examples where we see the entrance of Ennahdha and its consensus-based 
approach to governance and politics, while still basing its approach on Islamic principles and 
morals. It is within the objectives of Ennahdha that we see the symbiotic relationship that can 
exist between political Islam and liberal democracy. This ability to seek the attainment of the 
relationship between democracy and Islam also provided the first signs of the potential viability 
of political Islam as an approach to democratisation in majority Muslim populated countries. 
In order to test this compatibility, the case study of Tunisia and its Ennahdha Movement was 
undertaken. It was first however critical to the study to understand the evolution of political 
Islam in Tunisia. This included an in depth look at the origins of Ennahdha and its evolution 
into the political Islam movement that would compete in Tunisia’s first democratic elections 
in 2011. The impact of the policies of both President Bourguiba and President Ben Ali on 
Ennahdha and its leadership were also covered. Of particular interest to the study was the use 
of Islam by both presidents to achieve their stated objectives. On the part of Bourguiba a policy 
of secularism or laïcité was pursued, even to the point of him defying religious practices to 
push for a more productive and competitive Tunisia. President Ben Ali initially chose to 
embrace Islamists and even allowed them to participate in elections, however when the real 
threat of a defeat to the MTI appeared imminent, he chose imprisonment, torture and 
disappearances to deal with the Islamists. This approach was also well timed with the fallout 
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following the 9/11 terrorist attack on New York and resulted in a period of apparent prosperity 
for Tunisia as a result of their President’s alliance with the USA in the fight against terrorism. 
These periods of imprisonment, torture and disappearances served to strengthen the resolve of 
many Ennahdha leaders and followers. During the period from the late 1980s to 2011 when 
much of its leadership was forced into exile, the true strength of Ennahdha started to emerge 
as it forged a strong network across Europe which eventually supported the establishment of a 
clandestine network in Tunisia to support the efforts of the leadership in Europe and also to 
start communicating the political Islam approach to democratisation which Ennahdha’s 
congresses adopted.  
Leaders such as Rached Ghannouchi arrived in Europe with strong Islamist views and were 
compelled to experience the liberal democracy of their adopted homes. Through this exposure, 
interaction with other Muslims in these countries and the belief that existing Islamist views 
needed to be challenged in order to take the faith forward started to see value in seeking an 
approach where the values of Islam could be applied to a liberal democratic state.  In order to 
even better understand the Ennahdha view of political Islam, it was necessary to delve into the 
thinking and approach of its leader Rached Ghannouchi and how he influenced what would 
become Ennahdha’s approach to a democratic Tunisia. As mentioned, Ghannouchi along with 
many other leaders spent time engaging with the Tunisian diaspora and other intellectuals while 
abroad. It is within the ambit of these encounters that Ennahdha stated to plot its course towards 
a political Islam which would see it embrace Islamic ideals of tolerance, patience, and 
consensus within a liberal democratic system which respected rights and liberties. Rached 
Ghannouchi in particular had challenged the traditional Islamist thinking around the rights of 
women and religious freedom, pointing out that these rights did not have to be in conflict with 
Islamist values (Ghannouchi R. , 2011). While there were detractors within the Ennahdha 
Movement to this approach, it was nevertheless adopted during the congresses held in Europe 
and endorsed by the Ennahdha leadership.  
It is critical to understand that during this time it was often the wives, mothers and sisters of 
Ennahdha’s leadership that had to fight the cause in Tunisia. It is highly unlikely that this strong 
showing of female members of the movement did not influence Ghannouchi and the rest of the 
leadership in exile. It is during these difficult periods under the Ben Ali regime that Ennahdha 
was able to become a social movement seeing to the needs of the poor and destitute in the often 
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neglected interior and South of the country. It is therefore no surprise that during the elections 
of 2011 and 2014 these were the major strongholds of the Movement. This level of organisation 
and the network of supporters it was able to maintain, despite being a banned movement 
contributed to the ease within which it was able to embark on an electoral programme. 
During this study of the approach of the Ennahdha Movement to electioneering, governance 
and nation building valuable insight were gained into one of the few Islamist political 
movements to have won an election and subsequently peacefully and deliberately handed over 
power to an apolitical caretaker government in the interests of national unity and peace. This 
respect for the results of elections, the transparency shown in their actions as well as seeking 
to prevent abuse of power, all tenets of liberal democracy, supported the premise that political 
Islam and democracy could coexist. 
Throughout the period covered in this study it became very clear that a dichotomy exists within 
the Tunisian population that draws a line between Islamism and secularism. As much as Tunisia 
is an almost homogenous people, politics and religion have divided it throughout its history as 
an independent state. What is evident from the research carried out is that despite the best 
efforts of successive autocratic regimes, the political influence of Islam and the Ennahdha 
Movement in particular could never be completely ignored and would be engrained into a 
significant proportion of the population.  
Consistently shown in this study has been the presence in Ennahdha, a recognised political 
Islam movement, of strong liberal democratic elements. Whether it is through the speeches of 
its leaders, the decisions of its congresses or the policies it proposed prior to the elections, the 
tenets of liberal democracy were clear to be seen. An unexpected conclusion has been that 
while its politicians may be ready for democracy, the demands of the Tunisian people during 
the difficult 2013 period resembled the governmental actions of the Ben Ali era. In this regard 
Ennahdha may be ahead of its time in seeking to propose to a Muslim majority population a 
brand of democracy which includes elements of the faith. This study has therefore succeeded 
in answering the question of compatibility of political Islam and liberal democracy but has also 
raised an important question requiring further study as to whether Muslim majority countries 
and their populations are ready for liberal democracy.  
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